MUNDER, J.
Solomon Raffe for plaintiff. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Wendell P. Brown, Francis R. Curran and George Grau of counsel), for Industrial Commissioner, defendant. MUNDER, J. This is an action under article 15 of the Real Property Law, for the determination of claims to real property. The plaintiff purchased the premises in question on November 28, 1951, from the County of Suffolk. The county had acquired the title through a tax sale on November 23, 1948, for unpaid taxes for the year 1947-1948. The defendant, Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, pursuant to section 573 of the Labor Law, caused a warrant for unpaid unemployment contributions to be docketed in the judgment docket of the Suffolk County Clerk on June 24, 1948, against the then record owner of the real property in question. These unemployment contributions assessed against an employer pursuant to the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law (Labor Law, art. 18) are taxes. (W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc., v. Andrews, 159 Misc. 124, mod. on other grounds, 271 N.Y. 1.) Both plaintiff and the Industrial Commissioner have moved for judgment on the pleadings. quoted, such preference became a part of the common law of our state, and is so continued under our present Constitution." Judge BRANDEIS, in Marshall v. New York (254 U. S. 380, 382) said: "The priority could be defeated or postponed only through the passing of title to the debtor's property, absolutely or by way of lien, before the sovereign sought to enforce his right". Judge CONWAY, in Matter of Gruner (supra, p. 524), quoted with approval the following from the English decision of Giles v. Grover (9 Bing. 128, 156): "`If, however, the right of the subject be complete and perfect before that of the king commences, it is manifest that the rule does not apply, for there is no point of time at which the two rights are in conflict; nor can there be a question which of the two ought to prevail in a case where one, that of the subject, has prevailed already. But if whilst the right of the subject is still in progress toward completion, the right of the crown arises, it seems to me that the two rights do come into conflict together at one and the same time, and that the consequence in that case is that the right of the crown ought to prevail.'" No statute is needed to create the prerogative right or to preserve it once it exists. It takes express legislation to extinguish the right. (Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Dinowitz, 179 Misc. 278.) It appears then that the clause in section 154 of the Tax Law, saving the liens of the State or county, at least insofar as tax liens are concerned, is simply a restatement of the common-law rule. The absence of the clause from section 53 of the Suffolk County Tax Act, does not destroy the sovereign prerogative. The claim of the Industrial Commissioner in the present case, having been perfected by the issuance and docketing of a warrant before the conveyance by the County Treasurer, it is a subsisting lien and not extinguished by the transfer of title. Nor was the county's tax claim, for default in the payment of which the sale was held and the subsequent deed given by the County Treasurer, superior to that of the State (County of Nassau v. Lincer, 165 Misc. 909, revd. 254 App. Div. 746, affd. 280 N.Y. 662; Village of Garden City v. Roeder, 165 Misc. 928, revd. 254 App. Div. 747, affd. 280 N.Y. 663). It follows then that the motion of plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings must be denied and that of the defendant, Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, as lienor, granted, without costs.