Edelstein, Faegenburg & Brown, Brooklyn (
Philip S. Brown of counsel), for respondent.
Nina K., petitioner pro se.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARTIN G. KAROPKIN, J. Respondent moves for an order dismissing the instant petition for failing to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) and because an order of protection would be a duplication of remedies for the petitioner. Petitioner opposes the motion. The motion is denied for all of the reasons set forth below. the respondent's bail was revoked and the respondent was incarcerated. He was subsequently sentenced to prison. In September 2002, the respondent was placed on supervised release. One of the conditions of respondent's probation is that he "is to have no contact with his ex-wife except as necessary and authorized to facilitate his visitation rights with his son." It was the event of respondent's release from prison that caused petitioner to seek an order of protection based on the same threat that led to the revocation of respondent's release prior to sentencing in October 1998. Moreover, the respondent, if he were so inclined, has been unable to act on the threat because he was incarcerated. His recent release brings the threat into full bloom and creates an "immediate and ongoing danger" to the petitioner within the meaning of Family Court Act § 827 (a) (vii) (Swersky v Swersky, 299 AD2d 540 [2002]). This court finds that there is no duplication of remedy for the petitioner. An order of protection issued in New York State Family Courts or Criminal Courts has a specific and unique value: it is recognized by local police forces and subject to their immediate action. Conditions of parole are enforced by the Bureau of Parole which may not be available with the speed or reliability of the local police. The order of protection stands as an independent and distinct remedy for this petitioner. Motion denied. [*] Respondent pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit mail fraud and bank fraud.