Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA

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Docket Number

11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP)

Judges

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion (Docket No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP), dated February 14, 2012) addresses Plaintiffs' appeal of United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck's discovery rulings from January 4, 2012 and Plaintiffs' request for an emergency conference to discuss Judge Peck's February 8, 2012 rulings. The case caption identifies Monique Da Silva Moore and others as Plaintiffs and Publicis Groupe SA and MSL Group as Defendants. Plaintiffs challenged Judge Peck's January 4 rulings as (1) issued without an opportunity to brief their disputes, (2) limiting the temporal scope of discovery so it does not cover the full liability period, and (3) appearing to relieve MSL Group from producing employment data previously compelled by a prior district judge. The district court reviewed the submissions and transcripts from the January 4 and February 8 proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Magistrate Judge Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings were "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" such that the district court should reverse them.
Whether Plaintiffs' request for an emergency conference to address Judge Peck's February 8, 2012 rulings should be granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

They were not given an opportunity to brief their discovery disputes before Judge Peck issued his rulings.
Judge Peck limited the temporal scope of discovery in a manner that does not cover the full liability period.
Judge Peck's rulings appear to relieve MSL Group from producing employment data that had been previously compelled by the prior district judge.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of Defendants' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mobil Shipping and Transp Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers, Ltd., 190 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1999)	Definition of the "clearly erroneous" standard of review for a district court reviewing a magistrate judge's factual findings.	The court cited this case to explain that reversal is warranted only if the district judge is left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)	Authority quoted in defining the "clearly erroneous" standard.	Used (via quotation) as the Supreme Court authority underlying the standard quoted in Mobil Shipping.
Catskill Dev., LLC v. Park Place Entm't, 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)	Definition of the "contrary to law" standard (reversal when magistrate fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules).	The court relied on this articulation to describe when a district court may reverse a magistrate's non-dispositive rulings on the basis that they are "contrary to law."
Conway v. Icahn, 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994)	The breadth of a magistrate judge's discretion in resolving discovery disputes.	The court cited this case to emphasize the broad discretion afforded to magistrate judges on discovery and that reversal is appropriate only if that discretion is abused.
Arista Records v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010)	Definition of abuse of discretion: decision rests on error of law, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or cannot be located within permissible decisions.	The court used this formulation to define the circumstances in which a magistrate judge's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.
AP Links, LLC v. Global Golf, Inc., No. 08-CV-1730, 2011 WL 888261, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar 14, 2011)	The heavy burden on a party seeking to overturn a discovery order.	The court cited this authority to underscore that a party challenging a magistrate's discovery order faces a heavy burden under the deferential standard of review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The district court framed the applicable standard: magistrate judges may make findings on non-dispositive pretrial matters which may be reversed only if clearly erroneous or contrary to law (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)). The court reviewed the parties' submissions and the January 4, 2012 transcript and, applying the highly deferential standard, found that Judge Peck's discovery rulings were neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. The court concluded Judge Peck did not abuse his discretion: although Plaintiffs did not submit formal briefs, they submitted extensive letters and the transcript shows Judge Peck thoroughly discussed the issues. Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs' objections and affirmed Judge Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings. Regarding the February 8, 2012 proceedings, the court reviewed the submissions and transcript and denied Plaintiffs' request for an emergency conference, noting Plaintiffs remain free to file Rule 72 objections. The court also directed that requests concerning the personal-jurisdiction discovery schedule for Defendant Publicis Groupe SA be submitted to Judge Peck and reaffirmed that general non-dispositive pretrial matters have been referred to the magistrate judge.

Holding and Implications

Plaintiffs' requests are DENIED.

Holding: The district court denied Plaintiffs' appeal of Magistrate Judge Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings and denied Plaintiffs' request for an emergency conference regarding the February 8, 2012 rulings; Judge Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings are affirmed.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the magistrate judge's discovery rulings remain in effect. Plaintiffs may seek clarification from Judge Peck or file Rule 72 objections to his February 8 rulings. Requests to modify the personal-jurisdiction discovery schedule for Publicis Groupe SA should be directed to Judge Peck. The opinion does not assert the creation of any new legal precedent beyond applying the established deferential standards of review for magistrate judges' non-dispositive orders.

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Monique Da Sil v. Moore; Maryellen O'Donohue; Laurie Mayers; Heather Pierce; and Katherine Wilkinson, on behalf of themsel

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge

Order ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge :

Before the Court is (1) Plaintiffs' appeal from United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings and (2) Plaintiffs' request for an emergency conference to discuss Judge Peck's February 8, 2012 rulings. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' requests are DENIED.

I. January 4, 2012 Rulings

Plaintiffs argue that Judge Peck's rulings are clearly erroneous and contrary to law. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that (1) they did not have an opportunity to brief their discovery disputes before Judge Peck issued his rulings; (2) Judge Peck's rulings limit the temporal scope of discovery to a period that does not cover the full liability period; and (3) Judge Peck's rulings appear to relieve MSL Group from producing employment data that was previously compelled by the previous district judge.

A magistrate judge is permitted to make findings as to non-dispositive pretrial matters, such as discovery matters, which may not be disturbed by a district judge absent a determination that such findings were "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, a district judge may reverse a magistrate's finding only if it is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Mobil Shipping and Transp. Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers, Ltd., 190 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, under the "contrary to law" standard of review, a district court may reverse a finding only if it finds that the magistrate "fail[ed] to apply or misapplie[d] relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure." Catskill Dev., LLC v. Park Place Entm't, 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Under this highly deferential standard of review, a magistrate judge is afforded broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes and a reversal is appropriate only if the district judge finds that discretion is abused. See Conway v. Icahn, 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994). "A court abuses its discretion when its decision rests on an error of law or on a clearly erroneous factual finding, or when its decision—though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." Arista Records v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010)(internal citation omitted). Thus "a party seeking to overturn a discovery order bears a heavy burden." AP Links, LLC v. Global Golf, Inc., No. 08-CV-1730, 2011 WL 888261, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar 14, 2011) (internal citations omitted).

The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions and the January 4, 2012 transcript. Pursuant to the applicable deferential standard of review, the Court finds that the discovery rulings are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law and does not find that Judge Peck abused his discretion. While Plaintiffs' did not submit formal briefs to Judge Peck, they did provide extensive letters summarizing their positions and the transcript adequately shows that Judge Peck spent a substantial amount of time discussing the issues. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' objections are DENIED and Judge Peck's January 4, 2012 discovery rulings are affirmed. If Plaintiffs need further clarification concerning Judge Peck's rulings, they are directed to ask Judge Peck, Further, the transcript reflects that some of the issues will be re-visited by Judge Peck at the appropriate time.

II. Request for an Emergency Conference

Plaintiffs submitted a letter on February 9, 2012 requesting an emergency conference to discuss Judge Peck's February 8, 2012 rulings. Plaintiffs request for an emergency conference is denied. The Court has reviewed the submissions and the transcript from February 8. If Plaintiffs wish to file Rule 72 objections, they are free to do so. If the Court decides to reverse Judge Peck's rulings, it will remain mindful that the Court's decision will be filed after the service of Plaintiffs' motion.

If Plaintiffs wish to submit a joint request to the Court seeking an extension of the personal jurisdiction discovery schedule concerning Defendant Publicis Groupe SA (Dkt. 44), they should submit the request to Judge Peck. All general, non-dispositive pretrial matters, including the scheduling of the collective action motion, have been referred to the magistrate judge. The undersigned will decide the motion once it is fully briefed. Dated: New York, New York
February 14, 2012 SO ORDERED.

/s/_________

Andrew L. Carter, Jr.

United States District Judge