PITNEY, V. C.
Bill for injunction by Robert Fair and the Trustees of the Bloomingdale Methodist Episcopal Church against the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Bloomingdale and others. Granted.
George Biller, for complainants.
Ralph Shaw, for defendants.
PITNEY, V. C. (orally). The question in this cause, it seems to me, is fully stated by me in my opinion when the case was previously before the court (42 Atl. 166), namely, whether the complainant corporation, the Trustees of the Bloomingdale Methodist Episcopal Church, is the trustee of the true society or association,—the same society and association that originally worshipped in this church the title to which is here in controversy.
If so, then the complainant corporation is entitled to its possession, and it has properly brought its suit for the benefit of its cestuis que trustent.
The trustees compose the corporation that holds the legal title for the benefit of the association. I call it the association; it is a collection of individuals who worship in a particular place, in a particular manner. Now, it is perfectly evident that the intention of Mr. Martin John Ryerson was to convey that property in Bloomingdale to trustees,—individual trustees, unincorporated persons,—for the benefit of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America, to be used as a place of worship, under the "discipline" and regulations then in force, or which might thereafter come in force, of that great organization. That, organization accepted it, and made a church of it; appointed a clergyman to preach there; put it within the Newark Conference,—I believe I am right about that; and it was under the care and control-ecclesiastical control—of the Newark Conference until the year 1897,—all without any formal, legal incorporation. At that time it was under the pastorate, I believe, of the Reverend Mr. Kieffer, and the church edifice had become too small, and it was inconveniently located. The greater part of the congregation came from across the river, in Morris county, from the town called Butler, then growing up and getting to be a large manufacturing town. A gentleman by the name of Butler, who was one of the original proprietors of the town of Butler, proposed to give the association a lot in Butler on which to erect a church. And Mr. Kieffer, the pastor, conferred with the members of the congregation, and found that a large majority of the congregation, as he says, was in favor of moving over there; and they took the title to a tract of land in Butler, in the name of individual trustees, without any incorporation, to be used for the building of a church, and a parsonage I believe. Is that right?
Counsel: Yes, sir.
The Court: Then, in order to procure means to build their church and parsonage, they proposed to sell the old property to Mr. Fair. Now, whether they succeeded in conveying even the equitable title, it is not necessary for me here to determine. They did call a meeting, and took a vote of the congregation upon that matter; and I do not find it necessary to determine whether that meeting was held strictly in accordance with the canons of the church, and whether everybody was permitted to vote that was entitled to vote. I have no doubt, however, that it was properly called and conducted. The pastor stated that only oaree persons, I think, offering themselves to vote were refused. The majority of the meeting, at least two-thirds,—I think a little more than that,—was in favor of selling the church property and moving to Butler. The point of the affair, in this connection, is that it was an expression of a desire on the part of the majority of that congregation to move over to Butler. An attempt was made to convey the old property to Mr. Fair by their trustees. I shall assume that that attempt failed. But Mr. Fair was put in possession, and executed a mortgage back to the church; and part of the resolution of that meeting, or of the trustees afterwards, was that that mortgage should be held by the church for the purpose of paying the expenses of their new work at Butler. This shows there is not the least glimpse of an intention here to divert the proceeds of the sale from the purpose named in the original donation of it to the purposes of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Those facts, as I now recollect, did not all appear distinctly in the affidavits before me on the original application for an injunction, but I had to infer that that was the intention of the church; but it now appears that it was the intention. It further appears that the discipline of the church then in force provided for such a sale and alienation of church property, so that the alienation, if effectual, was not a breach of the original trust upon which the property was conveyed, because that trust declared that the property should be held according to the discipline of the church then or thereafter in force. Mr. Fair was put in possession by the dignitaries—the governing power—of the church, before it was incorporated. Subsequently there was an incorporation, of which I shall speak directly, and he has continued there by the consent of everybody in authority in that association.
Now, it is alleged by complainant that the association went over to Butler, and located itself there, and the question is whether it did or not. Now, I think that the proof is that a large majority did go there, and the proof is that the organization that located itself in Butler was recognized by the Newark Conference—the bishop and the governing power-as the true Bloomingdale Church, as the true successor of the old church. I find the proof is quite clear on that subject, and that those who stayed behind, and attempted to continue the orgauization, and to be the true Bloomingdale Church, were refused recognition by the church dignitaries. They attempted to obtain it They appointed committees to wait on the higher dignitaries, and obtain recognition, but they got no comfort. They got no recognition whatever. They were treated as seceders.
Now, in the absence of clear proof that the church dignitaries were wrong in that, and did not proceed according to the discipline, I think that this court is bound by the action of those dignitaries; because we must bear in mind at all times what the original trust was, and the original trust was for the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, subject to the discipline and government of the church for the time being.
Now, can I recognize, even though I thought— Suppose I thought, as I do not that the Newark Conference made a mistake;would that justify me in recognizing the minority as the real association, and not the majority, that the church recognized? If I did, I would be going, as it seems to me, against the terms of the trust declared in the deed, which distinctly puts the church under the control of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States of America. But I think that the evidence is clear that the majority did go there, and that they are the real persons who are the cestuis que trustent of that property, and that the party represented by the defendant corporation is the minority.
Now, the party represented by the defendant met and organized under the law, and appointed trustees, and were incorporated. That fact alone was not sufficient to make them the true representatives and successors of the old church; otherwise, a dozen people here in the Presbyterian Church in Morristown might give a notice, and call a few people in, and organize themselves as trustees. That will not do. While the statute is silent, I am of opinion that it must appear that the persons claiming themselves to be trustees do really represent the majority of the congregation. That is what must appear. Now, the old church party were organized first. After what I will call the "seceders" were organized, the others—the majority, who went to Butler —became a corporation, or had their trustees become a corporation, under the statute, and the corporation thus organized is here, with a standing in court. Now, I hold this: that it has the equitable title to these premises. Now, who has the legal title? It is either in the heirs of Ryerson, or it is in this corporation that was attempted to be incorporated by the defendants. The heirs of Ryerson were not made parties here. The heirs of Ryerson had made a deed, at any rate, to the defendant corporation, and for present purposes the defendant corporation must be treated as a corporation, and the legal title is in it And the complainant corporation says: "I am entitled to that legal title, and you must not enforce it against my tenant, Mr. Fair; he is my tenant by sufferance." I think the complainant is entitled to that relief, and a perpetual injunction against an action of ejectment. In other words, I decide the case, on all hands, in favor of the complainant,—the complainant church. The decree will be that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from interfering with the possession, and that they convey, if that is among your other reliefs prayed for.
Mr. Shaw: No prayer, I think, that they convey.
The Court: There is a prayer, I think, for other relief.
(After discussion.) There will be a perpetual injunction, and the defendants are, at the request of the complainant the Methodist Episcopal Church of Bloomingdale, directed to convey the title to Robert Fair. I think Robert Fair has standing in court as the tenant of the complainant, even if there has been no title made to him,—as appointee of the complainant. The resolution of the church authorities, and the deed made by the trustees, operate as an appointment,—as a direction to the holders of the legal title to make the title to Fair. You may just state that the complainant Robert Fair, by the direction and at the instance of the complainant church, is entitled to the deed of conveyance.