MAGIE, Ch.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Bill by the Standard Roller Bearing Company against the Crucible Steel Company of America. Rule to show cause why injunction should not issue. Injunction ordered on filing bond.
Martin V. Bergen, Jr., for complainant Charles D. Thompson, for defendant.
MAGIE, Ch. The right of one claiming to be a creditor to pursue his debtor in any court of competent jurisdiction selected by him ought not to be interfered with by an injunction, unless it is made to appear clearly that the alleged creditor is using the process of the courts in an inequitable and unconscionable manner. The bill in this cause is filed by the complainant to obtain an injunction restraining the defendant from further prosecuting three several actions against complainant commenced by attachment—one in the state of Wisconsin, another in the state of Michigan, and the third in the state of Ohio. Upon the filing of the bill, with accompanying affidavits, a rule to show cause why the injunction prayed for should not issue was made, with an ad interim stay. The rule was brought to hearing upon the bill and accompanying affidavits, the answer of the defendant and accompanying affidavits, and an additional affidavit presented on the part of the complainant.
It is first claimed, on the part of complainant, that the rule should be made absolute and an injunction be issued restraining the further prosecution of the actions in question, upon the ground that it is made to appear that the claim of defendant against the complainant, on which those actions are founded, has been satisfied and discharged, and cannot be rightly prosecuted to judgment therein. The accord and satisfaction thus claimed will doubtless furnish, if establish by sufficient proof, a complete defense to the complainant against the enforcement of defendant's claim in said actions, or other actions if brought. Counsel for complainant, while conceding that it had a complete defense to defendant's claim in the actions at law, insists that it may also invoke the power of equity, and relies upon decisions of our courts to sustain that contention. He cites Cornish v. Bryan, 10 N. J. Eq. 146; Smith v. Smith's Adm'rresult, was not intended to produce the result, is not within the range of belief. I think therefore that the complainant presents a case for relief.
The only question that has given me any trouble has been whether the bill is not deficient in that it does not offer to do equity. Equity will require the complainant to put the defendant in a position to enforce its claim, and in a position as favorable to that enforcement as it now possesses by means of the attachments in question. But no objection to the bill was interposed on this ground, and at the argument the complainant offered to submit to any equitable terms that should be imposed upon it, as a condition of the restraint it seeks. I think that it should be compelled to secure the defendant an opportunity for speedy trial, and the payment of whatever claim defendant establishes. If, therefore, complainant files, within 10 days a bond to the defendant in the penal sum of $8,000, with sufficient security (the form of the bond and the sufficiency of the security to be approved by Charles V. D. Joline, special master), conditioned that if defendant applies in this cause and consents to an order of reference whereby it may be determined whether the complainant is indebted to it, and, if so, for how much, or, if the defendant elects so to do, and brings an action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state upon the claim set up in the answer, that the complainant will appear to the action, plead issuably, and accept short notice of trial, and if in either way it shall be determined that the complainant owes the defendant the amount claimed, or any part thereof, that complainant will, within 20 days from the final determination, pay the amount so determined, and also the taxed costs of the defendant in this suit, and the costs of the attachments in question, upon the filing of the bond an injunction will issue restraining the further prosecution of the actions commenced by the attachments aforesaid until the further order of this court.