John R. Parrinello for appellant.
R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CRAIG J. DORAN, J. The appellant in the above-captioned action has filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction of the Town Court, Town of Richmond, rendered on the 19th day of January it a criminal action. The Court of Appeals in Matter of Darvin M. v Jacobs (supra at 959) determined that a probation revocation is a "criminal proceeding" brought after the completed "criminal action." "Its purpose is to determine if defendant's subsequent acts violate the conditions of the original sentence not whether the acts constitute a crime" (Matter of Darvin M. v Jacobs, supra at 959). Similarly, a violation of a conditional discharge, as presented herein, must be determined not to be a crime in and of itself, but rather a violation of a condition of the original sentence. As such, a conditional discharge is a revocable sentence and not a lawful process or mandate of a court that upon which a criminal contempt charge may be premised. Based upon the foregoing, this court determines that the charge of criminal contempt in the second degree was not proper and should be dismissed. The defendant's conviction of the same shall be vacated. With respect to the defendant's conviction for harassment in the second degree, the defendant asserts that the information was jurisdictionally defective. This court determines that the information was not defective. Given the court's decision regarding the crime of criminal contempt, this court need not address the defendant's argument that CPL 340.40 prohibited the bifurcated proceeding which took place in the instant matter. Harassment in the second degree, a violation, does not constitute an offense for which the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. With respect to the remaining issues, this court either finds them without merit, or moot in light of the findings made herein. Based upon the foregoing, the judgment is hereby modified by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal contempt in the second degree and vacating the sentence imposed thereon and, as modified, the judgment is affirmed.