Cummins v. Goolsby

MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/26/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JACQUELINE ESTES MASK TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JOHN A. FERRELL WALTER ALAN DAVIS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PRENTISS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WALTER ALAN DAVIS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOHN A. FERRELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/18/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT : ¶1. Dr. Christopher Cummins—a married man who was separated but not divorced from his wife—began a romantic relationship with one of his employees, Leah Jordan Goolsby (Jordan). The two began living together, had a child, and became engaged to one another. But Dr. Cummins never divorced his wife. And he and Jordan never married. Jordan eventually ended their relationship and kept the engagement ring and wedding ring he gave her. When Jordan filed a paternity suit for child-support payments for their child, Dr. Cummins counterclaimed for the rings, which together were worth $11,435. Alternatively, he argued that if Jordan was awarded the rings, their value should be deducted from any child-support obligation. ¶2. The chancellor found Dr. Cummins had made a completed inter vivos gift. So she awarded the rings to Jordan. The chancellor found that the rings were not a conditional gift, because the condition of marriage was not met, since Dr. Cummins had remained married to his wife. The chancellor certified the ruling on the ring issue as a final judgment, and Dr. Cummins appealed. ¶3. After review, we agree the fatal fact to Dr. Cummins's claim was his marriage to another woman. Because Dr. Cummins could not legally marry at the time he gave the engagement rings, he cannot argue to a court of equity that he is entitled to get the rings back, since the condition of marriage never took place. Because Dr. Cummins has no right to recover the rings due to his unclean hands, we affirm.

¶4. Jordan started working at Dr. Cummins's medical practice in July 2013. In August, although he was married but separated from his wife, he and Jordan became romantically involved and moved in together. The couple then had a child on June 29, 2015. All during this time, Dr. Cummins's divorce was supposedly pending but never was finalized. Still, he had given Jordan an engagement ring and a wedding ring allegedly worth $11,435. ¶5. But Dr. Cummins remained married to his wife and failed to get a divorce. So Jordan broke off the engagement in September 2016. Jordan also claimed that she no longer wished to marry Dr. Cummins "based upon his erratic and abusive conduct and the decision to break off the engagement was mutual." ¶6. On March 1, 2017, Jordan filed a petition to establish paternity, among other relief, for her and Dr. Cummins's child. On April 21, 2017, Dr. Cummins responded and filed a counterclaim for return of the rings. Alternatively, he asserted he was entitled to a credit for the rings' value against any financial obligation he might be ordered to pay. The Prentiss County Chancery Court heard arguments on Dr. Cummins's counterclaim on May 15, 2017. Dr. Cummins argued that, under Cooley v. Tucker , the rings were a conditional gift, and the condition—marriage—was never met. See Cooley v . Tucker , 200 So. 3d 474 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Thus, Dr. Cummins argued the gift was incomplete and the rings should be returned to him. Jordan countered that when Dr. Cummins gave her the rings, the condition could not be met because he was still married to his wife. In fact, he was still married at the May 15, 2017 hearing. ¶7. The chancellor ruled that when Dr. Cummins gave the rings to Jordan, the condition to marry could not be completed because he remained married to his wife. Therefore, Jordan was awarded the rings as a completed inter vivos gift. The trial court entered its Rule 54(b) Final Judgment on Limited Issue the next day. Dr. Cummins filed his Notice of Appeal on June 23, 2017. The single issue on appeal is whether the chancellor erred by awarding the rings to Jordan.

¶8. We will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly ¶13. "[O]ne of the maxims of equity is, 'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.'" Thigpen v. Kennedy , 238 So. 2d 744, 746 (Miss. 1970). And conditioning a gift on marriage when one cannot lawfully marry violates public policy and constitutes unclean hands. See, e.g., Morgan v . Wright , 133 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ga. 1963) (holding that an action to recover an engagement ring given to a married woman was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands). Dr. Cummins could not legally marry Jordan at the time he gave her the rings. So, he cannot now bring an action for the rings to be returned because the condition of marriage never occurred. See Lipschutz v . Kiderman , 76 A.D.3d 178, 184 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) ("[W]here a party gives an engagement gift to another with knowledge that an impediment to a lawful marriage exists, whether the impediment is on the part of the donor or the recipient, no action will lie to compel a return of the property on the ground that the condition of marriage did not take place."). ¶14. Because, unlike the boyfriend in Cooley , Dr. Cummins had no right to have the rings returned as part of his paternity dispute with Jordan, the chancellor did not err when she awarded the rings to Jordan. We affirm the chancellor's judgment. ¶15. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY ISHEE, J.; RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J., JOIN IN PART.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING: ¶16. The act of giving an engagement ring, wedding band, or the like defies easy categorization. Because the parties in the instant case stipulate that Cummins intended the engagement and at the time of the action, was a married man; the man's betrothed had been unaware of his marriage. Id. at 488. The Court held that the woman could recover from the man because "[t]he fact that the promisor was already married at the time of making the promises furnishes no defense to an action for a breach of promise, where this fact was unknown to the promisee." Id . (emphasis added). The Court continued that a woman may maintain an action for breach of promise, "notwithstanding the fact that he was married to another woman at the time the contract was made, if such fact was unknown to the woman at the time of the engagement." Id . (emphasis added). ¶20. Although the Court of Appeals in Cooley chose not to follow Carney and Ashley in that it did not analyze the issue presented under contract law, we never have overruled those cases and, in a case lacking the stipulations found in the record here, they might have well controlled.

ISHEE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.