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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAHSHON WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 13 CR 17653 Honorable Maura Slattery Boyle, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine or object to evidence. Defendant failed to properly preserve his claims of prejudicial closing argument by the State or judicial bias; they do not rise to the level of plain error and are forfeited. The fines and fees order is corrected to reflect vacation of the Electronic Citation Fee, the Court System Fee, and the Trauma Fund Fee, as well as $115 of $5-per-day presentence custody credit toward the imposed fines. ¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Nahshon Williams was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2012)) and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to challenge the admission of a mask he allegedly dropped during a police chase; (2) the State's closing argument prejudiced him and was plain error when it improperly argued that he was going to use the mask and gun to commit another crime; (3) the trial court's improper comments and conduct towards defense counsel denied him a fair trial; and (4) certain fines and fees were improperly assessed and should be vacated. For the following reasons, we affirm and correct the fines and fees order.

The record on appeal and most trial documents list defendant's name spelled as "Nashon." However, the notice of appeal, completed by defendant, lists his name spelled as "Nahshon;" we will use this spelling.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was initially charged with being an armed habitual criminal and multiple counts of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon and aggravated UUW. The State subsequently nol prossed the UUW counts and proceeded to trial on the armed habitual criminal charge. ¶ 5 The following facts adduced at trial are not in dispute. ¶ 6 At trial, Chicago Police Officers David Carey, Nick Kakos and Detective Robert Vahl all testified that they were on patrol in an unmarked squad car on August 5, 2013, at approximately 7:21 p.m. near 5324 South Aberdeen Street. Officer Kakos was driving, Officer Carey was in the front passenger seat and Detective Vahl was in the back passenger seat. Officer Carey saw defendant standing next to a parked car in a vacant lot at that location, facing the officers, and the ¶ 14 The State argued in closing that defendant's possession of the mask was linked to a possible future crime and when the officers encountered him that evening they prevented defendant from committing that crime. The State also said that Officer Carey and Detective Vahl separately testified that they saw defendant place what they thought was a gun in a car and two minutes later Officer Carey retrieved a gun from that car. The State lastly argued that it only needed to prove that defendant had a gun that night to convict him of the armed habitual criminal charge and gave an explanation of the difference between actual and constructive possession in regards to an armed habitual criminal charge. ¶ 15 The defense argued in closing that the police officers' collective testimonies were not credible. During defense counsel's closing argument, the trial court sustained several objections to statements regarding discrepancies within the contents of the officers' police reports. In sustaining the objections, the court stated that the reports were not relevant as part of the evidence. ¶ 16 The jury convicted defendant of being an armed habitual criminal. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, contending that the trial court had been prejudiced against him and denied him a fair trial, which was denied. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to challenge the admission of a mask he allegedly dropped when officers encountered him and when counsel failed to object to the State's closing arguments about the mask; (2) the State's closing argument prejudiced him and was plain error when it improperly argued that he was going to use the gun and mask to commit another crime; (3) the trial court's improper comments and conduct towards defense counsel during the trial and closing arguments denied him a fair trial; and (4) certain fines and fees were improperly assessed and should be vacated.

¶ 19 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 20 Defendant first contends that various errors by his trial counsel denied him effective assistance of counsel, including: (1) the failure to seek a motion in limine to exclude the mask as evidence; (2) the failure to object to the State's introduction of the mask at trial; and (3) the failure to object to the State's closing arguments which suggested the mask was evidence of a future potential crime. ¶ 21 In determining whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, this court applies the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), as adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, People v. Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d 332, 346 (2010). More specifically, the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 346. The failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 346. ¶ 26 Since we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the mask, we need not decide whether counsel's performance was so deficient that it affected the outcome of trial. Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 346. ¶ 27 We reach the same result with respect to defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to irrelevant testimony and arguments regarding the mask at trial. Trial counsel's decision to object to testimony is generally a matter of trial strategy that is entitled to great deference and does not amount to ineffective assistance. People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 102354, ¶ 71. During closing arguments, the prosecutor may comment on the evidence and on any fair and reasonable inference the evidence may yield, even if it reflects negatively on defendant. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 347 (2007). A reviewing court will find reversible error only if defendant shows that the improper remarks were so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the verdict resulted from error. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 347. ¶ 28 Defendant cannot reasonably argue that defense counsel's failure to object to testimony or closing arguments concerning the mask denied him real justice or resulted in an erroneous verdict. We have already concluded that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to file a motion to exclude the mask because the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal. It follows then that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony and closing arguments regarding the mask because defendant suffered no prejudice.

¶ 29 B. Prosecutor's Improper Closing / Judicial Bias

¶ 30 Defendant next contends that the prosecutor improperly stated during closing argument that he planned to use the mask to commit a future, more dangerous crime and made improper the trial court explained that it reviewed defendant's bail and found that while the original amount was appropriate for the lesser UUW and aggravated UUW counts, it was inappropriate for the Class X felony of armed habitual criminal because when [the court] previously served in bond court, bonds for Class X felonies started at $125,000. Defendant fails to show that the trial court's sua sponte decision to increase his bail, which is allowable under the Criminal Code, was error, and thus we decline to review this issue under plain-error. ¶ 39 Next we examine defendant's claim that the trial court threatened him with a Batson challenge which also showed hostility towards defense counsel and tainted the proceedings. A trial court has standing to raise a Batson preemptory challenge issue against a party sua sponte in certain circumstances. People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349, 365 (2008). However, the trial court in this case never raised a Batson challenge against defendant as shown by the record. ¶ 40 During the juror challenge portion of voir dire, the trial court noted that defense counsel used his peremptory challenges to strike white women from the jury. A discussion was then held off the record. At the end of the first day of trial, outside of the jury's presence, the trial court clarified as follows:

"[I]f you want to inject error, I suggest I have acted completely in compliance with the law. I never called out a Batson on you. I called out what you were doing on record and said based on the next round, I would have to determine whether or not there would be one as you excused six white women * * *."
¶ 48 In sum, none of the complained-of instances of judicial conduct during the proceedings below constituted error that was a material factor in the conviction and deprived defendant of a fair trial. It follows then that they do not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to invoke application of the plain-error doctrine. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 612.

725 ILCS 5/110-6 was amended on January 1, 2018, but this amendment does not affect the section applicable to this case. --------

¶ 49 C. Assessed Fines and Fees

¶ 50 Finally, defendant contends that four of the fines and fees assessed against him are invalid and must be vacated. These assessments are a $25 Court Services Fee, a $5 Electronic Citation Fee, a $5 Court System Fee and a $100 Trauma Fund Fee. While the defendant did not raise this assessment issue before the trial court or in his motion for a new trial, the State does not object to this issue and concedes that three of the costs were improperly assessed and should be vacated. The State disagrees, however, that the $25 court services assessment should be vacated, and defendant concedes as such in his reply brief. ¶ 51 Our court has the authority to modify fees, fines, and costs under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(1), which allows this court to modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1963). ¶ 52 The Electronic Citation Fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3e (West 2014)) only applies to certain traffic violations, and does not apply to felony convictions; thus it must be vacated. The Court System Fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(a) (West 2014)) only applies to convictions for violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code or "violations of similar provisions contained in county or municipal ordinances ***" which is not applicable here. Thus, the Court System Fee must be vacated. The Trauma Fund Fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.10 (West 2014)) only applies to "violation[s] of Sections 24-1.1, 24-1.2, or 24-1.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012." As the jury convicted defendant under section 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2014) of the Criminal Code, and section 5/5-9-1.10 does not authorize a fine under this section, it must be vacated. ¶ 53 The Court Services Assessment (55 ILCS 5/5-1103 (West 2014)) applies to convictions in all criminal cases, as stated in People v. Adair, 406 Ill. App. 3d 133, 144 (2010), and should remain. ¶ 54 Defendant also correctly asserts that he is entitled to a presentence incarceration credit for 530 days before sentencing amounting to a $2650 credit. See 725 ILS 5/110-14(a) (West 2014). In addition to the previously credited Mental Health Court Fine ($10), the Youth Diversion / Peer Court Fine ($5), the Drug Court Fine ($5), and the Children's Advocacy Center Fine ($30), he contends that two fines, a $15 State Police Operations Fee and a $50 Court System Fee, were incorrectly noted as unable to be offset. The State concedes that these two fines may be added to others the court already allowed to be offset, and we agree. See People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 150146, ¶¶ 36-37. Defendant is thus entitled to a credit of $115 against all fines imposed, including the State Police Operations Fee and Court System Fee.

¶ 55 CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and modify the fines and fees order. ¶ 57 Affirmed; fines and fees order modified.

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People v. Williams
(Dec 14, 2018)