PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 17-JD-281 Honorable Christopher B. Morozin, Judge, Presiding. PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 In a petition for adjudication of wardship, respondent, Jose A., was charged with delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(5) (West 2016)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016)). Respondent filed a motion to suppress statements, alleging that at two separate interviews—one at his high school and one at a police station—he was subjected to custodial interrogations in violation of section 5-401.5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-401.5 (West 2016)). After a hearing, the circuit court of Lake County agreed with respondent and granted his motion to suppress statements. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the trial court properly suppressed the statement respondent made at the police station but erred in suppressing the statement respondent made at the high school. As a result, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Given that we ordered supplemental briefing in this case and held oral argument, we have good cause for issuing our decision beyond the 150-day deadline under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660A(f) (eff. July 1, 2018).
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On April 6, 2017, a teacher at Lake Zurich High School suspected that a student was under the influence of "something." The teacher contacted Tiffany Reagan and Matthew Aiello, deans at the high school, to investigate the situation. Believing that the student was under the influence of alcohol, Deans Reagan and Aiello called Mark Frey, an officer with the Lake Zurich Police Department and the resource officer assigned to the school, to bring a Breathalyzer machine to the school. Officer Frey was unable to assist at that time, so he instructed the deans to call the police department and request another officer for assistance. Ultimately, Deans Reagan and Aiello learned that the student had taken Xanax. The student informed the deans that respondent provided the substance to her in the school library. During the investigation, drugs were seized from other students, some of whom stated that they had obtained the substances from respondent. ¶ 4 When the investigation began, respondent was off the high school's premises to attend classes at the College of Lake County. Deans Reagan and Aiello waited outside the main entrance of the high school for respondent to return. When respondent's bus arrived, Deans Reagan and Aiello "retrieved" respondent and brought him to Aiello's office, where they and Assistant Principal Pikul began questioning him. Respondent was told that he was under investigation for possessing or delivering Xanax. Respondent initially denied the allegations, officer from the Kildeer Police Department to arrive to translate. Once the translating officer arrived, Officer Frey escorted respondent, respondent's mother, and the translating officer to an interview room adjacent to the lobby. ¶ 9 Officer Frey described the interview room as follows:
"It was [
sic] an unlocked door. It is accessible to the public. It is not in the secured area by any means. The door was unlocked. I had to unlock it to get in, but then it was left unlocked while we were in there. There is fingerprint equipment out for other purposes in the police department, and there is a table with four chairs. So it is sort of as [
sic] an area where we can talk with somebody that's kind of secluded from obviously the public lobby area."
Officer Frey added that the room is typically used when someone comes to the police station to make a report or for "private conversation" between a police officer and a member of the public. Officer Frey said that he also uses the room to interview suspects before taking them into custody. ¶ 10 Officer Frey explained that respondent was at the police station so that he could be "booked and processed for the charges of possession of a controlled substance and the distribution of [a] controlled substance." During the interview, Officer Frey was dressed in plain clothes, the same way he dresses while on duty at the high school. In addition, Officer Frey was armed with his duty pistol and carrying handcuffs. In the interview room, Officer Frey read respondent the juvenile
Miranda form (see
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and then questioned him for 15 minutes regarding the incident at the school.
Officer Frey testified that
of detention," the State had offered little to no evidence concerning the voluntariness of the statement and so the presumption, under the totality of the circumstances, was not overcome. ¶ 14 As for the interview at the police station, the court began by stating that to argue that it was "not [a] custodial interrogation is really beyond this Court's belief." The court noted that respondent was there for booking and fingerprinting and the processing of juvenile charges. Respondent had been brought into an interrogation room, he was read
Miranda warnings, and he was questioned. There was no recording made, although one was required by statute (
705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016)). There was no other evidence presented as to the tone or manner of questioning. Thus, the State did not overcome the presumption of inadmissibility. As a result, both of respondent's statements were suppressed. ¶ 15 On February 16, 2018, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling. At the hearing on that motion, the State argued that the definition of "custodial interrogation" had not changed with the amendment to section 5-401.5(a-5) and that the court had misinterpreted that definition. The State argued that "custodial interrogation" refers only to police conduct, under
People v.
Travis, 2013 IL App (3d) 110170. Additionally, under
People v.
Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d 248 (2006), there was no police custodial interrogation and the issue was whether the school personnel were acting as agents of the police when they questioned respondent. The court denied the State's motion, remarking:
"I disagree with the State's interpretation of the new statute. The new statute expounded [
sic] protections for minors and *** extended those typical
Miranda protections to include not only police officers or police agents but also now public officials or employees ***. Even the statute acknowledges that custodial
interrogation could include by a public official or employee [sic], and that's what I found here."
The court reiterated that, as to both statements, a reasonable person in respondent's position would consider himself to be in custody and the questions asked were designed to elicit incriminating statements. On February 28, 2018, the State filed a certificate of impairment and a notice of appeal.
People's exhibit No. 1, the Miranda form Officer Frey read to respondent at the police station, and respondent's exhibit No. 1, the security video of the library, were both admitted during the hearing but were withdrawn at the close of the hearing. The State has not made either exhibit part of the record on appeal. --------
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, the State argues that, for various reasons, the trial court improperly granted respondent's motion to suppress the statements he made at both the high school and the police station. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-part standard of review. In re D.L.H., Jr., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 46. Under this standard, the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations are accorded great deference and will be overturned only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009); Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 252. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re Marriage of Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853, ¶ 65. However, we review de novo the ultimate issue of whether the evidence should be suppressed. D.L.H., Jr., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 46; Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 252. ¶ 18 Resolution of the issues presented also requires us to construe statutory language. Statutory construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review. People v. Manning, 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 15. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Village of Lake in the Hills, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 15. Only where the language of the statute is ambiguous, or where a literal interpretation of the statute would either lead to absurd results or thwart the goals of the statutory scheme, may a court look beyond the express language of the statute and consider extrinsic aids of construction. Lansing v. Southwest Airlines Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 101164, ¶ 30; NDC LLC v. Topinka, 374 Ill. App. 3d 341, 359 (2007). With these principles in mind, we turn to the State's first argument.
¶ 19 A. Statement at the High School
¶ 20 The State first argues that the trial court improperly granted respondent's motion to suppress the statement respondent made at the high school. The State's argument in this regard is twofold. Relying principally on Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d 248, and the cases cited therein, the State initially contends that, because the school personnel were not acting as agents of the police, respondent was not subject to a custodial interrogation at the high school. The State also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the school personnel were "other public official[s] or employee[s]" and therefore required to comply with the procedural safeguards set forth in section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act. Because we find the State's second argument dispositive, we confine our discussion to that matter. ¶ 21 Subsection (a-5) of section 5-401.5 was added to the Act by an amendment effective January 1, 2017. Pub. Act 99-882, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5). Section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act provides as follows:
"(a-5) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor, who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 18 years of age, is presumed to be inadmissible when the statement is obtained from the minor while the minor is subject to custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, juvenile officer, or other
public official or employee prior to the officer, State's Attorney, public official, or employee:
(1) continuously reads [sic] to the minor, in its entirety and without stopping for purposes of a response from the minor or verifying comprehension, the following statement: 'You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not have to say anything. Anything you do say can be used against you in court. You have the right to get help from a lawyer. If you cannot pay for a lawyer, the court will get you one for free. You can ask for a lawyer at any time. You have the right to stop this interview at any time.'; and
(2) after reading the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (a-5), the public official or employee shall ask the minor the following questions and wait for the minor's response to each question:
(A) 'Do you want to have a lawyer?'
(B) 'Do you want to talk to me?' " 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a-5) (West 2016).
Thus, in this case, if the school personnel who questioned respondent at the high school were "other public official[s] or employee[s]" and respondent was subject to a "custodial interrogation," respondent's statement is presumed to be inadmissible unless he was read the statement and the questions set forth in subsections (a-5)(1) and (a-5)(2) of section 5-401.5. While section 5-401.5 of the Act defines "custodial interrogation" (see
705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a) (West 2016)), it does not define the phrase "other public official or employee." ¶ 22 The trial court summarily concluded that school officials are "public employee[s]" for purposes of section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act. The State argues that the trial court's determination
was designed to remedy [citation], as well as the legislative history to discern legislative intent [citation]."). ¶ 27 As noted previously, effective January 1, 2017, the General Assembly amended section 5-401.5 of the Act to add subsection (a-5). Pub. Act 99-882, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending
705 ILCS 405/5-401.5). Public Act 99-882 began as Senate Bill 2370 (99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 2370, 2016 Sess.). Introduced on January 28, 2016, by Senator Van Pelt, Senate Bill 2370, as originally drafted, did not include subsection (a-5). 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, January 28, 2016, at 6. During debate on the bill prior to the adoption of the amendment adding subsection (a-5), Senator Van Pelt expressed concern about false confessions by children at the hands of law enforcement personnel. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 53-56 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). She commented:
"Also to note that currently our police officers are even—are allowed to use deception in interrogating children. The courts have upheld waivers of lawyers by children. Even when the police misrepresent the evidence and deceive the child, the Supreme Court has held that the deception is not
per se unlawful and the use of deception or subterfuge does not alone invalidate a confession. Now, any of us know that if we have a fourteen-year-old that is up against a veteran police officer with twenty years of experience and he comes and begins to use psychological interrogation tactics, that our children are more likely than not [
sic] going to be able to—stand under that type of pressure, and being afraid and many of them being intimidated will confess to crimes." 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 54 (statements of Senator Van Pelt).
Senator Van Pelt explained that the purpose of the legislation was to "ensure[ ] that all children subject to custodial interrogation in a homicide case will have a lawyer." 99 Ill. Gen. Assem.,
forth in the statute. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment suppressing the statement respondent made to the school personnel at the high school.
¶ 36 B. Statement at the Police Station
¶ 37 The State also argues that the trial court improperly granted respondent's motion to suppress the statement he made at the police station, on the basis that respondent was not "in custody" when he spoke to Officer Frey. ¶ 38 The recording requirement set forth in section 5-401.5(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016)) applies only to a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or "other place of detention." Specifically, the statute provides:
"(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor who, at the time of the commission of the offense was under the age of 18 years, made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the minor in any criminal proceeding or juvenile court proceeding, for any act that if committed by an adult would be a misdemeanor offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or any felony offense unless:
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered." 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016).
Subsection (f) of section 5-401.5 allows for the presumption of inadmissibility to be overcome "by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances."
705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(f) (West 2016).
(f) of section 5-401.5 allows for the presumption of inadmissibility to be overcome "by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was
voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances." (Emphasis added.)
705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(f) (West 2016). In this case, although the State argues that the statement respondent provided at the police station was voluntary, it makes no claim that the statement was reliable. See
People v.
Whitfield, 2017 IL App (2d) 140878, ¶ 97 (noting that the issue of reliability must be considered separately from voluntariness);
People v.
Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 100678, ¶ 66 (emphasizing that whether the defendant's statement was reliable is a separate inquiry from whether it was voluntary). The failure to provide argument as to both prongs of subsection (f) results in forfeiture of the State's claim that it had overcome the presumption of inadmissibility. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (providing that an appellant's brief must include "[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on");
In re Marriage of Woodrum, 2018 IL App (3d) 170369, ¶ 63 (noting that failure to develop an argument and provide any authority in support of a contention results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal).
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm that portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County granting respondent's motion to suppress the statement respondent made at the police station but reverse that portion of the judgment granting respondent's motion to suppress the statement respondent made at the high school. This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 47 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. ¶ 48 Cause remanded.