People v. Youngs

W. PATRICK FALVEY, J. submit to the chemical test under the facts herein. They argue that there is no constitutional Sixth Amendment right to counsel at this stage of the proceedings. (People v Shaw, 72 NY2d 1032 [1988].) The court notes that the defendant relies on the rationale of People v Iannopollo (131 Misc 2d 15 [1983]). However, that case was decided before Shaw (supra) which makes Iannopollo invalid regarding the case at bar. The People further assert that the holding in People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224) requires the court to determine if defendant's request to consult with his lawyer would have substantially interfered with their procedure. Here, since defendant was in custody, police procedures required that he remain under the control of an officer at all times. Thus, the officers could not leave the defendant alone to speak to his attorney by phone. In reply, defendant argues that the defendant is entitled to a confidential, meaningful and effective communication with his attorney, and People v Iannopollo (131 Misc 2d 15 [1983]) is instructive on this issue, even though the right to counsel is statutory and not constitutional. Clearly, People v Shaw (72 NY2d 1032, 1033 [1988]) limited People v Iannopollo (supra) when the Court ruled: "The Sixth Amendment does not require that the defendant be afforded counsel at this stage in the proceedings." Furthermore, although a defendant, in deciding whether to consent to a chemical test, has the right to access an attorney, the Court of Appeals in People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224 [1968]) sets forth a limitation of such right to, "if such access does not interfere unduly with the matter at hand." (Id. at 227.) Here, and as distinguished from Iannopollo (supra), the People provided proof at the Huntley hearing (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]) as to why the defendant was not allowed a private conversation with his attorney. The defendant was in custody, and there was no cell or other appropriate holding area at the police station where the defendant could be allowed to speak to his attorney in private while at the same time being adequately subjected to such custody. Thus, the court concludes that private access to the defendant's attorney would have unduly interfered with the matter at hand. Therefore, the lower court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the results of the chemical test. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.