Adrian P. Burke, Corporation Counsel (
Mathilda Miller of counsel), for petitioner.
Alfred E. Santangelo for respondent.
But what of the children? Respondent denies paternity of the No. 2 child. A blood-grouping test to which respondent submitted does not exclude respondent as a possible father of the No. 2 child. The testimony of the parties indicates that the opportunity for accessibility was present and existed throughout the entire period that petitioner and respondent lived together and before respondent left their home in February, 1953. Respondent has failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy attaching to the birth of the No. 2 child. Both parties admit the ceremonial marriage. Subdivision 6 of section 101 of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York provides as follows: "A child born of parents who at any time prior or subsequent to the birth of said child shall have entered into a ceremonial marriage shall be deemed the legitimate child of both parents for all purposes of this act regardless of the validity of such marriage." "For all purposes of this act" embraces the obligation for the support of child No. 1 and child No. 2. Respondent cannot escape that obligation. (
Andrews v. Andrews, 185 Misc. 970;
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 195 Misc. 366;
Gilpin v. Gilpin, 197 Misc. 319.) Respondent is ordered to pay $20 per week, beginning August 17, 1954, for the maintenance and support of child No. 1 and child No. 2. [*] Names herein are fictitious for the purposes of publication.