People v. Vega

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 14 CR 2252 Honorable Matthew E. Coghlan, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder over his contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to an aggregate 61-year prison sentence. ¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Brandon Vega was found guilty of two counts of attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2012)) and received consecutive sentences of 35 and 26 years' imprisonment, for a total sentence of 61 years' imprisonment. Defendant's sentences included a 25-year minimum enhancement because he personally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily harm to one victim (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2012)), and a 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2012)) with respect to the other victim. On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted first-degree murder and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 61 years' imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with, inter alia, six counts of attempted first-degree murder stemming from the October 26, 2013 shooting of Xazavier Little (Xazavier) and Edward Little (Edward). At trial, the following evidence was presented. ¶ 5 Xazavier testified that, prior to October 2013, when he was 16 years' old, he was a member of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang. He knew several other people in the gang, including defendant, with whom he attended grammar school. Xazavier explained that, in order to join the gang, a person must be "violated in," which encompasses being beaten without fighting back by fellow gang members for two minutes. He was a member for two years before he decided to "quit," by not associating with the gang members anymore. Ordinarily, when a person leaves the gang, that person is supposed to be "violated out," which entails a "more violent" beating by gang members for six minutes. Xazavier was not "violated out" of the gang. ¶ 6 In October 2013, Xazavier was living in a two-flat apartment in the 2100 block of North Mulligan Avenue with his family, including his uncle Edward. Edward's bedroom was located on the first floor, in the back of the house, overlooking the patio. Xazavier lived on the second floor. There was a motion-activated light over the patio and garage. ¶ 7 On October 26, 2013, Xazavier was no longer in the gang and was at his cousin's house smoking marijuana. He left his cousin's house around 3 a.m. and walked home through the alley behind his house. As Xazavier approached his house, he saw defendant and two other people drinking and talking near a blue van parked two garages down from his garage. Xazavier became nervous and walked closer to the garages in order to avoid being seen. ¶ 8 Xazavier entered his backyard, walked through the yard, and began climbing the back steps when he heard defendant yell, "Zaza, come here." Xazavier continued to climb the stairs and observed defendant walk into the backyard with codefendant Jackie Mendoza. As Xazavier was at his back door, defendant began climbing the stairs behind Xazavier and told him to "come outside and handle [your] business like a man." Xazavier believed this meant to "come take a violation." He responded, "I am not on none of that." ¶ 9 Defendant, on the third step of the staircase, pulled a handgun from his waistband. Defendant then pointed the gun at Edward, who had gotten out of bed and was looking outside through a window. Defendant stated, "I will shoot your uncle in the head right now." Defendant then began to shoot, hitting Xazavier in his hand and abdomen. ¶ 10 Xazavier ran inside and told his mother that he had been shot. He then ran downstairs and saw Edward coming out of his bedroom holding his leg, which had a "hole" in it and was bleeding. Police eventually arrived, and Xazavier told them he had been shot by defendant. Xazavier was taken to the hospital where surgery was performed because of internal bleeding. He later learned that a bullet pierced his lung and exited his back, and that there were bullet fragments left in his right hand. Xazavier remained hospitalized for about a week. ¶ 11 Later on the same day as the shooting, following surgery, Detectives Tekaki and Jensen met with Xazavier in his hospital room. Xazavier told them that he had been shot by defendant, and identified defendant in a photo array. On January 1, 2014, Xazavier went to the police station and identified defendant from a lineup. Xazavier was "a hundred percent" certain that defendant was the person who shot him when he spoke with responding officers, when he picked defendant out of a photo array, when he picked defendant out of a lineup, and when he identified defendant in court. ¶ 12 Xazavier testified that he knew brothers Michael and Matthew Berrones, having grown up with them. They were also members of the same gang as defendant and Xazavier. Xazavier testified that Michael Berrones does not look like defendant and that he would never confuse the two. ¶ 13 On cross-examination, Xazavier admitted that, on January 1, 2014, he told police that he did not know the people who were present by the van in the alley on October 26, 2013. Xazavier further testified that he did not recall whether he told the detectives at the hospital that defendant fired at his uncle before firing at him, but admitted he "may have." Xazavier testified that he is not currently in a gang but admitted to posting pictures on his Facebook page after the shooting "throwing up" hand signs for different gangs. ¶ 14 On redirect examination, Xazavier testified that he had told detectives at the hospital, following his surgery, that defendant was among the individuals by the van in the alley. Xazavier also explained that he was not in a gang but wanted to be in one. Because of this, he posted pictures of himself flashing gang signs, which was considered "false reporting," making him a "poser." ¶ 15 Edward testified that, on October 26, 2013, he was living at the same address on Mulligan Avenue as Xazavier. Around 3 a.m., Edward was asleep in the back bedroom when he heard both a male and female voice say, "come take your punishment, Jay-Jay, come take your punishment like a man." He looked out the window, which overlooked the back porch, and saw Xazavier standing in the doorway and a man holding a gun on the porch. Edward saw the left side of the man's face. The man, who he identified in court as defendant, was illuminated by a motion-detecting light. There was also a woman walking around the yard, telling Xazavier to come take his punishment. Edward had not seen defendant or the woman prior to that day. ¶ 16 When Edward saw defendant point the gun at Xazavier, he froze because he had not seen anything like that in his life. Defendant then pointed the gun at Edward and said, "I'll kill your family." Edward then saw Xazavier begin to go upstairs, and defendant shoot the gun towards Xazavier five times, hitting him as he entered the doorway. ¶ 17 Edward jumped to the floor and began crawling out of the bedroom. He heard five more shots and felt pain in his right calf. Edward realized he had been shot and was bleeding. He took a towel and wrapped it around his leg. The police were called, and an ambulance took him to the hospital. ¶ 18 Edward was "in pain" and his "mind wasn't right or nothing because of what [he] had been through." At the hospital, he met with detectives, but was not able to identify defendant in the photo array. When Edward went to the police station on January 1, 2014, he identified defendant in a lineup as the individual who had shot him. ¶ 19 On cross-examination, Edward testified that he wears glasses for distance and reading and that he did not have them on when the shooting occurred. He explained that he did not need them because he could see "practically well without them." Edward denied telling Officer Perez at the house that he was asleep when he awoke to gunshots and felt a "burning sensation." He explained that if a police officer wrote that down, "[s]omebody took a wrong report." Edward did not have a chance to talk to Xazavier about the shooting prior to speaking with the detectives at the hospital. ¶ 20 Chicago police officer Angela Perez testified that, on October 26, 2013, she arrived at the apartment building on Mulligan Avenue shortly after the shooting. She observed Xazavier lying in blood on the ground of the hallway. Prior to his transport by ambulance, Xazavier told her that he was shot by defendant. Officer Perez also observed Edward with a gunshot wound to his right leg, a few feet from Xazavier. Edward told her that he was asleep in bed, heard gunshots, felt a burning sensation before realizing he had been shot. Edward did not tell Officer Perez that he had seen the shooter or had looked out of the window. ¶ 21 Chicago police detective Ross Tekaki testified that he arrived at the residence on Mulligan Avenue around 3:30 a.m. and proceeded to the back yard. He observed shell casings from a .40 caliber firearm around the deck area and bullet holes in a window and around the window frame. He further saw bullet holes in the door of the rear entrance. Detective Tekaki went into Edward's room and saw bullet holes in the blanket covering the window and on the walls, door, and dresser. ¶ 22 Later in the day, around 12:20 p.m., Detective Tekaki went to the hospital and showed Xazavier a photo array. Xazavier identified defendant, without hesitation, as the individual who had shot him. ¶ 23 The parties stipulated that Dr. Anthony Beldea would testify that he treated Xazavier for multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Beldea observed one gunshot wound to the right chest, a second bullet hole in right mid lower back, and a third and fourth bullet hole in the left hand. ¶ 24 Xazavier underwent surgery where it was determined that his diaphragm and liver were lacerated. Further, Xazavier's left hand was treated for a through and through gunshot wound, and x-ray imaging determined bullet fragments were present in the wound. ¶ 25 The parties further stipulated that Dr. Stephanie Eugene would testify that she treated Edward for a through and through gunshot wound to his right calf. The wound was cleaned and dressed and did not require surgery. Edward was released from the hospital a few hours later. ¶ 26 Chicago police officer O'Campo testified that, on December 6, 2013, he was assigned to accompany a parole agent performing a parole check on a juvenile at a house on North Moody Avenue. Matthew Berrones opened the door to the basement apartment. While officers were standing in the doorway, Michael Berrones tried to quickly exit the apartment through the same door. Officer O'Campo observed the butt of a handgun sticking out of the Michael Berrones' left pants pocket. The gun was recovered and determined to be a Glock model 22, .40 caliber, with three live rounds inside the magazine. ¶ 27 The parties stipulated that two shell casings from under the rear porch and three from on the rear porch were recovered from the Mulligan Avenue address. These five shell casings were fired from the Glock recovered from Michael Berrones. Further, this Glock was tested and found to be in good working order. ¶ 28 Chicago police officer Rodriguez testified as a gang expert, specifically Latin gangs in Chicago. He explained gang organization, boundaries, hand signals, and general behavior of gangs and their members. Specifically, Officer Rodriguez testified that there are various reasons why a gang member could be "violated," including if a member decided to leave the gang. Generally, "violations" take the form of a physical beating. He further described various tattoos of the Maniac Latin Disciples gang and identified tattoos from photographs of defendant as being gang related. Rodriguez identified hand signals from Xazavier's Facebook postings, which showed Xazavier "representing" rival gangs of the Maniac Latin Disciples. ¶ 29 At the conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of attempted first-degree murder of Xazavier and Edward, including a special finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to both Xazavier and Edward. It further found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. ¶ 30 Defendant filed a written motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial and a sentencing memorandum. This memorandum focused on the injury suffered by Edward and argued that, given the facts and Illinois case law, Edward did not suffer severe bodily injury. Accordingly, defendant argued, consecutive sentences were not appropriate. The trial court granted defendant's motion in part, stating that Edward's gunshot wound did not amount to great bodily harm where he was treated and released the same day. ¶ 31 At the sentencing hearing, Janette Rincon, defendant's cousin, testified that she had known defendant his entire life and was raised with him. She testified that defendant was always helpful to her, and would frequently babysit her two children. Defendant also visited his grandmother in the nursing home and took care of his father, who is paralyzed. ¶ 32 Richard Rincon, another of defendant's cousins, testified that, prior to defendant's incarceration, defendant was a temporary employee at the same company where he worked. Other workers considered defendant to be a "really good, hardworking guy." ¶ 33 In aggravation, the State highlighted the facts of the case and noted that defendant faced a minimum sentence of 31 years' imprisonment with respect to the attempted murder of Xazavier and 26 years' imprisonment with respect to the attempted murder of Edward. Further, the State argued that consecutive sentences were mandatory because the injuries to Xazavier constituted "severe bodily harm" under section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Because of this, the State noted the minimum possible sentence was 56 years' imprisonment and the maximum possible sentence was 105 years' imprisonment or natural life. The State asked for "an appropriate sentence given the nature of the two shootings." ¶ 34 In mitigation, defense counsel noted the testimony of his two cousins, wherein they testified that defendant was a hard worker who was helpful and caring to his family members. Counsel further referred to the presentence investigation report (PSI), which indicated that defendant had a substance abuse problem with alcohol and drugs. Specifically, counsel noted that defendant often drank in excess, even resulting in having his stomach pumped, smoked marijuana regularly, and had experimented with other drugs. Counsel referred to the testimony of his codefendant Mendoza that defendant was drunk the night of the shooting and is uncontrollable when he is drunk. Defense counsel noted defendant's rehabilitation potential and asked for the minimum sentence of 31 years' imprisonment for the attempted murder of Xazavier and 25 years for the attempted murder of Edward, to be served concurrently. ¶ 35 In allocution, defendant apologized "to the victims and to the families," regretted what had happened, and "accept[ed] full responsibility for [his] actions." He noted that his "drinking problem is not an excuse for what [he] did." He further stated that he was "glad nobody died" but knew he had "to pay the consequences." ¶ 36 The court stated, "I've had the opportunity to review the presentence investigation, the defendant's background, family histories, alcohol and abuse of substance history, social history. I've considered all the factors in aggravation and mitigation." The court found that the injury suffered by Xazavier constituted severe bodily injury mandating the imposition of consecutive sentences. ¶ 37 Following a break in the sentencing hearing to review case law, the court again held that the sentences were to run consecutively. It stated:

"The Court has taken into consideration the facts of the case, the defendant's background, all the factors in aggravation and mitigation, and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. Certainly, the defendant's conduct threatened serious harm. That is implicit in the offenses. I do not consider that in aggravation. My recollection is this was gang motivated."

The court noted that defendant faced a maximum sentence of natural life imprisonment, but believed that the mandatory minimum sentences "certainly are significant jail sentences themselves." ¶ 38 The court sentenced defendant to "10 years plus 25 years with 35 years" in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) for the attempted murder of Xazavier. It imposed a sentence of "6 plus 20 years" in the IDOC for the attempted murder of Edward. It further ordered the sentences to run consecutive to each other for a total of 61 years in the IDOC. The court merged the remaining aggravated battery with a firearm counts into the attempted murder counts. Defendant's written motion to reconsider sentence was denied. This appeal followed.

Defendant proceeded to a jury trial, while his codefendant, Jacqueline Mendoza, proceeded to a simultaneous, but severed, bench trial. Our recitation of the facts is limited to only those presented as a part of defendant's jury trial. --------

¶ 39 ANALYSIS

¶ 40 We note we have jurisdiction to review this matter, as defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 606 (eff. Dec. 11 2014). ¶ 41 On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the shooter and sustain his convictions for attempted first degree murder where there were several inconsistencies and contradictions in the witnesses' testimonies. He further argues the trial court abused its discretion where it failed to properly consider the relevant sentencing factors and imposed an excessive sentence. ¶ 42 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. A reviewing court will not substitute its own judgment for the trier of fact on issues of the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v. Moore, 2016 IL App (1st) 133814, ¶ 54. The jury, as trier of fact, has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and any inferences derived therefrom, determine the credibility of witnesses, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. People v. Kidd, 2014 IL App (1st) 112854, ¶ 27. We will not reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). ¶ 43 In order to sustain a conviction for attempted first-degree murder, the State had to prove that defendant (1) performed an act constituting a "substantial step" toward the commission of murder, and (2) intended to kill the victim. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2012); People v. Petermon, 2014 IL App (1st) 113536, ¶ 39. Proof of a specific intent to kill is a necessary element of the offense. People v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 683, 687 (1995). "However, because the specific intent to take a life is a state of mind, it is rarely proven through direct evidence." People v. Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142085, ¶ 52. This court has noted that " '[t]he very fact of firing a gun at a person supports the conclusion that the person doing so acted with an intent to kill.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petermon, 2014 IL App (1st) 113536, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Ephraim, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1110 (2001)). The jury is tasked with determining whether a specific intent to kill exists, and its conclusion will not be disturbed absent reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142085, ¶ 52. ¶ 44 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted murder convictions as to both Xazavier and Edward. The record shows that defendant pointed his gun at Xazavier and Edward and said, "I will shoot your uncle in the head right now" or "I'll kill your family." Defendant began to shoot and hit Xazavier in his hand and abdomen and hit Edward as he crawled from the bedroom. Both Xazavier and Edward identified defendant as the shooter. Viewing defendant's statements to Xazavier and Edward, coupled with his subsequent shooting of them, the evidence was sufficient to show a specific intent to kill both Xazavier and Edward. See People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 27 ("A reasonable trier of fact could infer that shooting a defenseless person multiple times evinces a specific intent to kill that person"), pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 121932 (May 24, 2017). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that no rational jury could find the offense of attempted murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 45 Defendant nevertheless contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Edward's testimony was contradictory to Officer Perez's testimony, Edward's credibility was lacking because he could not identify defendant in a photo array following the shooting, and Xazavier's testimony was inconsistent regarding both who was present in the alley before the shooting and who defendant shot at first. He argues these inconsistencies and contradictions established reasonable doubt precluding a guilty finding of attempted first-degree murder. ¶ 46 Defendant's arguments essentially ask us to resolve the inconsistencies in the evidence presented at trial and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. However, we will not substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. See Moore, 2016 IL App (1st) 133814, ¶ 54. Any inconsistencies regarding Edward's testimony were brought out at trial, where it was the duty of the jury to resolve the inconsistencies and determine his credibility. See People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. Likewise, the jury heard the inconsistencies regarding Xazavier's testimony and resolved them accordingly. "Moreover, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt." People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 332 (2000). Where the jury was presented with the all the testimony, including any contradictions or inconsistencies, we cannot say the evidence was so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt exists. See Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. ¶ 47 In his reply brief, defendant contends that, given Edward's testimony, "the victim's identification of the shooter remained uncorroborated at the conclusion of the State's case in chief." He further asserts that, because the firearm used in the shooting was recovered from someone other than defendant, namely Michael Berrones, no reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of attempted first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the identification of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed the offender under circumstances permitting a positive identification. People v. Starks, 2014 IL App (1st) 121169, ¶ 48. Here, even if the identification was uncorroborated as defendant claims, Xazavier made a positive identification of defendant, not Michael Berrones, as the shooter. Further, Xazavier testified that he was in the same gang as Michael Berrones, and that Berrones does not look like defendant. Xazavier explained that he would never confuse the two individuals. ¶ 48 Further, rational jurors could find Xazavier's identification of defendant reliable. Xazavier viewed defendant face to face before the shooting, and had known him through both the gang and grammar school. The patio was illuminated, and Xazavier and defendant were talking while defendant held the gun. Xazavier identified defendant at his home moments after the shooting, at the hospital later that day after seeing a photo array, and in court at trial. Accordingly, Xazavier's identification of defendant was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. See People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307-08 (1989) (listing factors to consider when assessing the reliability of identification testimony). ¶ 49 Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 61-year prison sentence where it failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors and his potential for rehabilitation. He asks us to reduce his sentence. ¶ 50 The trial court has broad discretion in imposing an appropriate sentence, and where, as here, that sentence falls within the range provided by statute it will not be altered absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Cole, 2016 IL App (1st) 141664, ¶ 55. An abuse of discretion exists where the sentence is "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000) (citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999)). The trial court is in the superior position to determine an appropriate sentence because of its personal observation of defendant and the proceedings. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). It must consider the relevant sentencing factors, which include the defendant's credibility, demeanor, social environment, age, mentality, habits, and moral character. Cole, 2016 IL App (1st) 141664, ¶ 55. ¶ 51 We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence of 61 years' imprisonment. Attempted first-degree murder is a Class X felony, punishable by 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012). However, there was a special finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to Xazavier, requiring an enhancement of 25-years or up to a term of natural life to defendant's sentence for attempted first-degree murder of Xazavier. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2012). Based on this, defendant faced a term of 31 to 55 years' imprisonment, or up to natural life, for the attempted first-degree murder of Xazavier. ¶ 52 Additionally, there was a special finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm, requiring a 20-year enhancement to the sentence imposed for attempted first-degree murder of Edward. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2012). Based on this, defendant faced a term of 26 to 50 years' imprisonment for the attempted first-degree murder of Edward. ¶ 53 Moreover, section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences where "[o]ne of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2012). Here, the trial court explicitly found that defendant inflicted severe bodily injury on Xazavier, requiring mandatory consecutive sentences. Therefore, defendant faced an aggregate term of 57 to 105 years' imprisonment, or up to natural life, for the attempted first-degree murder of both Xazavier and Edward. ¶ 54 Defendant's 35-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder of Xazavier and his 26-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder of Edward, each fall within the statutorily-provided ranges, and we therefore presume they are proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 47. Therefore, his aggregate 61-year prison sentence also falls within the statutory range and is presumed proper. Id. ¶ 55 Defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors before imposing sentence. We disagree, as the trial court explicitly stated:

"The Court has taken into consideration the facts of the case, the defendant's background, all the factors in aggravation and

mitigation, and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. Certainly, the defendant's conduct threatened serious harm. That is implicit in the offenses. I do not consider that in aggravation. My recollection is this was gang motivated."

¶ 56 The defendant "must make an affirmative showing that the sentencing court did not consider the relevant factors." People v. Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 38. Here, defendant has failed to point to any evidence or any mitigating factors that the trial court supposedly did not consider. Rather, defendant conclusorily states "[t]he trial court did not point to any particular piece of evidence or factor that leads to his sentence of sixty one years' imprisonment." Further, to the extent defendant is challenging the trial court's failure to explicitly list the reasons for a particular sentence, our supreme court has held that a trial court is not required to list the particular reasons. See People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 162-63 (1982). ¶ 57 Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider his rehabilitative potential. Specifically, he notes that, while he did have one juvenile conviction for aggravated battery, he did not have any adult convictions. Further, defendant had an educational goal of obtaining his G.E.D., had been steadily employed for five months, and was helpful and caring to his family members. ¶ 58 A sentence must reflect both the seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The seriousness of the offense, and not mitigating evidence, is the most important sentencing factor. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55. Here, the evidence established that defendant shot a gun multiple times at Xazavier and Edward, striking them both. The jury concluded that he intended to murder both of them. Given the danger, the trial court could have properly placed more emphasis on the seriousness of the offense over mitigating factors. See People v. Sims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 9, 24 (2010) ("[t]he seriousness of the offense or the need to protect the public may outweigh mitigating factors and the goal of rehabilitation"). ¶ 59 Moreover, the trial court knew about defendant's educational aspirations as it was contained in the PSI, which the trial court stated it had considered. The court also heard from defendant's cousins about his prior work history, as well as the help and support he provided to his family. Further, defense counsel highlighted defendant's cousins' testimonies in mitigation. It is presumed that when mitigating evidence is presented to the trial court, the court considered it absent some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself. People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. As this evidence was presented to the trial court, defendant cannot show that the trial court failed to consider this mitigating evidence or otherwise did not consider his rehabilitative potential. ¶ 60 In his reply brief, defendant asserts, for the first time, that his sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence. However, points not argued in an appellant's opening brief are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time in the reply brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017); People v. Polk, 2014 IL App (1st) 122017, ¶ 49. Even if we were to address this argument, we find defendant's reliance on cases where sentences imposed on juvenile offenders were considered to be de facto life sentences, inapposite. See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271; People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B; People Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604. ¶ 61 Here, defendant was 18 years' old at the time of the attempted murders and was therefore not a juvenile. See People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶¶ 25-28 (finding the 18-year- old defendant sentenced to 80 years' imprisonment was an adult and rejecting reliance on cases where juvenile offenders received de facto life sentences); but see Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 52-54, 76 (finding the 18-year-old defendant's 76-year sentence to be a de facto life sentence and remanding for resentencing), pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 121932 (May 24, 2017). Even if we were to overlook the fact that defendant was an adult at the time of the offense, he would still be 70 years' old at the time of his projected parole date and, therefore, not subject to a de facto life sentence. We recognize that defendant's sentence is lengthy but, as discussed above, the jury found the defendant guilty of attempting to murder two people with a gun. The record shows that the trial court considered mitigating circumstances as well as the seriousness of the crime. Therefore, the defendant's sentence is not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 62 CONCLUSION

¶ 63 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 64 Affirmed.