KAREN M. WILUTIS, J.
Felice B. Miliani, Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County, for the Defendant.
Nicole L. Gallo for Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney of Suffolk County, for the People.
KAREN M. WILUTIS, J.
Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 7 read on this submission by the People regarding a CPL § 250.10 notice
| Notice of motion and supporting papers; |
| | | Affirmation in opposition;
| | | Filed papers Affidavit in opposition to defendant's notice of psychiatric evidence (People)
1 |
| Notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence |
2 |
| Response to People's affidavit (defendant) |
3; |
| Other Order dated 10/02/2015 |
4 |
| Order dated 01/22/2016 |
5 |
| Defendant's statement dated 12/30/2014 |
6 |
| Exhibits |
7; |
| (and after hearing counsel in support of and opposed to the motion) it is, |
| ORDERED that the request of the People, which the court deems a motion to vacate defendant's notice of intention to offer psychiatric evidence, is denied. The People challenge the notice on two grounds, timeliness and relevance.
With respect to timeliness, in its order dated January 22, 2016, the court found that defendant had demonstrated an acceptable excuse for failing to serve and file his notice in timely fashion, and permitted him to serve and file an adequate notice no later than the new court date specified in the order. Defendant served and filed its notice within the time limit set by the court. In the affidavit the People have submitted, they recycle the same points they already put before the court, and which the court rejected in permitting defendant leave to serve his notice late.
With respect to relevance, defendant has indicated that at trial he will raise the issue of the voluntariness of a statement he gave to law enforcement personnel, his motion to suppress this statement having been denied by court order dated October 2, 2015 following a Huntley hearing. According to defendant's notice of intent, the psychiatric evidence will be addressed to the voluntariness issue.
CPL § 710.70(3) reads in pertinent part,
Nothing ... precludes a defendant from attempting to establish at a trial that evidence introduced by the People of a pre-trial statement made by him should be disregarded by the jury or other trier of the facts on the ground that such statement was involuntarily made ...
[T]he defendant may adduce trial evidence and otherwise contend that the statement was involuntarily made [emphasis added].
This statute is dispositive of the issue of the relevance of psychiatric evidence.
The final point raised by the People appears to be that during the Huntley hearing the court ruled that the psychiatric evidence defense sought to present would not be probative on the voluntariness issue, and that this ruling is the law of the case. The language of CPL § 710.70(3) is its own refutation of their position. Whether the evidence is probative is an issue which may be raised at trial, but the Huntley ruling of itself does not prevent defendant from attempting to offer it.