People v. Johnson

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Illinois Official Reports Appellate Court

Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 08-CR-14022; the Hon. Thomas V. Gainer Jr., Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel on Appeal Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Christopher Kopacz, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Christine Cook, and Sheilah O'Grady-Krajniak, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Gordon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Robin Johnson, was convicted in a jury trial of the first degree murder of Chicago police officer Richard Francis, disarming Officer Francis, and aggravated discharge of a firearm toward another Chicago police officer, for which she received sentences of, respectively, mandatory natural life, 4 years' imprisonment, and 15 years' imprisonment. In this appeal, defendant raises several challenges to the judgment. Defendant alleges that the trial court violated her constitutional right to present a defense when it barred proposed expert and lay testimony that she contends establishes that she was in a postictal, or post-seizure, state at the time of the offense. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and in not allowing defense counsel to impeach a defense witness about the State having provided the witness with housing prior to her testifying at trial. Finally, defendant contends that her mandatory natural life sentence is unconstitutional. ¶ 2 The record shows that defendant was charged by indictment with four counts of first degree murder of a peace officer, eight counts of attempted murder, four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and disarming a peace officer, arising from a July 2, 2008, incident that occurred after Officer Francis was called to investigate a disturbance on a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) bus. Prior to trial, defendant submitted an answer to the State's motion for pretrial discovery that suggested that defendant would "rely on the State's inability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant also indicated that she was contemplating asserting the affirmative defense of insanity. ¶ 3 On October 16, 2013, the day before jury selection was set to commence, defendant filed a motion to allow her "to present the defenses and supporting evidence that (1) she did not act intentionally or knowingly as required under the charged statutes and (2) she did not perform a voluntary act as required by the criminal code." The defense indicated that it "had investigated the possibility of presenting an insanity defense" and believed that the insanity defense would be "a weak and ineffective defense." However, counsel believed that defendant had "a strong defense" based on her "not possess[ing] the mental state necessary to commit first degree murder" and "not perform[ing] a voluntary act." Counsel further stated an intent to call Dr. Stephan Schuele to testify that defendant suffers from epileptic seizures and that she was "in a postictal or post-seizure state at the time that" the officer was shot. Dr. Schuele would further testify that defendant "was not capable of forming the necessary mental state to commit first degree murder" and that her medical condition "created a confused state such that [defendant] was not performing voluntary acts." Defendant also claimed that her condition, which resulted from "a seizure and postictal state, could lead a jury to conclude that she acted recklessly and therefore committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter rather than first degree murder." ¶ 4 On October 16, 2013, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude defendant's proposed expert testimony in the absence of an insanity defense. The State argued that where defendant was not presenting an insanity defense, the proposed testimony was irrelevant and amounted to He also stated that he could not "exclude that during these three days she would have the intention to go to the bathroom or she had the intention to eat something or do something intentional" but stated that the surveillance video of the incident gave him "information of how erratic she was at the moment of the incident." Dr. Schuele specifically characterized the video as showing that when defendant was on the bus, she engaged in a motion mimicking putting money in the fare box, when she did not actually do so, and that she was walking behind one of the bus passengers with her arms bent. Dr. Schuele also relied on reports that the bus passenger asked defendant why she was following her, and defendant responded, "[Y]ou made me this way." ¶ 10 Dr. Schuele further explained that a person

"in a delirious state has actions which are volitional and actions which are erratic. *** [W]e are not talking about a patient who is comatose and unresponsive and where things are black and white. We're talking about a situation where obviously every step a person does is a volitional act because, otherwise, we wouldn't walk. *** So, yes, obviously, she does many volitional things. She does—it is my opinion as well that she does many erratic things."

¶ 11 When asked whether Dr. Schuele could tell which parts of the sequence of events were volitional and which were erratic, the doctor responded:

"I think you can probably judge erratic behavior as good [sic] as I can. You know, it's erratic to mimic putting money in the fare thing. *** [I]t is erratic to walk behind someone with your arms bent and walking back and forth. *** It is erratic to answer questions of why do you follow me with, like, you made me this way. That is paranoid and delusional."

Dr. Schuele clarified, however, that when he used the words "paranoid and delusional," he was describing the postictal state, not making a psychiatric diagnosis, and that a doctor "obviously do[es]n't make a psychiatric diagnosis just because someone *** was confused after a seizure." ¶ 12 Dr. Schuele stated that it was his understanding that "movements are volitional" and that "holding something, pulling a trigger" and pointing a gun at someone, were "volitional act[s]." However, Dr. Schuele stated that he believed that defendant did not "understand[ ] the situation" and that she was "paranoid and *** fe[lt] threatened to an irrational degree." ¶ 13 When asked about whether he knew from witness accounts that Officer Francis did not get up or move after the initial gunshot, Dr. Schuele responded, "If I remember the video, the video, obviously, doesn't show much. The video on that part, there's a lot of obstruction." Dr. Schuele was also asked whether he recalled that defendant was "accused of hiding behind a car and shooting in the direction of other officers after she shot and killed Officer Franc[i]s," and responded that he "d[id]n't remember that detail." ¶ 14 At the conclusion of Dr. Schuele's testimony, the court indicated that it would have a ruling in the morning before jury selection. ¶ 15 The next morning, the court began by noting that, typically, "a defendant's state of mind is a question of fact to be determined by the jury" and that it "may be inferred from the character of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." The court continued:

"The admissibility of expert testimony regarding a defendant's intent or lack thereof which is the ultimate issue in a murder prosecution depends on whether the expert is to testify to facts requiring scientific knowledge not within the common knowledge of the jury.
***
Dr. Schuele's testimony in this case is not being offered in support of the affirmative defense of insanity. It's being offered only on the issue of her intent, and it comes under the rubric of a reasonable doubt argument. ***
But expert testimony cannot and must not confuse the jury or invade the province of the jury in determining the ultimate issues. ***
Dr. Schuele described what he called the postictal phase which occurs after the seizures. ***
In this state, the person could appear paranoid and delusional, but according to Dr. Schuele, would also be capable of performing voluntary acts such as pointing a gun at someone, shooting that person, hiding behind a vehicle, and firing a weapon at other police officers who arrived on the scene while protecting herself.
Dr. Schuele testified that there was no psychiatric or psychological diagnosis made that the defendant suffered from paranoia or delusional thinking[.]
***
Dr. Schuele testified that while she may have been confused and agitated as a result of her postictal state, she was capable of engaging in voluntary acts such as I have described, aiming a gun at a victim, shooting the victim, protecting herself, and then shooting at other police officers.
In this Court's opinion, this testimony would only serve to confuse the jury on the ultimate issue in the case since the doctor is saying two things. She's in this confused and agitated state, but she's also capable of engaging in volitional acts. To allow anger, agitation, confusion, erratic behavior which result in the defendant's long history of alcoholism and substance abuse to rise to the level of mental disease or defect would make voluntary intoxication a defense to criminal conduct, and Illinois does not recognize voluntary intoxication as a defense.
***
This testimony that's being offered is more akin to the diminished capacity defense ***.
***
Dr. Schuele's testimony that the defendant was in a postictal state of agitation and aggression but still capable of volitional acts would only confuse the jury on an issue which is theirs [sic] to decide."

¶ 16 After ruling, the State also indicated that it "would be objecting" to the defense presenting evidence through lay opinions given by family members and paramedics that defendant suffered from seizures. Defense counsel responded that the defense would not be asking about their opinions of whether defendant was suffering from a seizure, but that the defense should be able to call these witnesses to testify regarding the "facts of what they observed." The court ruled that defendant did not have a right to "ask them opinions about postictal states and such. But I believe you have a right to call witnesses to testify to her behavior." ¶ 17 On October 21, 2013, the State sought to clarify the trial court's ruling by filing a motion in limine seeking to prevent the defense from providing evidence of "defendant's medical and mental history as it is not relevant to any issue before the court." The State asserted that any evidence "of the defendant's mental health in the form of prior seizures, confusion, medication or current medical diagnoses are not relevant absent an insanity defense." The State argued that it was "obvious that the defense [wa]s trying to circumvent their burden" of proving insanity, and that the defense's "attempts to call her family, paramedics, and doctors" were only relevant to a nonexistent diminished capacity defense. The State asked that the evidence "be excluded as it remains irrelevant, in no way assists the jury and would instead serve to confuse the jury while deliberating the issues in the case." The State also explained that some of the evidence that defendant sought to admit constituted hearsay, was speculative, or was "too remote to be relevant." ¶ 18 In ruling on the State's motion in limine, the court explained that its prior ruling

"was that the jury should be able to determine [the voluntariness of] the acts, all the acts of the defendant and her acts at the time she encountered the police officer, and no expert testimony was necessary ***.
The evidence that this woman suffers from epilepsy, had suffered from epilepsy in the past and had involved herself in seizure-type behavior in the past is not relevant to the issue of whether or not she was committing a voluntary act on the night in question."

¶ 19 The court noted that Dr. Schuele testified that defendant was "capable of committing voluntary acts" and concluded that

"all this epilepsy evidence is only going to confuse the jury. It's excludable under 403. It's really not relevant to what happened. ***
This type of evidence, all of it, the daughters, the boyfriend, the paramedics, and the doctors, is going to mislead the jury. The jury is going to have to make up its mind from what it hears from the witnesses, *** and *** what they see in the video to determine whether or not she was acting volitionally.
She does not have an affirmative defense, and there is no defense of diminished capacity under Illinois law."

¶ 20 The defense asked the court to reconsider, and the court stated, "I still believe that this is more in the nature of a diminished capacity defense which does not exist in Illinois, and my ruling is no one will testify concerning epilepsy." ¶ 21 After opening statements, the State called Debra Francis, widow of the deceased victim, Chicago police officer Richard Francis. Debra testified that she last saw her husband at 10:40 p.m. on July 1, 2008, before he left for his 11 p.m. shift. After 2 a.m., a police officer rang her doorbell and drove her to the hospital, where she learned that her husband had died. ¶ 22 Tracey Jackson testified that she was working the overnight shift as a CTA bus operator on July 1 and 2, 2008. Around 1:50 a.m. on July 2, 2008, Jackson stopped the bus at the intersection of Belmont, Western, and Clybourn Avenues, across the street from a police station, to let passengers on and off the bus. One passenger, a middle-aged Hispanic woman later identified as Donna Barney, exited the bus, and two people stepped onto the bus. Jackson identified defendant as the second person to step onto the bus, and testified that defendant turned around and stepped off of the bus a few seconds after Barney exited. Jackson saw lay testimony of defendant's boyfriend, family members, and paramedics who interacted with defendant on previous occasions, all of whom would have corroborated defendant's "history of epileptic seizures and prolonged postictal states, as well as her condition in the days before the shooting incident." She contends that such evidence was relevant to the determination as to whether she acted voluntarily and her mental state. The State responds that the trial court properly excluded the proposed evidence because defendant was essentially attempting to raise the nonexistent defense of diminished capacity. ¶ 61 Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the proposed evidence would have demonstrated that her actions were not voluntary. A material element of every offense is a voluntary act (720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2008)), and it is a fundamental principle that a person is not criminally responsible for an involuntary act. People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 558 (1978). "A cornerstone of the defense of involuntary conduct is that a person, in a state of automatism, who lacks the volition to control or prevent his conduct, cannot be criminally responsible for such involuntary acts." Id. "Such involuntary acts may include those committed during convulsions, sleep, unconsciousness, hypnosis or seizures." Id. Here, however, there is no question that defendant was not in the throes of a seizure. Instead, she claimed to have been in a "postictal" state, during which she "wax[ed] and wane[d]" between volitional and "erratic" behavior, according to her proposed expert. ¶ 62 We ultimately agree with the State that the evidence was properly excluded because it amounted to a diminished capacity defense. ¶ 63 Diminished capacity is an affirmative defense that permits a "legally sane defendant to present evidence of mental illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime." Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2013); see also Black's Law Dictionary 199 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "diminished capacity" as, "An impaired mental condition—short of insanity—that is caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease and that prevents the person from having the mental state necessary to be held responsible for a crime."). This defense is recognized in some jurisdictions around the country; however, some jurisdictions, including Illinois, have chosen to reject it. See People v. Hulitt, 361 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636 (2005); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770-79 (2006) (holding that Arizona's rule precluding the use of diminished capacity evidence to negate the mens rea element in the absence of an insanity defense did not violate due process). ¶ 64 As we discussed in Hulitt, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 640-41:

"The doctrine of diminished capacity, also known as the doctrine of diminished or partial responsibility, allows a defendant to offer evidence of her mental condition in relation to her capacity to form the mens rea or intent required for commission of the charged offense. [Citation.] Similar to the insanity defense in that it calls into question the mental abnormality of a defendant, it differs in that it may be raised by a defendant who is legally sane."

¶ 65 We find this case analogous to Hulitt, in which this court affirmed the trial court's determination to exclude evidence that the trial and appellate courts found amounted to raising a diminished capacity defense. Specifically, in Hulitt, the defendant was charged with first degree murder of her two-year-old daughter. Prior to trial, the defendant claimed that she did not intend to raise an insanity defense, but instead wanted to raise a "reasonable doubt defense" through the expert testimony of a psychologist showing that she suffered from postpartum depression which left her "unable to appreciate the danger of her actions toward [her daughter]." Id. at 636. The State filed a motion in limine barring testimony from the psychologist as to the defendant's mental capacity, and the trial court granted that motion. Id. at 636-37. The trial court found that the defendant was attempting to raise a diminished capacity defense, which did not exist in Illinois. Id. at 636. On appeal, the defendant argued that she was not attempting to claim diminished capacity; instead, she was attempting to show that she did not have the requisite intent to commit first degree murder. ¶ 66 This court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that "[d]efendant could not raise [diminished capacity] as an affirmative defense and, therefore, should not be permitted to raise it in the guise of a reasonable doubt argument." Id. at 641. We explained that the doctrine of diminished capacity allowed a defendant to offer evidence of a mental condition in relation to the defendant's capacity to form the intent required for commission of the charged offense. Id. at 640. We described the defense as follows:

"Diminished capacity is considered a partial defense because it is not presented as an excuse or justification for a crime but, rather, as an attempt to prove that the defendant, because she was incapable of forming the requisite intent of the crime charged, is innocent of that crime but likely guilty of a lesser included offense." Id. at 641.

¶ 67 Despite defendant's claims to the contrary, we find that, like in Hulitt, defendant's proposed evidence goes to the defense of diminished capacity, which does not exist in Illinois. Id. ¶ 68 Specifically with respect to the proposed expert testimony of Dr. Schuele, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to exclude it. Our courts have held that the defendant's mental state is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. at 637. Mental states " ' "are not commonly established by direct evidence and may be inferred from the character of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ' " Id. (quoting People v. Raines, 354 Ill. App. 3d 209, 220 (2004), quoting People v. Adams, 308 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1006 (1999)). ¶ 69 When deciding whether to admit expert testimony, the trial court should balance the probative value of the testimony against its prejudicial effect and should "carefully consider the necessity and relevance of the expert testimony in light of the particular facts of the case before admitting that testimony for the jury's consideration." People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23. Relevant and probative testimony should be admitted, whereas misleading or confusing testimony should not be admitted. People v. Anderson, 2017 IL App (1st) 122640, ¶ 78 (citing People v. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468 (2003)). Moreover, expert testimony is only necessary when the subject is both particularly within the witness's experience and qualifications and beyond that of the average juror's, and when it will aid the jury in reaching its conclusion, and expert testimony addressing matters of common knowledge is not admissible unless the subject is difficult to understand and explain. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23. ¶ 70 In the absence of an insanity defense, we agree with the trial court that the proposed evidence would be irrelevant and serve only to confuse the jury. An expert may not give an opinion supporting the doctrine of diminished mental capacity because, as we have previously stated, that doctrine is not recognized in Illinois. See Hulitt, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 641. From our reading of the record, it is apparent that defendant was attempting to circumvent the requirements of pleading and proving an insanity defense, by instead claiming that her bizarre behavior was indicative of her lacking the mental state necessary for first degree murder. In defendant's conviction for aggravated domestic battery, where the police tased the defendant, and he fell onto his wife, breaking her arm. Because the defendant was "incapable of controlling his muscles" as a result of being tased, "his act of falling on [his wife] and breaking her arm was an involuntary act for which he cannot be held accountable." Martino, 2012 IL App (2d) 101244, ¶ 15. Unlike in these cases, there was no evidence that defendant was acting "pursuant to an involuntary tic" or was "incapable of controlling h[er] muscles." ¶ 81 For many of the same reasons, we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proposed lay witness testimony from defendant's family members, boyfriend, and medical personnel who interacted with defendant on prior occasions. Like Dr. Schuele's testimony, the proposed lay witness testimony was, at best, relevant to a diminished capacity defense. Additionally, none of the proposed lay witnesses were present at the scene of the offense, and each could testify only to having interacted with defendant several hours to four years prior to the incident. The testimony could have established, at most, that defendant had prior periods where she behaved "erratic[ally]" following seizures, but it would not have shown that she did not act voluntarily when she shot Officer Francis. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling on the State's motion in limine was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, and we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the proposed evidence. ¶ 82 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant, citing People v. Consago, 170 Ill. App. 3d 982, 986 (1988), argues that the evidence supported that the jury could have found her actions merely reckless based on the trial evidence because "the defendant's discharge of a weapon during a struggle is a well established form of reckless conduct." ¶ 83 The parties disagree on the applicable standard of review for this issue as well. Defendant cites People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 19, to contend that the determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the giving of a jury instruction is a question of law subject to de novo review. However, as the State points out, our supreme court has since clarified that holding, limiting it to the facts of that case, which "reviewed a question of law: whether a second degree murder instruction must be given as a mandatory counterpart to an instruction on self-defense." People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 41. The supreme court then went on to hold that "when the trial court, after reviewing all the evidence, determines that there is insufficient evidence to justify the giving of a jury instruction, the proper standard of review of that decision is abuse of discretion." Id. ¶ 42. Accordingly, we review this issue for an abuse of discretion. ¶ 84 "The offenses of involuntary manslaughter and first degree murder require different mental states, such that involuntary manslaughter requires a less culpable mental state than first degree murder." People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 31 (2006). A defendant commits first degree murder when "he kills an individual without lawful justification and he knows that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm," whereas a defendant commits involuntary manslaughter when he "performs acts that are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another and he performs these acts recklessly." People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 249-50 (1998) (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), 9-3(a) (West 1994)). Recklessness is defined in section 4-6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 as follows:

"A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from

the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2008).

¶ 85 In general, an instruction on a lesser offense is justified "where there is some evidence to support the giving of the instruction." DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 249 (citing People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132 (1997)). Specifically, an involuntary manslaughter instruction should be given if there is some credible evidence in the record that would reduce the crime of first degree murder to involuntary manslaughter. Id. (citing People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 87 (1987), and People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (1984)). However, a manslaughter instruction should not be given where the evidence shows that the homicide was murder, not manslaughter. People v. Arnett, 217 Ill. App. 3d 626, 634 (1991) (citing People v. Simpson, 74 Ill. 2d 497 (1978)). ¶ 86 Although a defendant "is entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction if there is 'slight' evidence upon which a given theory could be based, there must be some evidence of the reckless conduct." People v. Eason, 326 Ill. App. 3d 197, 209 (2001) (citing People v. Trotter, 178 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298 (1988)). The appellate court has held that

"[c]ertain factors may suggest whether a defendant acted recklessly and whether an involuntary manslaughter instruction is appropriate: disparity in size and strength between the defendant and the victim, the severity of the victim's injuries, whether the defendant used his bare fists or a weapon, whether there were multiple wounds, or whether the victim was defenseless." Id. (citing DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 251).

Conversely, "Illinois courts have consistently held that when the defendant intends to fire a gun, points it in the general direction of his or her intended victim, and shoots, such conduct is not merely reckless and does not warrant an involuntary-manslaughter instruction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sipp, 378 Ill. App. 3d 157, 164 (2007). ¶ 87 While we agree that a gun discharging during a struggle may be indicative of recklessness, there was no evidence in the record that would tend to show that the gun accidentally discharged during a struggle. The evidence in this case showed that Officer Francis's gun had two internal safeties and could not fire unless the trigger was pulled. Additionally, there was no evidence presented that would tend to show that defendant and Officer Francis were struggling over the gun itself. Instead, the witnesses who saw the struggle at the time of the initial gunshot testified that Officer Francis was getting up from the ground and holding his open and empty hands by his face when defendant fired the gun. The evidence also showed that defendant shot Officer Francis two more times after the initial gunshot, and there was evidence that Officer Francis was on the ground at the time of those gunshots based on abrasions on his back and "flattening" on one of the bullets. There was also evidence that defendant then shot at the responding officers, and tried to hide under Officer Francis's vehicle to evade apprehension. This context to the offense belies any suggestion that defendant's actions were merely "reckless" or that defendant accidentally shot Office Francis during a struggle. ¶ 88 In these circumstances, we find no evidence from which the jury could have found defendant's conduct to be merely reckless. Given the evidence that was presented in the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. ¶ 89 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach witness Donna Barney regarding the State having paid for her to stay in a hotel so that she could be available for trial. She specifically asserts that where Barney "recanted her offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. ¶ 99 All statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality and "the party challenging the statute bears a heavy burden of clearly establishing its constitutional infirmities. [Citation.] Any reasonable construction which affirms a statute's constitutionality must be adopted, and any doubt regarding a statute's construction must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity." People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 486 (2003). We generally defer to the legislature in the sentencing arena

"because the legislature is institutionally better equipped to gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly. [Citation.] The legislature's discretion in setting criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally decline to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this authority." People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005).

¶ 100 Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2008)) mandates a sentence of natural life imprisonment for an adult offender when he or she is

"found guilty of murdering a peace officer *** when the peace officer *** was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer *** from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer *** performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer."

¶ 101 Defendant, citing People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002), argues that this statute violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause as applied to her because the punishment "is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community" in light of her mitigating circumstances. She acknowledges that the offense was "serious and tragic" but contends that it was "not so abhorrent that it warrants the automatic imposition of the most severe sentence in Illinois." ¶ 102 As our supreme court has "repeatedly recognized," the legislature "has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary's discretion in imposing sentences." People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004). "The rehabilitative objective of article I, section 11, should not and does not prevent the legislature from fixing mandatory minimum penalties where it has been determined that no set of mitigating circumstances could allow a proper penalty of less than natural life." People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984). ¶ 103 As relevant to this case, the legislature has determined that the seriousness of the offense of murdering a police officer mandates a sentence of natural life imprisonment, such that "no set of mitigating circumstances" could properly allow for a lesser penalty. Id. This court has also noted that a statute that punishes more severely those persons who murder, or attempt to murder, a peace officer in the line of duty is justified because it serves a more specific purpose than simply deterring people from unlawfully killing. People v. Henderson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 8, 16 (2004) (citing People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 458 (2002)). Specifically:

"Police officers play a vital role in our society. The demands of their position regularly place officers in potentially violent and dangerous situations. The need to protect these officers and to punish more severely those who interfere with their duties is a determination that the legislature is in a better position than this court to make." Id. at 18.

¶ 104 We also note that defendant's contention that a mandatory life sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate in light of the mitigating circumstances is undermined by the record of the sentencing hearing, which suggests that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence, even if it had discretion. The record shows that, despite the mandatory sentencing scheme, the trial court reviewed the mitigating circumstances and determined that defendant had "earned" a natural life sentence and that her actions "warrant[ed] that sentence." ¶ 105 In light of the above, we conclude that defendant's mandatory sentence of natural life for murdering a police officer does not shock the moral sense of the community and does not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to her. See People v. Ybarra, 2016 IL App (1st) 142407, ¶ 30. ¶ 106 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 107 Affirmed.

In defendant's initial brief, she also raised an issue regarding her mittimus, contending that she was credited for only 2044 days spent in custody prior to sentencing when she actually spent 2045 days in pre-sentencing custody. After the State responded that 2044 was the correct number of days, since the date of sentencing is not included in the calculation (see People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503, 509 (2011)), defendant withdrew that issue in her reply brief. --------