People v. Wilson

ROCHFORD

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

PRESIDING JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

¶ 1 Held: Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of forgery based on deposit of forged check; admission of prior conviction was harmless error and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defendant from questioning witnesses regarding his actions after the check was deposited.
¶ 2 On March 25, 2010, defendant Henry Wilson deposited a check in the amount of $508.98, made payable to Yolanda Martin by the office of the Illinois State Treasurer, into his personal Chase Bank account. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of forgery based on this transaction, and was sentenced to 24 months' probation. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with a prior conviction and, alternatively; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this impeachment evidence. Defendant also argues the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from questioning witnesses regarding his voluntary restitution to Chase Bank. We affirm.

¶ 4 The bench trial was conducted on May 17, 2011, and the following evidence was presented. ¶ 5 Yolanda Martin had resided at 1817 West 77th Street, in Chicago for over 7 years. Ms. Martin received a bimonthly check in the amount of $508.98 from the office of the Illinois State Treasurer (treasurer's office). The checks were delivered by mail to her address on the 5th and 19th of each month. On April 5, 2010, Ms. Martin discovered that she had not received her anticipated check. Ms. Martin called the treasurer's office and was informed that the check had been mailed. ¶ 6 Ms. Martin identified People's exhibit number 1 as the April 5 check she had never received. The check bore her name and address on 77th Street. Ms. Martin did not know defendant and had not given him permission to take the check and deposit it into his personal account. ¶ 7 Jerry Phillips testified that he investigates financial crimes for the United States Postal Service. In April 2010, he received a call from Ms. Martin about her missing check. Inspector Phillips later discovered that Ms. Martin's address had been changed to 5818 South Carpenter Street, rear apartment, Chicago, through the United States Postal Service online change-of-address system. He learned from the treasurer's office that Ms. Martin's missing check had been sent to the Carpenter Street address and cashed at Chase Bank. Ms. Martin informed Inspector Phillips that she had not requested the change of address. Inspector Philips identified People's exhibit number 2 as a printout of the form which changed Ms. Martin's address. ¶ 8 Inspector Phillips contacted Chase Bank and requested information regarding the person who had cashed the check. Chase Bank provided Inspector Phillips with defendant's account information and surveillance photographs that had been taken of defendant at the Chase Bank ATM located at 87th and Halsted Streets where he deposited the check and withdrew cash. Inspector Phillips compared the surveillance photographs with defendant's driver's license picture, then contacted Chicago police detective Sandy Byrant. the check cleared, defendant kept $90-which Tonya owed him for his work on her car-then he gave her the rest of the money. Defendant denied telling anyone that he thought the check was fraudulent, but that the conflicting information printed on the check did raise some doubts. After he deposited the check, defendant was contacted by Chase Bank. When defense counsel inquired as to what defendant did based on that communication from Chase Bank, the State objected. The trial court sustained the objection finding the question was related to defendant's activity after the transaction which was the basis of the forgery charge. ¶ 12 When defendant met with Detective Bryant and Inspector Phillips, he learned that Tonya was not Yolanda Martin. He then informed them that Tonya, and not Ms. Martin, had given him the check. ¶ 13 In rebuttal, without objection, the State introduced evidence that defendant had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 2000 (case number 00 CR 1250) and sentenced to probation, which was terminated satisfactorily on June 7, 2002. ¶ 14 The trial court found defendant guilty of forgery. In doing so, the trial court noted: defendant knew the check was written to Yolanda Martin; observed Tonya endorse the check as Yolanda Martin; and, despite his doubts and suspicions, and without asking any questions regarding the check, he deposited it and received a portion of the proceeds. The trial court ruled it was "certainly clear" that the State proved defendant guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 15 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 months' felony probation. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 17 Defendant first argues the State failed to prove him guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to establish he had knowledge of the fraud and intended to defraud Ms. Martin or Chase Bank. Defendant contends his behavior indicates no consciousness of guilt. He made no attempt to conceal his identity, deposited the check at a bank he frequents, and did not to defraud whether payment or restitution is subsequently made. Cundiff, 16 Ill. App. 3d at 272; Bormet, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 426. Thus, any actions by defendant after the forgery to rectify the wrong are irrelevant. Cundiff, 16 Ill. App. 3d at 271-72; People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 371-72 (1994). We find no abuse of discretion by the court in sustaining the State's objection to questions regarding defendant's actions after issuing and delivering the fraudulent check.

¶ 33 In sum, we conclude the State proved defendant guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of defendant's prior conviction was harmless error, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the prior conviction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting questioning regarding any restitution made by defendant. ¶ 34 Affirmed.