violence counseling as a sanction, it is not punitive in nature, since its purpose is to ameliorate the roots of discord in the family and is not "so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes `punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." (United States v Halper, 490 US 435, 443.) The punitive sanction addressed in People v Wood (supra) functions only when a defendant violates a provision of a dispositional order and is returned to the court pursuant to a new petition alleging that violation (Family Ct Act § 846). At that point, the punitive sanctions available under Family Court Act § 846-a trigger the double jeopardy concerns discussed in Wood. Here, since no punitive sanction is authorized upon disposition of the petition under Family Court Act § 841, prosecution of the same act in a criminal venue does not constitute double jeopardy. The defendant's motion is denied.