JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois, Circuit No. 16-MR-1067 Honorable John C. Anderson, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice McDade concurred in the judgment.
Justice Schmidt dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Pension Board's denial of plaintiff firefighter's claim for a line of duty disability pension was reversed where the manifest weight of the evidence established that certain acts of duty causally contributed to plaintiff's disability by aggravating or exacerbating the symptoms of his preexisting psychological disorder to the point that they became permanently disabling. ¶ 2 The plaintiff, Gregory Prawdzik (Prawdzik), a former firefighter, brought an action for administrative review to the circuit court of Will County appealing the decision of the defendant, the Homer Township Fire Protection District Firefighters' Pension Fund (Board), denying Prawdzik a "line of duty" disability pension. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. This appeal followed.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 Prawdzik was employed as a firefighter for the Homer Township Fire Protection District Fire Department starting on May 8, 2006. He also served in the Air National Guard. ¶ 5 In 2008-09, during his employment as a firefighter, Prawdzik was deployed for military duty in Afghanistan for a 10-month period. He was deployed to the eastern border of Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan, where he served as a combat medic and combat advisor. The area where Prawdzik served was a thoroughfare for Taliban insurgents. Prawdzik trained, mentored, and advised a medical platoon of a battalion-sized element of the Afghan army. He accompanied his Afghan unit on combat missions approximately 3-4 times per week. Missions could last anywhere from several hours to one week. Prawdzik provided medical treatment to troops who later died. ¶ 6 Prawdzik testified that he encountered many life-threatening incidents while he was in Afghanistan. While on combat missions, Prawdzik was shot at approximately 10 times. Moreover, he testified that he experienced approximately 10 rocket attacks or improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. On one occasion, insurgents fired rockets at the base where Prawdzik was stationed. Prawdzik rolled out of his bunk and laid on the floor. As the rockets kept coming, someone yelled for everyone to get to the bunkers. Prawdzik thought he was going to die and was thinking about his wife and son and how they would get along without him. The evaluated by three physicians of its choosing: Dr. Robert Reff, Dr. Stevan Weine, and Dr. Cathy Frank. ¶ 24 Dr. Reff opined that Prawdzik suffers from Generalized Anxiety Disorder with residual post-traumatic symptoms. Dr. Reff concluded that this condition prevented Prawdzik from functioning as a firefighter because it limits his ability to drive large vehicles, including fire trucks and engines. Although Dr. Reff acknowledged that Prawdzik's preexisting PTSD and anxiety disorder was caused by his combat experiences in Afghanistan, he opined that Prawdzik's disability from PTSD was, at least in part, the result of his firefighter duties. Dr. Reff explained:
"It is my opinion that Mr. Prawdzik suffers from a disability resulting from an act of duty. After completing the sixth month Corrective Plan established by Dr. Rogers in September 2011, it appears as if Mr. Prawdzik was able to perform adequately as a firefighter/paramedic, including driving as required. It was not until [the November 7, 2014, incident] that Mr. Prawdzik experienced performance limiting anxiety again. * * * Mr. Prawdzik's current episode would be considered an aggravation of his pre-existing psychiatric condition, more likely than not, caused by the incident that occurred on November 7, 2014."
Dr. Reff further opined that Prawdzik's current disability was "permanent" based upon the length of time that Prawdzik had suffered some degree of symptoms and "the significance of symptoms he suffered following the [November 7, 2014] incident." ¶ 25 Dr. Weine opined that Prawdzik was disabled and suffered from chronic PTSD, recurrent Major Depression, and isolated traumatic stress symptoms. Dr. Weine concluded that, over time, Prawdzik's PTSD symptoms had diminished to the point where he no longer meets the formal
inherent in the occupation and common to all firefighters is not the equivalent of the specific acts of duty contemplated by section 4-110" of the Code. ¶ 30 The Board concluded that the "underlying cause" of the claimant's disabling PTSD was "external to, and independent of, any specific act of duty or to the cumulative effects of acts of duty." It denied Prawdzik's claim for a "line of duty" pension on that basis. ¶ 31 Prawdzik filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board's decision in the circuit court of Will County. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. In its written Order, the circuit court stated that, "[h]ad the [court] been a member of the administrative board, the [court] might have reached a different conclusion." However, the circuit court found that, "regardless of which standard of review is applied, the Court must find that the record does not justify reversal." ¶ 32 This appeal followed.
PTSD is an anxiety disorder that occurs after an individual has experienced a traumatic event. More specifically, it is a psychological response to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or threat to the physical integrity of another person. The person's response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the trauma include persistent re-experiencing of the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent increased symptoms of arousal. Associated features include depressed mood, anxiety and irritability, sleep disturbance, difficulty concentrating, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollection of the trauma, feeling detached from others, markedly diminished interest or participation in activities, and recurrent and intrusive distressing recollection of the events.
The Board acknowledged that, during his November 2014 fitness for duty evaluation, Prawdzik denied almost all symptoms of PTSD. However, the Board found these denials to be "false in light of the record."
¶ 33 ANALYSIS
¶ 34 Prawdzik appeals the Board's denial of a line of duty disability pension. Before addressing the issues raised by Prawdzik, we note that Prawdzik's brief on appeal does not comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a). That rule provides, in relevant part, that
"[t]he appellant's brief shall include, as an appendix, * * * a copy of the judgment appealed from, [and] any opinion, memorandum, or findings of fact filed or entered by the trial judge
or by any administrative agency or its officers * * *. (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005).
Although Prawdzik included a copy of the circuit court's order in his appendix, he failed to include a copy of the Board's decision, in violation of Rule 342(a). Moreover, the table of
¶ 39 "Whether the facts, as found by the Board, satisfy the standard for awarding a line of duty disability pension" is a mixed question of law and fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Hammond, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 307. This is a less deferential standard than the manifest weight of the evidence standard, yet still "significantly deferential." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 21. Under this standard, we should affirm the Board's decision unless, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Hammond, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 307;
Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 21 Pure questions of law (such as the proper interpretation of a statute) are reviewed
do novo.
Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 538;
Village of Oak Park, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 365. ¶ 40 The section of the Illinois Pension Code addressing line of duty disability pensions provides, in relevant part:
"If a firefighter, as the result of sickness, accident or injury
incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, is found, pursuant to Section 4-112, to be physically or mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her being placed on disability pension, the firefighter shall be entitled to" a line of duty disability pension. (Emphasis added.)
40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2014).
Section 6-110 of the Code (
40 ILCS 5/6-110 (2014)) defines "act of duty" as:
"Any act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman
while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person." 40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West 2014).
¶ 41 To recover a line of duty disability pension, a claimant need not prove that his job duties were the "sole or even the primary cause" of his disability"; rather, it is sufficient that an act of duty was an "aggravating, contributing or exacerbating factor" in the ensuing disability.
Edwards v.
Addison Fire Protection District Firefighters' Pension Fund, 2013 Ill App (2d) 121262, ¶ 32; see also
Village of Oak Park, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 371. The claimant must only prove that the duty-related injury is a "causative factor contributing to the claimant's disability."
Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27; see also
Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 23. "There is no requirement that the duty-related incident be the originating or primary cause of injury, although a sufficient nexus between the injury and the performance of the duty must exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27. Accordingly, "[a] disability pension may be based upon the line-of-duty aggravation of a preexisting condition."
Id. (quoting
Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 505); see also
Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 23. ¶ 42 In this case, two of the three physicians chosen by the Board (Drs. Reff and Weine) expressly opined that Prawdzik's work duties, including the November 7, 2014, work incident, aggravated or exacerbated Prawdzik's preexisting psychological conditions, resulting in Prawdzik's disability (
i.
e., his inability to continue working as a firefighter). Dr. Reff opined that the Prawdzik's disability was caused by an "act of duty," (specifically, the November 7, 2014, work incident). Similarly, although Dr. Weine acknowledged that Prawdzik's PTSD was
¶ 53 In any event, the instant case is distinguishable from
Graves. Here, Prawdzik presented evidence of a specific, work-related traumatic incident (the November 7, 2014, incident) that aggravated his preexisting symptoms and rendered his preexisting psychological condition permanently disabling. Unlike the claimant in
Graves, Prawdzik's did not base his claim entirely upon allegations of stress or depression resulting from general employment functions. ¶ 54 The manifest weight of the evidence in this case establishes that Prawdzik's psychological disability was caused, at least in part, by his work duties. Even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in the Board's favor, a conclusion opposite of that reached by the Board is clearly apparent.
This provision appears in the Code section governing municipalities of 500,000 people or more. There is no definition of "act of duty" in the section of the Code applying to firefighters in municipalities with populations of 500,000 and under. However, our appellate court has held that section 6-110's definition "applies equally to all firefighters" in Illinois. Mabie v. Village of Schaumburg, 364 Ill. App. 3d 756, 759 (2006); Jensen v. East Dundee Fire Protection District, 362 Ill. App. 3d 197, 204 (2005).
Nor did Dr. Wasyliw deny that Prawdzik's work duties aggravated or exacerbated his symptoms in a way that contributed to his disability. To the contrary, Dr. Wasyliw acknowledged that the increasing "generalized" anxiety that Prawdzik had been experiencing for a few days in early November "became worse" after the November 7, 2014, work incident, and he opined that Prawdzik's anxiety disorder was "more widespread" at the time of his November 21, 2014, evaluation than it had been in 2011. --------
¶ 55 CONCLUSION
¶ 56 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed. The cause is remanded to the Board with instructions to award Prawdzik a line of duty disability pension. ¶ 57 Reversed; cause remanded. ¶ 58 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: ¶ 59 I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff's service to this country, which undeniably came at a great personal loss, demands the respect of this court. However, I disagree with the majority's finding that a conclusion opposite that reached by the Board is clearly apparent. For that reason, I would affirm the Board's decision and find plaintiff is not entitled to a line-of-duty fireman's disability. ¶ 60 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that neither plaintiff's general firefighting/EMS duties nor the November 7, 2014, incident were " 'causative factor[s] contributing to the claimant's disability.' " Supra ¶ 41 (quoting Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27). In fact, the record shows that plaintiff's PTSD symptoms waxed and waned since he returned from combat. For example, in 2010 and 2011, plaintiff expressed concerns that 24 his PTSD symptoms were causing problems with coworkers. In 2013, plaintiff's PTSD symptoms increased to the extent that he sought mental health treatment. As late as September 2014, plaintiff continued to complain of a depressed mood, nightmares and flashbacks. In the weeks leading up to the November 7, 2014, incident, plaintiff reported experiencing increased anxiety. After the incident, claimant worked two more shifts without issue. He reported experiencing a "normal amount" of anxiety following the incident that slowly increased until he realized, on November 16, 2014, he could no longer focus on his job. Dr. Wasyliw attributed plaintiff's increased anxiety leading up to the incident to plaintiff's longstanding physical problems, new medications—which plaintiff stopped taking following the incident—and alcohol use. In January 2015, plaintiff reported having increased anxiety and panic attacks. In February 2015, he had a panic attack while driving his personal vehicle and in July 2015 he had a panic attack while riding on a duck boat. Because there is sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision, I would defer to its finding that the November 7, 2014, incident, like others before and after, merely triggered symptoms of plaintiff's preexisting PTSD but that the incident did not causally contribute to his disability. ¶ 61 In closing, I note that the majority's analysis in this case could have far reaching detrimental consequences for our combat veterans. Specifically, the majority's decision may deter employers—at least police and fire departments—from hiring combat veterans if their general job duties might trigger some preexisting PTSD which would entitle them to receive a line-of-duty disability pension.