Matthews v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA United States District Judge

Iaisha N. Matthews ("Plaintiff"), represented by counsel, brings this action pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "the Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). The Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). Presently before the Court are the parties' competing motions for judgement on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that the matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings and Defendant's motion is denied.

On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Social Security Income ("SSI"), alleging disability as of January 1, 2005 due to a learning disability, anxiety disorder, manic depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Administrative Transcript ("T.") 95, 107. The claims were initially denied on July 3, 2013. T. 113-18. At Plaintiff's request, a hearing was conducted on September 3, 2015, in Buffalo, New York by administrative law judge ("ALJ") Bruce Mazzarella, with Plaintiff appearing with her attorney. A vocational expert ("VE") also testified. T. 31-93. At the hearing, Plaintiff withdrew her Title II application for DIB, noting a lack of significant medical evidence of disability prior to the date last insured of September 30, 2005. T. 35-36.

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on December 31, 2015. T. 10-25. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals' Council. T. 8. On April 11, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. T. 1-5. Plaintiff then timely commenced this action.

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date. T.15.

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the "severe" impairments of: learning disability; schizoaffective disorder; bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; panic disorder; alcohol abuse; and mild carpal tunnel syndrome. Id.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. T. 16.

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff as having the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: limited to performing simple, repetitive and routine tasks, with only occasional contact with the general public and fellow workers; and should not engage in constant, repetitive gross and fine dexterity with the hands. T. 17.

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. T. 24. At step five, the ALJ relied on the VE's testimony to find that, taking into account Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including the representative occupations of: cleaner, housekeeper; picking table worker; and routing clerk. Id. The ALJ accordingly found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. T. 25.

A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by "substantial evidence" or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court must accept the Commissioner's findings of fact, provided that such findings are supported by "substantial evidence" in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner's findings "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive"). "Substantial evidence means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). The reviewing court nevertheless must scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or detracts from both sides. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "The deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).

Plaintiff seeks remand of this matter, arguing that although the ALJ purported to give great weight to the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Renee Baskin, he improperly ignored Dr. Baskin's finding that Plaintiff would have moderate limitations in her ability to maintain attention and concentration, and to maintain a regular schedule. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that the ALJ failed to properly explain his assessment of Dr. Baskin's opinion.

Dr. Baskin performed a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on May 6, 2013. T. 382-85. Dr. Baskin noted that upon examination, Plaintiff's attention and concentration were mildly impaired due to limited intellectual functioning (lack of formal education). T. 384. Plaintiff was able to do simple calculations, but unable to do serial threes. Id. Plaintiff's recent and remote memory skills were mildly impaired - she was able to recall three out of three objects immediately, but only one out of three objects after five minutes. Id. Dr. Baskin estimated Plaintiff's by the ALJ further warrants remand.

Plaintiff has been treated by LCSW-R Corsaro, under the supervision of treating psychiatrist Dr. Brian Joseph, on a biweekly basis since April 2013. T. 396-404, 621. Based on two years of biweekly treatment, LCSW-R Corsaro opined on May 8, 2015, that Plaintiff had moderate limitations with her: activities of daily living; ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions; and ability to respond appropriately to supervision. T. 622-23. She further opined Plaintiff had marked limitations in: maintaining social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner; her ability to respond appropriately to co-workers; and her ability to satisfy an employer's normal quality, production, and attendance standards. T. 622-24. LCSW-R Corsara also opined Plaintiff had severe limitations in her ability to: respond to customary work pressures; perform complex tasks on a sustained basis in a full-time work setting; and perform simple tasks on a sustained basis in a full-time work setting. T. 624. Finally, she reported Plaintiff has experienced repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation (on three or more occasions within one year, for at least two weeks at a time), causing her to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms. T. 623.

In his decision, the ALJ found that LCSW-R Corsara's opinion should not be given controlling weight because LCSW-R Corsara is not a physician. T. 23. The ALJ further found the opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Baskin's report and inconsistent with NCMHD treatment notes over the treatment period. Id. He accordingly gave LCSW-R Corsara's opinion little weight. Id.

The Court acknowledges that mental health counselors are "not an acceptable treating source as defined by the Commissioner." Esteves v. Barnhart, 492 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). "Acceptable medical sources" include licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists, podiatrists, and qualified speech-language pathologists. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a). Nonetheless, opinions from other sources must be considered by the adjudicator, as the regulations require the Commissioner to "consider all relevant evidence in the case record when [making] a determination or decision about wether [an] individual is disabled. SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4 (S.S.A. Aug. 9, 2006). Furthermore, the opinions from medical sources such as Licensed Clinical Social Workers and Nurse Practitioners are "important and should be evaluated on key issues such as ... functional effects [of an impairment]." Anderson v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-4969, 2009 WL 2824584, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009). Notably, this is even more relevant within the context of "mental disabilities, which by their nature are best diagnosed over time." Santiago v. Barnhart, 441 F. Supp. 2d 620, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

While an ALJ may reject the opinion of a mental health counselor where it is inconsistent with the claimant's treatment records (Bulavinetz v. Astrue, 663 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)), the ALJ is required to use the same factors as used for the evaluation of the opinions from "acceptable medical sources" enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (see § 404.1527(f)), including properly explaining weight given to such opinions in such a way that "allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator's reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case." Id.

In this case, the ALJ again failed to provide the specificity required by the regulations to allow for a meaningful review of his reasoning. See Marthe, 2016 WL 3514126, at *8. In particular, the ALJ indiscriminately cited no less than 150 pages of treatment notes from over a period of more than two years, making the conclusory assertion that LCSW-R Corsaro's assessment was inconsistent with them. T. 23. Given the length of time over and frequency with which LCSW-R Corsaro treated Plaintiff, the Court finds the ALJ did not meet his burden of properly explaining his rejection of LCSW-R Corsaro's disability-supporting opinion. Accordingly, on remand, the Court instructs the ALJ to give a thorough and proper analysis of LCSW-R Corsaro's opinion, in conjunction with a thorough review of the NCMHD treatment notes, and to then provide an appropriate explanation of the weight assigned to the opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 11) is granted to the extent that this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. The Commissioner's opposing motion for judgement on the pleadings (Docket No. 13) is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.

S/Michael A. Telesca

HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA

United States District Judge Dated: September 13, 2018

Rochester, New York