HARRY C. DEES, JR., JUDGE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Chapter 13 Appearances:
Megan E. Binder, Esq., and Heather M. Crockett, Esq., 302 West Washington Street, IGCS, Fifth Floor, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, for the plaintiff. Ricky Allen Humphrey, Jr., 1804 Connecticut Avenue, Elkhart, Indiana 46514, pro se defendant. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
At South Bend, Indiana, August 23, 2017.
Now before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff State of Indiana ex rel. Indiana Department of Workforce Development (IDWD). This motion asks the court to enter summary judgment against the defendant, Ricky Allen Humphrey (Humphrey) for $13,881.19. The IDWD has alleged Humphrey improperly received unemployment insurance benefit payments during periods when he was working and not entitled to receive such payments. The amount sought by the IDWD includes statutory civil penalties and interest. Upon a review of the record the court finds the motion is well taken and will grant it.
Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, and 1334, and Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 200-1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) the court finds that venue is proper. The court has determined that this matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(I). As required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008 the plaintiff has acknowledged the authority of this court to hear and determine this adversary proceeding.
Findings of Fact
The court summarizes the relevant facts as follow. During parts of 2009, 2010, and 2011, Humphrey made 45 weekly applications to the IDWD for regular and emergency unemployment insurance benefits. Based on those applications, the IDWD made payments to Humphrey. During the periods covered by his unemployment benefit claims, Humphrey was working for four different employers, United Pies of Elkhart, Best Formed Plastics, Swanson Staffing, and Americana Development. Under Indiana law, Humphrey was not entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits for weeks when he received wages from employment.
Previously, the IDWD filed a motion for default judgment due to Humphrey's failure to file an answer to its complaint. Due to the status of the pleadings and the serious consequences of a default judgment, the court denied that motion, finding the IDWD failed to present a prima facie case that it was entitled to a judgment.
Discussion
In its complaint, the IDWD alleges that Humphrey applied for unemployment insurance benefits and received benefit payments during weeks when he was working and not qualified to receive those payments. The complaint asserts that Humphrey's benefit claims falsely represented his employment status in order to receive benefit payments. Humphrey's course of conduct in submitting benefit claims, the IDWD argues, shows his intention to deceive the IDWD to get unemployment insurance benefits. His actions provide a basis to except his debt to the IDWD for unentitled payments he received from his bankruptcy discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). The IDWD also asks to recover statutory civil penalties and interest on the unlawful unemployment benefit payments it made to Humphrey.
Bankruptcy Rule 7056 requires the court to enter summary judgment when no disputed issues of material fact exist, and the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion. The movant must identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, along with the affidavits, if any, which it believes show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id., at 323. When reviewing facts in support of a motion for summary judgment, this court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. KDC Foods, Inc. v. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, PA, 763 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2014). But the role of this court is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or decide the truth of the matter. Rather the court must only determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 951 (7th Cir. 2013) ("If a party moving for summary judgment has properly supported his motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 'come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" (citation omitted)); Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2015) (The non-moving party must designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial).
Humphrey has not participated in this adversary proceeding. He has not filed an answer to the IDWD complaint, nor has he responded to the motion for summary judgment. As he has not suggested any issues of material fact, the court can draw no inferences in his favor from the record before it. By not responding, Humphrey has waived any opposition to the IDWD's motion. Consequently the court accepts the factual allegations in the IDWD complaint and motion as true.
The record created by the IDWD shows that Humphrey applied for unemployment benefits while he was receiving wages from employment. The IDWD has also shown that it made benefit payments to Humphrey by means of a debit card. The record of Humphrey's debit card use shows many purchases from numerous sources the court finds consistent with personal and family use. The IDWD has convinced the court that Humphrey has obtained the benefit of unemployment compensation payments that he was not entitled to receive. His mendacious conduct in applying for benefits while he was working convinces the court that it should except his debt to the IDWD from his discharge.
Purchases were made at a variety of fast food, pharmacy, gasoline, convenience and liquor stores. Usage also included video rentals, rent-to-own payments, and wireless phone service payments. --------
Conclusion
The undisputed facts demonstrate Humphrey intentionally filed claims for unemployment benefits when he was in fact working. The court finds that Humphrey intended to trick or deceive the IDWD into paying him unemployment benefits he would not otherwise be entitled to receive. Such conduct justifies excepting his debt to the IDWD from discharge. Therefore, the court GRANTS the IDWD motion for summary judgment and excepts Humphrey's debt to the IDWD, in the amount of $13,881.19, from discharge.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ HARRY C. DEES, JR.
HARRY C. DEES, JR., JUDGE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT