OPINION OF THE COURT
WAYNE SAITTA, J. The defendant, Daniel Moya, was arraigned in Kings County Criminal Court on February 24, 2002 and charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (1) (a), aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle, and § 509 (1), unlicensed operator. By notice of motion dated July 9, 2002, the defendant moves for an order: (1) suppressing Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV) records and observations of defendant; (2) reserving defendant's right to file further motions pursuant to CPL 255.20; and (3) for such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper. The People filed and served an affirmation in opposition dated July 26, 2002, along with a memorandum of law. Upon reading the defendant's notice of motion, the People's affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition to defendant's motion, all documents, annexed exhibits and appendices, and upon all the proceedings heretofore had herein and after due deliberation, the motion is granted to the extent of suppressing all observations and statements of defendant made after the stop of the vehicle and suppressing evidence of his DMV records. Also that part of the motion reserving defendant's rights to file further motions is granted.
Facts
The defendant was arrested on February 23, 2002 at 3:50 P.M. on Bedford Avenue in Kings County, near a garage located at 364 Bedford Avenue which was the subject of a search warrant. The issuing court found that there was "probable cause for believing that certain property, namely: a 1999 Toyota 4Runner will be found in the location" based on a Lojack search conducted by the Brooklyn North Auto Larceny Unit. The search warrant authorized the search of the garage at the location and "of any person who may be found to have such property in his possession or under his control, or to whom such property may have been delivered." The defendant was not named in the warrant. Pursuant to the execution of the search warrant, Police Officer Michael O'Rourke observed one Luis Rodriguez enter, exit and lock the garage named in the search warrant. The defendant, Daniel Moya, was observed on the street near the location working on a 1987 Volvo station wagon. Thereafter, Mr. Rodriguez entered the 1987 Volvo. Mr. Moya entered the Volvo and drove away with Mr. Rodriguez as a passenger. Officer O'Rourke stopped the Volvo and asked the defendant, Moya, for his driver's license. After the defendant stated that he did not have a driver's license, the officer conducted a check of the official computerized Department of Motor Vehicles driving records. The DMV check showed that the defendant was driving with a suspended license. It is not alleged that the defendant, Daniel Moya, entered the location subject to the search warrant at any time. It is not alleged that Rodriguez was attempting to flee from or elude the officer at the time of the stop. Further, the defendant Moya was not observed committing a traffic offense or any other criminal activity. Defense counsel submits that the inquiry into defendant's driver's license and DMV records were a direct result of an illegal stop and seizure and, therefore, the records should be suppressed. Additionally, defense counsel contends that Daniel Moya had a privacy interest in his DMV records under the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act (18 USC § 2721). Specifically, defense counsel seeks to suppress all of the defendant's DMV driving records and the identity of the defendant as the driver of the 1987 Volvo. In the alternative, the defense requests a hearing to aid the court in determining the issues raised herein. The People submit that the defendant's motion to suppress should be denied because the police possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the 1987 Volvo pursuant to the search warrant, and to investigate its occupants and any criminal activity. The issues herein are: (1) whether the police officer's stop of the 1987 Volvo constituted an illegal seizure; (2) whether the police were authorized to ask defendant for his license; and (3) whether the defendant had a privacy interest in his DMV driving records pursuant to the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act (18 USC § 2721). There is no dispute between the parties as to the underlying facts and therefore it is not necessary to hold a hearing in order to decide the motion.
Analysis
A stop of an automobile constitutes a seizure. (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 [1978].) The New York Court of Appeals has held that a police officer may stop an automobile where he defendant's records indicate he was driving with a suspended license was a direct result of the unlawful questioning. But for the questioning the officer would not have discovered records of defendant's suspensions.
Further Motions
The People did not oppose defense counsel's request to reserve the defendant's right to make further motions pursuant to CPL 255.20. Wherefore, the court finds that in questioning the defendant about his license and searching for his DMV records, the officer unreasonably exceeded the lawful scope of the stop. As such, the court grants the defense counsel's motion to suppress all observations and statements of defendant made after the stop of the vehicle, and to suppress evidence of his DMV records. The court also grants defendant's request to reserve his right to make further motions pursuant to CPL 255.20.