HAGEN, Judge
Opinion Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 161901905 Debra M. Nelson and Wojciech S. Nitecki, Attorneys for Appellant Sean D. Reyes and Jonathan S. Bauer, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred. HAGEN, Judge: ¶1 Timothy Ryan Robinson appeals his sentence for aggravated assault, arguing that the district court failed to properly resolve an inaccuracy in his presentence investigation report (PSR). Specifically, Robinson objected to the four points added to his criminal history score based on his prior conviction for assault on a police officer. In determining that the assault was a "person crime with injury" for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, the district court looked to the PSR, police report, and photographs from the prior crime and concluded that an "injury" occurred where Robinson punched the police officer in the face, causing pain and a laceration to his nose. Robinson argues that the court should not have relied on such evidence and that the court abused its discretion by finding that the injury sustained by the police officer qualified for the four-point assessment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Following an episode of domestic violence between Robinson and his wife, the State charged Robinson with several offenses, including aggravated assault. In exchange for the State dismissing six of the charges, Robinson pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, with a weapon enhancement. ¶3 At the district court's request, Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) conducted an investigation and submitted a PSR. As part of the PSR, AP&P calculated a criminal history assessment score for Robinson, which it then incorporated into the Utah Sentencing Commission's general matrix (Sentencing Matrix). The Sentencing Matrix "compare[s] a defendant's 'criminal history assessment' score with the degree of the offense of which he ha[s] been convicted" to "assist sentencing judges in deciding whether or not to incarcerate." State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 561-62 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting). ¶4 Robinson received a criminal history assessment score of eight, placing him in criminal history category III. Four of the eight criminal history points were based on Robinson's prior conviction for attempted homicide, which AP&P categorized as a "person crime with injury." When viewed in conjunction with the court stated that its decision to send Robinson to prison was not "based on those two extra points." ¶11 Robinson appeals. Although he does not challenge the ultimate sentence imposed, he asserts that his PSR "will follow him through the justice system" and seeks "a remand for the purpose of correcting the inaccuracy in his PSR."
This category no longer appears in the Utah Sentencing Guidelines. "The distinction between prior person crimes with or without injury has been replaced with a specific number for a specific type of offense by severity." Utah Sentencing Comm'n, Adult Sentencing & Release Guidelines 1 (2017), https://justice.utah.gov/Sentencing/Guidelines/Adult/2017%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶12 Robinson raises two sentencing issues on appeal, one procedural and one substantive. As to the procedural issue, he contends that the district court failed to comply with its legal duty to properly resolve the alleged inaccuracy contained in the PSR. "Whether the [district] court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Waterfield, 2014 UT App 67, ¶ 29, 322 P.3d 1194 (quotation simplified). Robinson also argues that the court erred in relying on unreliable police reports and photographs to resolve his objection. Whether the court based its sentencing decision on reliable information also "presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, ¶ 24, 94 P.3d 295. ¶13 Substantively, Robinson contends that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the injury sustained by the police officer rendered that conviction a "person crime with injury." This sentencing determination resulted in a higher criminal history assessment score. District courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, and we will reverse a sentencing decision only if the court abused its discretion. See State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 34, 282 P.3d 985. "This court reviews the sentencing decisions to discover any abuse of discretion by applying varying standards of review consistent with the issues raised." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). For questions of law, we employ a correctness standard. See id. at 50. We review questions of fact for clear error. See id.
ANALYSIS
I. Procedural Challenge
¶14 Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a), "[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in the [PSR], which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). To resolve such issues, the district court must: (1) "consider the objection raised;" (2) "make findings on the record regarding the accuracy of the information at issue;" and (3) "determine on the record the relevance of that information as it relates to sentencing." State v. Abelon, 2016 UT App 22, ¶ 19, 369 P.3d 113 (quotation simplified). ¶15 At sentencing, Robinson objected to the PSR's calculation of his criminal history assessment score. Specifically, Robinson claimed that his prior conviction for assault on a police officer did not qualify as a "person crime with injury," which carried a four-point assessment. Robinson argued that assessing four points was only "rational when . . . someone is convicted or pleads guilty to an offense which requires as an element some type of injury, [and] this isn't such an offense." ¶16 The district court considered Robinson's objection and made findings on the record that Robinson's prior conviction qualified as a person crime with injury for purposes of calculating his criminal history score. On appeal, Robinson challenges the court's use of the police report and photographs from the prior offense in making that determination. Whether it was permissible for the court to look to this evidence to categorize the prior conviction involves two sub-issues, only the first of which was preserved. First, we consider whether the district court ¶27 Robinson has cited no authority to support the proposition that police reports and photographs generated during the investigation of a prior offense do not meet this threshold standard of reliability. Instead, he cites cases concerning the reliability of police reports for purposes of determining their admissibility under the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983) (concluding that police reports made in anticipation of prosecution and offered by the State do not provide a basis for reliability required under the business records exception); Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (extending Bertul to an incident report introduced at a probation revocation hearing where the district court applied the Utah Rules of Evidence). But it is well established that "[e]vidence that is inadmissible at the guilt stage may be admissible for the purpose of sentencing." Howell, 707 P.2d at 117. "The rules of evidence in general, and the rules on hearsay exclusions in particular, are inapplicable in sentencing proceedings." State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); see also Utah R. Evid. 1101(c) (providing that the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing). The cases Robinson cites, which involve the application of the business records exception to the hearsay rule, are similarly inapplicable in the sentencing context. ¶28 "For an error to be obvious to the trial court, the party arguing for the exception to preservation must show that the law governing the error was clear or plainly settled at the time the alleged error was made." State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21, 416 P.3d 443 (quotation simplified). In the absence of any authority suggesting that police reports and photographs relating to a prior conviction are inherently unreliable for purposes of sentencing, Robinson cannot establish that the district court plainly erred in relying on such evidence.
We note that the United States Supreme Court has adopted a categorical approach to determining whether a prior offense triggers an enhanced sentence under federal recidivism statutes. Under this approach, a court may look "only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). Lower courts have extended this approach to enhancements under the federal sentencing guidelines based on prior convictions, see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2016), and some states have applied the categorical approach to their own recidivism statutes as well, see, e.g., State v. Dickey, 329 P.3d 1230, 1240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
However, a criminal history assessment under the Utah Sentencing Guidelines does not function as a sentencing enhancement. Robinson's thirddegree felony conviction with the weapons enhancement carried a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 763203(3),203.8(2) (LexisNexis 2017), regardless of how his prior conviction for assault on an officer was characterized. Therefore, the court's determination that Robinson's prior conviction involved injury had no impact on the statutorily prescribed sentence. We express no opinion on whether the categorical approach would apply if the classification of Robinson's prior conviction had subjected him to an increased penalty.
II. Substantive Challenge
¶29 In addition to the procedural claims addressed above, Robinson raises a substantive challenge to the district court's result of the incident, the district court, as the finder of fact, was entitled to resolve apparent conflicts in the evidence. See State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d 644 ("It is the role of the factfinder to examine and resolve such conflicts."). This conflict alone does not render the court's finding clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
¶36 We conclude that the district court properly resolved the alleged inaccuracy in the PSR and did not abuse its discretion in assessing four criminal history points for Robinson's prior assault conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.