Richard Korn, Long Island City, for defendant.
William L. Murphy, District Attorney of Richmond County, Staten Island (
Keri Caden of counsel), for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WILLIAM E. GARNETT, J. The defendant moves to dismiss the charges of endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]) for the failure of the People to have afforded him a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. Inasmuch as the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of up to one year in jail, the applicable speedy trial period is 90 days. (CPL 30.30 [1] [b].) of its readiness, for the prosecutor did absolutely nothing to inform the defense that it was ready on June 23rd. However, a reading of Kendzia (supra) suggests that the notification must be made as soon as possible to satisfy the promptness requirement. Waiting until the next court date does not satisfy this requirement. If subsequent service in court were permissible, then the viability of the People's statement would be dependent upon the length of the next adjournment. Would six days, seven days, etc., be satisfactory to satisfy the requirement that the defense be promptly notified? This subjective exercise would simply be inconsistent with the rationale that a statement of trial readiness should be, at least, the rough equivalent of a statement of trial readiness in open court. When the statement is made in court, the defense is simultaneously informed. The Court of Appeals in Kendzia (supra) endorsed an alternate mechanism for such a statement of trial readiness which, in this court's judgment, would not brook a delay in service on the defense until the next trial date. The Court of Appeals described the alternate means of notification of trial readiness as "a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk." (People v Kendzia, supra, at 337 [emphasis added].) Such language suggests, if not mandates, that the notice be sent nearly simultaneously to the defense and the court. Thus, respectfully, this court declines to follow the holding in Cenat (supra). After reviewing the three theories of exclusion proffered by the People for the June 19th adjournment, at least seven days of delay are chargeable to the People. To date, at least 91 days of delay are chargeable to the People's 90-day trial readiness period. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 is granted. [Portions of opinion omitted for purposes of publication.]