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Summary of Opinion — Romo Productions, Inc. v. Paradise Sewing, Inc. (G052624 c/w G053005)

Factual and Procedural Background

Romo Productions, a garment manufacturer (owner: Rhonda Valles), contracted with Paradise Sewing (owners: Mai Linh Purdy and Prayune Torpipat) as a sewing subcontractor beginning in 2008. In March 2013 the parties executed a confidentiality, nonsolicitation, and noncompetition agreement. Disputes arose in mid‑2013 over unpaid invoices, withheld deliveries, and the handling of two pending orders for a major client, Drifire. Romo sued Paradise, Purdy, and Torpipat in June 2013 asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract, conversion, trade libel, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, unfair competition, accounting, and declaratory relief. Paradise filed a cross‑complaint.

Romo failed to respond to a second set of discovery requests concerning damages. The trial court granted a motion to compel, ordered responses, and later issued evidentiary sanctions precluding Romo and its experts from introducing or relying on evidence that Romo had been ordered to produce but did not produce. Romo's damages witness (Valles) and expert (Donoghue) identified or relied on documents not produced in discovery; the court excluded specified exhibits and later excluded Donoghue's report and testimony.

A jury trial began in June 2015. After Romo rested, the court granted Paradise's motion for nonsuit as to all claims except conversion against Paradise and Purdy. Romo's motion to reopen was denied. The jury returned a verdict favorable to Paradise, and the trial court entered judgment for Paradise and later awarded Paradise attorney fees and costs. Romo appealed; the appeals were consolidated.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court properly granted nonsuit as to Romo's breach of contract claim based on noncompetition, nonsolicitation, and confidentiality provisions.
  2. Whether the trial court properly granted nonsuit as to Romo's trade libel claim.
  3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Romo's motion to reopen after the nonsuit.
  4. Whether the trial court properly imposed evidentiary discovery sanctions and granted motions in limine excluding documents and expert testimony related to Romo's damages.
  5. Whether the trial court's evidentiary rulings and sustainment of foundation/hearsay objections during trial deprived Romo of due process or were reversible error.
  6. Whether appellate monetary sanctions against Romo and its counsel were warranted for alleged noncompliance with appellate rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Romo (Appellant)

  • Argued it had presented sufficient evidence of trade secrets and breaches (methods, processes, systems) to avoid nonsuit on the breach of contract claim.
  • Contended there was circumstantial evidence establishing causation for trade libel (loss of Drifire business after alleged statements).
  • Contended the trial court's evidentiary sanctions order was procedurally defective (lack of separate statement) and vague.
  • Argued Donoghue produced documents at his deposition and Romo had produced many documents in discovery, suggesting exclusion was improper.
  • Contended that sustaining foundation/relevance/hearsay objections improperly limited Valles's and other testimony.

Paradise (Respondents)

  • Moved to compel damages‑related discovery after Romo failed to respond to a second set of requests; obtained an order requiring production and monetary sanctions.
  • Sought and obtained evidentiary sanctions precluding Romo and its experts from using documents Romo had been ordered to produce but did not produce.
  • Moved in limine to exclude specified trial exhibits and portions of the expert deposition and to exclude Donoghue's report and testimony because they relied on excluded material.
  • Opposed reopening the case on the ground that Romo's offer of proof would not cure the evidentiary deficiencies, particularly lack of causation evidence from Drifire and lack of proof of misappropriation.
  • Sought appellate sanctions arguing Romo's briefs violated appellate rules and contained matters not reasonably material to the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291 Standard for reviewing a grant of nonsuit. The court applied Nally to require that plaintiff's evidence be accepted as true and that the record be reviewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff when evaluating nonsuit.
Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 Requirement to review the entire record, not only supporting evidence. The court cited Kidron to emphasize it must consider contradictory evidence in the record when reviewing nonsuit.
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 242 Judicial exception permitting narrow noncompete covenants to protect trade secrets. The court cited Muggill in discussing that covenants restraining competition may be enforceable only to the extent they protect trade secrets.
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 946, fn. 4 Discussion regarding continued viability of trade secret exception to noncompete. The court cited Edwards (with Dowell) and stated for purposes of appeal it would assume the exception remains applicable without deciding the issue.
Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 564, 577 Discussion regarding scope of trade secret exception to noncompete. As with Edwards, the court assumed the exception exists for purposes of analysis but concluded it had no application here absent proof of trade secret misappropriation.
DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 874 Statutory definition and elements of a trade secret. The court cited DVD Copy Control to state the statutory elements of a trade secret under Civil Code §3426.1.
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452-1454 Requirement that a claimed trade secret be identified with sufficient specificity. The court relied on Whyte to conclude Romo had not identified specifics of alleged methods/processes sufficiently for trade secret protection.
Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 66 Elements of trade secret misappropriation. The court quoted Ajaxo's formulation of misappropriation and applied it to find Romo failed to present substantial evidence of misappropriation.
Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 774, 780 Permissibility of inferring causation from circumstantial evidence when reasonable. The court cited Smith in evaluating Romo's circumstantial evidence of causation for trade libel but found the record did not support a reasonable inference of causation.
Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 886-887 Rule on right to reopen after nonsuit and requirement of offer of proof. The court applied Austin B. to hold denial of reopening was proper where Romo's offer of proof did not cure the deficiencies (lack of proof of misappropriation and causation).
Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 Standard of review for imposition of discovery sanctions (abuse of discretion). The court applied Lopez (and other authorities) to review the discovery sanctions and motions in limine for abuse of discretion.
Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 36 Prerequisites for discovery sanctions: failure to comply and willfulness. The court cited Do It Urself to confirm both prerequisites were met and to uphold the evidentiary sanctions.
People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1555 Standard of review for rulings on motions in limine. The court cited Sarpas in reviewing the trial court's in limine rulings for abuse of discretion.
Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493 Standard of review for motions in limine. Cited alongside other authorities to support abuse of discretion review of in limine rulings.
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409 Contacts the separate statement requirement; court discretion when no response provided. The court relied on Sinaiko to explain that a separate statement is not required when no discovery response was provided.
Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29 Imposition of appellate sanctions for unreasonable infractions of appellate rules or frivolous appeals. The court cited Pierotti in discussing sanctions but declined to impose monetary sanctions under rule 8.276 in this case.
People v. Modell (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 724, 729 Observations on specificity required to preserve objections for appeal (lack of foundation). The court cited Modell to note that generic lack‑of‑foundation objections may lack specificity for review, while concluding the foundation was obviously lacking here.
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 Rule that appellate issues not argued or supported are forfeited/waived. The court applied Cahill to deem multiple issues raised by Romo on appeal forfeited for lack of developed argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in structured steps:

  • Applied the nonsuit standard: view the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, but review the entire record and require substantial evidence to submit issues to the jury.
  • Breach of contract: held noncompetition and nonsolicitation provisions were barred by Business & Professions Code §16600 unless they fit the trade secret exception. The court explained that enforcement of confidentiality/nondisclosure provisions depended on proof of trade secrets and misappropriation; Romo failed to identify trade secrets with requisite specificity and presented no substantial evidence Paradise misappropriated or used any trade secret or that misappropriation caused harm.
  • Trade libel: applied the five elements for trade libel and concluded that, although publication and disparagement elements had some evidentiary support, Romo failed to produce evidence that the allegedly false statement caused specific pecuniary loss (no testimony or written evidence from Drifire explaining why it ceased using Romo), so causation was speculative.
  • Motion to reopen: reviewed the offer of proof requirement. Romo's offer of proof addressed identification and secrecy efforts for trade secrets but did not supply an offer showing how Paradise's use or misappropriation would be proved, nor did it address causation for trade libel; denial of reopening was proper because the additional evidence sought would not cure the deficiencies.
  • Discovery sanctions and motions in limine: concluded the evidentiary sanctions were supported because Romo wilfully failed to comply with discovery; a separate statement was unnecessary where Romo had not responded; the sanctions order and April 17, 2014 discovery order made clear the scope of excluded material. The court properly excluded identified exhibits and expert testimony that relied on excluded, unproduced documents.
  • Evidentiary objections at trial: the court found many foundational objections were properly sustained because Romo sought to elicit testimony based on documents excluded by the sanctions/in limine rulings; lack of foundation was obvious in those instances.
  • Appellate sanctions motion: acknowledged Romo's briefing deficiencies and improper rhetoric but concluded that monetary sanctions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 were not appropriate in addition to any trial attorney fees.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment is affirmed. The court also denied Paradise's motion for imposition of appellate sanctions.

Implications: The affirmance leaves the trial judgment and the amended judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to respondents intact; respondents are to recover costs on appeal, including attorney fees pursuant to contract. The opinion resolves the merits for this record by confirming that (1) covenants restraining competition were unenforceable absent proved trade secret misappropriation, (2) Romo failed to prove trade secret misappropriation or causation for trade libel, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing discovery/evidentiary sanctions or in excluding related evidence and expert testimony. The opinion does not announce or establish a new legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.

ROMO PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PARADISE SEWING, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

FYBEL, ACTING P. J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00659977) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Randall J. Sherman, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for imposition of sanctions. Denied. J. Grant Kennedy for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rutan & Tucker, Bradley A. Chapin and Kathryn D.Z. Domin for Defendants and Respondents.

* * *

INTRODUCTION

Romo Productions, Inc. (Romo) is a manufacturer of apparel, including military apparel. Paradise Sewing, Inc. (Paradise) was a sewing subcontractor for Romo. This case grew out of a dispute in which Romo accused Paradise of breaching their contract and stealing Romo's clients and property. The trial court granted a nonsuit on most of Romo's causes of action and denied a motion to reopen. We affirm the judgment.

Romo failed to prove necessary elements of its causes of action for breach of contract and trade libel, and its offer of proof did not show Romo could have done so if the trial court had granted the motion to reopen. The contract on which Romo sued was an unenforceable noncompetition, nonsolicitation, and nondisclosure agreement. Only if Romo could prove misappropriation of trade secrets by Paradise (a theory that was never pled) could it enforce any portion of the contract. Assuming for purposes of this appeal that Romo could have established the existence of a trade secret, it could not have established Paradise's misappropriation thereof. Further, Romo could not establish any causal connection between Paradise's alleged trade libel and Romo's loss of any business to Paradise.

Romo also challenges the trial court's pretrial orders granting evidentiary sanctions and granting motions in limine excluding evidence regarding damages. The court did not err in granting the evidentiary sanctions based on Romo's failure to provide discovery responses. The orders granting the motions in limine merely precluded Romo from offering documents and testimony at trial encompassed by the evidentiary sanctions order.

BACKGROUND I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Romo was a garment manufacturing business; Rhonda Valles was the president and owner of Romo. Much of Romo's business was in manufacturing military training apparel for the United States government. One of Romo's major clients was Drifire, a military supply company in Chicago, Illinois.

Paradise is a sewing manufacturer; Mai Linh Purdy and Prayune Torpipat are its owners. Starting in 2008, Romo contracted with Paradise to perform sewing services on garments Romo had agreed to produce for its customers. Romo would supply Paradise with fabric and trim to fulfill orders from Drifire; Paradise would deliver the completed clothing items to Romo, which would then ship them to Drifire.

In March 2013, Paradise and Romo entered a confidentiality, nonsolicitation, and noncompetition agreement. The agreement provided that Romo would only continue their business relationship if Paradise signed the agreement. The agreement provided that Romo would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees in the event it instituted litigation to enforce the agreement's terms.

Civil Code section 1717 makes this contract provision reciprocal.

In June 2013, Paradise advised Romo it would not deliver pending orders until Romo paid its outstanding invoices. Paradise claimed that immediately before this, Valles had informed Paradise that Romo was out of money, had used the money owed to Paradise to pay off another contractor, and would be going out of business. Valles denied making these statements. Romo had previously been late in making payments to Paradise, had stopped payment on checks to Paradise, and had offered the transfer of equipment to pay off its debts to Paradise.

At the time Paradise terminated its business relationship with Romo, it had two pending orders from Romo, both of which were for Drifire. Romo and Paradise agreed that Paradise would complete these orders, and Drifire would pay Paradise directly. Because the amount Drifire paid Paradise was in excess of the amount it was owed by Romo, Paradise applied the excess to Romo's outstanding debt to Paradise.

In September 2013, Drifire contacted Paradise to inquire whether Paradise would be interested in working directly with Drifire. Sonya Monroe of Drifire told Paradise: "I wouldn't have called you unless [Valles] suggested, because I know you don't want any involvement with Romo."

One of Paradise's former employees testified that boxes of zippers provided by Romo to Paradise to complete orders had been shipped from Paradise to Purdy's aunt in Canada, and then resold. Purdy, however, testified that she had sent one box containing no more than 50 unused zippers to a relative in Canada in 2009. Purdy further testified that these zippers had been provided to her by Romo to be used in military sewing projects, but that these particular zippers were no longer being used by that customer. A Romo employee advised Purdy to get rid of the old zippers in order to avoid mixing them up with the new zippers being used. Purdy testified Paradise never gave away any zippers that were supposed to be used for Romo's military contracts.

II. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

In June 2013, Romo sued Paradise, Purdy, and Torpipat for breach of contract, conversion, common counts, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, trade libel, unfair competition, accounting, and declaratory relief. Paradise filed a cross-complaint against Romo for breach of contract, account stated, and quantum meruit.

During trial, Paradise dismissed causes of action against Romo for fraud and violation of Civil Code section 1719, and dismissed all claims against Valles individually.

In response to Paradise's written discovery requests regarding Romo's damages, Romo produced, inter alia, spreadsheets identifying its damages and provided summary responses to the form interrogatories regarding damages. Paradise then served a second set of discovery requests for (1) documents used to prepare the spreadsheets and (2) documents that were identified in or used to prepare the responses to the form interrogatories regarding damages. Romo failed to respond to the second set of discovery requests and failed to respond to Paradise's attempts to meet and confer. Paradise filed a motion to compel responses, which Romo did not oppose. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered Romo to provide responses without objections and to pay monetary sanctions to Paradise.

When Romo failed to comply with the trial court's discovery order, Paradise filed a motion for evidentiary sanctions. The court granted the motion and ordered: "At trial, neither [Romo] nor its experts may introduce or rely on any evidence that [Romo] was required to provide by virtue of the Court's . . . discovery order but did not provide before the hearing."

After the evidentiary sanctions order was issued, Valles testified as Romo's person most knowledgeable regarding damages. At the deposition, Valles identified the documents and other evidence used to prepare the damage summary spreadsheets produced earlier in discovery; many of the documents Valles identified at her deposition had not been produced in discovery.

Romo designated Christopher Donoghue as its expert witness on damages. At his deposition, Donoghue produced several documents that had not been produced by Romo in discovery. Donoghue testified that he relied on these documents in forming his opinions and in preparing his expert witness report. Several of the documents were also listed on Romo's trial exhibit list.

Before trial, both parties filed motions in limine. Paradise's motion in limine No. 3 sought to exclude certain documents from trial because they were subject to the evidentiary sanctions order and/or were never produced in response to proper discovery requests. The trial court granted the motion and excluded Romo's trial exhibit Nos. 48 and 49, and portions of trial exhibit No. 89, and Donoghue deposition exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 25.

Paradise's motion in limine No. 4 sought to exclude Donoghue's testimony and his expert report on the ground that Donoghue relied on documents excluded by the evidentiary sanctions order in forming his opinions and in preparing his report. Before trial, the court granted the motion to exclude the expert report as hearsay. During trial, the court granted the motion to exclude Donoghue's expert testimony: "[T]he expert's testimony is tainted by reliance on information that was requested in discovery and not produced in discovery."

III. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

A jury trial began in June 2015. After Romo rested its case-in-chief, Paradise moved for a nonsuit on all causes of action. The trial court heard argument from Romo, and then granted the motion on all causes of action except the cause of action for conversion against Paradise and Purdy. Romo voluntarily dismissed its causes of action for common counts and unfair business practices.

Romo then made a motion to reopen its case. The trial court denied the motion to reopen. The trial continued on Paradise and Purdy's defense to the remaining cause of action for conversion and on Paradise's cross-complaint.

After deliberating, the jury returned its special verdict form in which it found (1) neither Paradise nor Purdy had intentionally interfered with Romo's property by keeping or refusing to return zippers and (2) Romo had failed to pay Paradise $27,000 for completed work. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Paradise. Romo appealed from the judgment.

After a hearing on an unopposed motion for attorney fees, the trial court entered an amended judgment awarding Paradise $350,000 in fees and $21,083.58 in costs. Romo filed a separate appeal from the amended judgment. This court consolidated the appeals for all purposes.

DISCUSSION I. NONSUIT

"A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] 'In determining whether plaintiff's evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give "to the plaintiff['s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff['s] favor."' [Citation.] A mere 'scintilla of evidence' does not create a conflict for the jury's resolution; 'there must be substantial evidence to create the necessary conflict.' [Citation.] [¶] In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we are 'guided by the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.' [Citation.] We will not sustain the judgment '"unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law."'" (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291.) We may not, however, only consider the supporting evidence in isolation, and disregard any contradictory evidence; rather, we must review the entire record. (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581.)

A. BREACH OF CONTRACT

The trial court ruled as follows in nonsuiting the breach of contract cause of action: "So on the breach of contact claim, we've got three claimed breaches of contract, don't contact, don't solicit, don't compete.

"All right. The don't compete part violates Business and Professions Code [section] 16600, so that's not going to be a viable claim.

"Don't solicit, that's in paragraph 2(B). It says that, 'Paradise shall not directly or indirectly solicit any customer to leave Romo.' That language basically means don't compete. So it's basically the same thing. So the court concludes that's also subject to the [Business and Professions Code section] 16600 rule prohibiting covenants not to compete. [¶] . . . [¶]

"Confidential information, paragraph 1 and 1(A). So to establish a breach of contract for violating that c[l]ause of the contract would require the plaintiff to show violation of trade secrets law, because otherwise we're talking about [Business and Professions Code section] 16600, since that clause not to use confidential information is a contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business. So paragraph 1 does come down to trade secrets. And even if we could conform pleading to proof and say that . . . would be the cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, we've got the CACI [S]eries 4400, which governs trade secrets, which provides the law that applies. And it doesn't appear that the evidence has established the existence of a trade secret as defined in the law, that information was secret, that it had actual or potential independent economic value because it was secret, and the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret with regard to any specific piece of information.

"As far as misappropriation, there doesn't appear to be substantial evidence to go to the jury, that any trade secret that did exist on behalf of Romo was misappropriated by defendants, or that any such misappropriation was a substantial factor in causing harm to Romo or causing Paradise to be unjustly enriched, as set forth in CACI [No.] 4401, requirement 5. So the court concludes that the plaintiff has not presented enough evidence to go to the jury on breach of contract."

Under California law, covenants not to compete are generally unenforceable: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600.) A judicially-created exception to Business and Professions Code section 16600 permits covenants not to compete that are narrowly drawn to protect an employer's trade secrets. (See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 242.)

The statutory exceptions regarding sale of goodwill or corporate shares, or dissolution of a partnership or limited liability company are inapplicable here. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16601-16602.5.)

For purposes of this appeal, we assume this exception is still applicable. (See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 946, fn. 4; Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 564, 577 ["Although we doubt the continued viability of the common law trade secret exception to covenants not to compete, we need not resolve the issue here. Even assuming the exception exists, we agree with the trial court that it has no application here. This is so because the noncompete and nonsolicitation clauses in the agreements are not narrowly tailored or carefully limited to the protection of trade secrets, but are so broadly worded as to restrain competition"].)

A trade secret is (1) information, including formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, or processes that (2) has independent economic value, either actual or potential, that derives from (3) the fact that it is not generally known in the industry, to the public, or to others who could realize economic value from its disclosure or use and (4) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. (Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (d); see DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 874.)

A claimed trade secret must be identified with sufficient specificity. (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452-1454.) In granting the nonsuit motion, the trial court stated: "I remember hearing the phrase method, process, and system a few times, but has there been any evidence as to the specifics of those conclusionary words?" Romo directs us to its 30-page statement of the case in the opening appellate brief as proof that "clearly sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to find trade secrets." It is Romo's obligation to identify specific information that its claims should be afforded trade secret protection. Our job as a reviewing court is not to review the full trial transcript in an attempt to determine which of Romo's methods, techniques, processes, etc., may have been sufficiently described so as to constitute trade secrets.

For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that Romo could have identified a particular trade secret at issue, and turn to the question of whether Romo made a prima facie case of misappropriation of that trade secret. "A trade secret is misappropriated if a person (1) acquires a trade secret knowing or having reason to know that the trade secret has been acquired by 'improper means,' (2) discloses or uses a trade secret the person has acquired by 'improper means' or in violation of a nondisclosure obligation, (3) discloses or uses a trade secret the person knew or should have known was derived from another who had acquired it by improper means or who had a nondisclosure obligation or (4) discloses or uses a trade secret after learning that it is a trade secret but before a material change of position." (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 66.)

Purdy testified that Paradise did not receive any methods, techniques, or training from Romo. Romo offered no evidence that Paradise had received or used any claimed trade secrets. On appeal, Romo contends that Paradise could not have obtained Drifire's business without Romo's processes, methods, or techniques, but does not cite to any evidence supporting that contention. To the contrary, Purdy's husband, Robert Purdy, testified that Paradise obtained business from Drifire when Drifire contacted Paradise directly due to Romo's inability to complete Drifire's work, and Romo's suggestion that Paradise might be able to assist Drifire. Robert Purdy testified that on September 23, 2013, he received a phone call from Sonya Monroe of Drifire, who said: "'"Hi, Bob, we have a cut that we have a problem with and we really need it. The troops are getting ready to rotate out to Afghanistan and we need this cut finished. I know you're not working with Romo anymore, but I talked to Rhonda [Valles]. Rhonda told me she had no ability to find someone to do that particular cut, and she suggested—Rhonda suggested that I call you directly and ask if you would do the work."'" (Italics added.) Robert Purdy further testified that in that telephone conversation Monroe said: "'"I wouldn't have called you unless Rhonda suggested, because I know you don't want any involvement with Romo."'" (Italics added.) Robert Purdy confirmed to Monroe that Paradise would not have anything further to do with Romo, but that he would speak with Purdy about Monroe's request.

Robert Purdy's deposition testimony was offered into evidence at the jury trial by Romo. No objection was raised based on hearsay.

There was no evidence that Paradise obtained business from Drifire by misappropriating Romo's alleged trade secrets; to the contrary, the only evidence on this topic was that Romo suggested to Drifire that it contact Paradise directly.

We conclude the trial court did not err in granting the nonsuit motion as to the breach of contract cause of action.

B. TRADE LIBEL

In granting the nonsuit as to Romo's cause of action for trade libel, the trial court stated: "On the trade libel claim, there's a difference between circumstantial evidence and speculation. So the court sees that all we have in this case is speculation. There's been no testimony by anybody from Drifire that—or any evidence from Drifire as to the reason they left Romo and went to Paradise. And so the court concludes that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof to establish the existence of each of the elements of trade libel. And not necessarily that one component."

To establish liability for trade libel, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant published a statement; (2) the statement tended to disparage the plaintiff's product or service; (3) the statement was provably false; (4) the defendant acted with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity; and (5) the statement caused specific pecuniary damage to the plaintiff. (Melaleuca, Inc. v. Clark (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1360-1361; see CACI No. 1731.)

Robert Purdy testified that he had told a Drifire employee: "'We have a serious problem between Paradise and Romo. Romo's told us that she's going out of business and she has no money to pay us. We have work in process. We need to talk to Drifire about getting paid for this and delivering the goods that you have ordered to Drifire.'" This admission meets the first two elements of the trade libel cause of action. Valles's testimony that Romo was not going out of business, while counter to Purdy's testimony that Valles had told her directly that Romo was going out of business, would be sufficient to overcome a nonsuit motion on the element of the falsity of the statement, and perhaps even the element of Paradise's reckless disregard for its truth.

However, Romo failed to produce any evidence that the statement caused it pecuniary harm, i.e., that Drifire stopped doing business with Romo because Robert Purdy told Drifire that Romo was going out of business. On appeal, Romo argues there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting its trade libel claim to avoid nonsuit.

Valles testified she did not know why Drifire had cancelled its business relationship with Romo, and could not remember if she had asked Drifire about it. Valles also testified she believed Drifire would continue providing business to Romo after the allegedly libelous statements made by Paradise.

Romo offered no testimony or written evidence from Drifire explaining why it stopped doing business with Romo. Romo contends it offered "circumstantial evidence" that because it received work from Drifire before the statement was made by Robert Purdy to Drifire, and did not receive work from Drifire after the statement was made, the statement was the cause of the loss of work.

"Although a finding of causation may not be based on mere speculation or conjecture, such finding may be predicated on reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence." (Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 774, 780.) Here, the evidence actually before the court does not support a reasonable inference of causation. Valles was unable to offer any admissible evidence regarding the reason Drifire stopped doing business with her company. Robert Purdy's testimony, cited ante in section I.A., was that Paradise obtained business from Drifire due to Romo's inability to complete the work, and Romo's recommendation of Paradise to Drifire as a company that could complete the work. Lacking any direct evidence from Drifire, either testimony or written evidence, a finding that Robert Purdy's statement in June caused Drifire to stop doing business with Romo, despite continuing to work with Romo through September and promising more work in 2014, would be rank speculation.

We conclude the trial court did not err in granting nonsuit of Romo's cause of action for trade libel.

C. MOTION TO REOPEN

"In response to a motion for nonsuit, a plaintiff has the right, upon request, to reopen its case to remedy defects raised by the nonsuit motion. [Citations.] However, the right to present further evidence is waived unless the plaintiff also makes an offer of proof, describing the evidence and explaining how it would cure the deficiencies. [Citation.] [¶] If an offer of proof is made, the denial of the motion to reopen 'will not be overturned when the additional evidence sought to be produced by the plaintiff is either irrelevant to the issues involved in the action (no error) or would not be sufficient to render defendants liable as a matter of law (no prejudice).'" (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 886-887.)

In the motion to reopen, Romo's trial counsel made an extensive offer of proof regarding testimony he would elicit from Valles regarding the identification of trade secrets and the means Valles used to ensure their secrecy. Counsel did not make an offer of proof regarding any other witness.

In opposing the motion to reopen, Paradise's counsel noted: "[I]n the court's ruling [on the nonsuit motion] . . . the court mentioned, among other things, that there was a failure . . . to establish the substantial factor in causing the harm. That is not something that can be corrected through calling Ms. Valles, as the court pointed out. There has been no testimony from Drifire. They are not going to be able to get over that hurdle by reopening."

As to the cause of action for breach of contract based on misappropriation of trade secrets, Romo did not make an offer of proof regarding Paradise's use or misappropriation of any of the alleged trade secrets. In its appellate briefs, Romo continues to argue that it could have proven the existence of trade secrets and Romo's attempts to maintain their secrecy. What it never addresses is how it could have proven Paradise used, much less appropriated, any of the alleged trade secrets.

In arguing the motion to reopen, Romo's counsel argued: "And, in fact, without any dispute when these secrets were taken, not returned, and kept, and the client was kept, it financially ruined Ms. Valles, who had a considerable operation, expenses, overhead, employees. And they took her main client, and they used her manuals, her procedures, her process, her delivery, her terms, her price, all of these things, which under the Whyte case are absolutely protectable, absolutely. And she is—those were misappropriated." Romo's counsel did not provide an offer of proof as to how Paradise's use or alleged misappropriation of those alleged trade secrets would be established, however.

As to the cause of action for trade libel, Romo did not make an offer of proof regarding the key missing element—causation. Romo did not claim it could prove it lost Drifire's business as a result of Paradise's statement to Drifire that Romo was going out of business. Romo does not address the motion to reopen this cause of action in its appellate briefs.

Romo also notes in its appellate briefs that the trial court cut off its offer of proof in the motion to reopen. Romo does not indicate what else it would have included in its offer of proof if the court had not limited its time.

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Romo's motion to reopen its case following the nonsuit.

II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

We review the trial court's order imposing discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604; Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 36.) The trial court's ruling on a motion in limine is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1555; Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493.)

A. Motion for Evidentiary Sanctions

"'The power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action. [Citations.] Only two facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply . . . and (2) the failure must be wilful [citation].'" (Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.) The motion established these two facts; neither in the trial court nor on appeal does Romo contend otherwise.

Romo challenges the order granting the motion for evidentiary sanctions because (1) the motion did not include a separate statement and (2) the order was too vague. While a separate statement is generally required for a motion for evidentiary sanctions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(7)), "[a] separate statement is not required when no response has been provided to the request for discovery" (id., rule 3.1345(b)). Romo failed to respond to the second set of discovery; that failure ultimately led to the motion for evidentiary sanctions, meaning a separate statement was not required.

The trial court could grant the discovery motion in the absence of a separate statement, even if one was required. "Although the court rule requiring a separate statement on a motion to compel further responses [citation] would permit the trial court to continue or deny a motion to compel when no separate statement is provided, it does not limit a trial court's discretion to compel further answers notwithstanding the absence of a separate statement." (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409, fn. 14 [citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1020, renumbered as rule 3.1345 in 2009].)

As to its alleged vagueness, the evidentiary sanctions order provides: "At trial, neither [Romo] nor its experts may introduce or rely on any evidence that [Romo] was required to provide by virtue of the Court's April 17, 2014 discovery order but did not provide before the hearing." The April 17, 2014 discovery order, in turn, provides: "Defendants' Motions to Compel (a) Responses to Special Interrogatories Set Two, (b) Responses to Document Requests Set Two and for Sanctions came on regularly as scheduled. [¶] There are no appearances by any party. [¶] Ruling: Moving party having telephonically waived oral argument, and no opposition having been filed, the court now rules as follows: Motions granted in their entirety. All further responses shall be made in writing, under oath within 10 days hereof." The document requests and interrogatories requested identification and production of, inter alia, documents used to prepare damage summaries already produced by Romo and supporting damage claims.

The evidentiary sanctions order precluded Romo from offering as an exhibit or providing any testimony relying on any document that supported the damage summaries or otherwise supported the claim for damages, but that had not been produced. Romo fails to explain how the order was vague or what it could not understand about the order's limits.

B. Motion in Limine No. 3

Paradise's motion in limine No. 3 sought to exclude documents from trial that were subject to the court's earlier evidentiary sanctions order. The motion was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128, subdivision (a)(2) through (4), and 187. The trial court was authorized to exclude from trial documents that were subject to its earlier evidentiary sanctions order, and testimony based on those documents, as a means of enforcing its orders.

The motion specified that it was seeking to exclude exhibits 5, 6, 9-12, 14-17, 19, 22, and 25 to the deposition of expert witness Donoghue, and trial exhibits 6, 44, 45, 52, 56, 59, 60, 91, and 102-104. --------

In its opposition to motion in limine No. 3, Romo argued that Paradise had failed to submit a declaration stating that "subject discovery was not in fact produced." To the contrary, motion in limine No. 3 specified which documents should be excluded at trial by identifying their trial exhibit number and/or their exhibit number at Donoghue's deposition, and included a declaration from Paradise's counsel stating that those documents had not been produced in discovery. At that point, the burden shifted to Romo to show the documents in question had been produced in discovery, either by identifying their discovery production numbers, or providing a declaration that the particular documents at issue had been provided. The general declarations from Romo's former counsel that several hundred documents had been produced by Romo in discovery were insufficient.

On appeal, Romo argues that the trial court erred in granting motion in limine No. 3 by improperly interpreting the word "used" in the discovery requests for documents used in making damage calculations. The April 2014 discovery order, however, ruled that Romo's objections to the requests were waived; whether there was any uncertainty in the use of the term "used" is no longer an issue in this case.

Having reviewed the record, we reject Romo's counsel's contention that the trial court simply rubberstamped Paradise's counsel's requests to exclude evidence. The court did not err in granting motion in limine No. 3.

C. Motion in Limine No. 4

In motion in limine No. 4, Paradise sought to exclude testimony from Romo's designated expert witness on damages—Donoghue—as well as his written report on the grounds that, in reaching his opinions, he relied on material that was excluded by the evidentiary sanctions order. Because, as discussed ante, the court did not err in granting the nonsuit motion and the jury found against Romo on the only remaining claim of conversion, any error in excluding testimony and a written report from Donoghue on damages would be moot.

In opposition, Romo made the same argument as in opposition to motion in limine No. 3, namely, that Paradise had failed to serve a "declaration under penalty of perjury that says the subject document was not within the items previously timely produced." As explained ante in connection with motion in limine No. 3, this argument lacks merit. Further, during argument in the trial court regarding this motion in limine, Paradise's counsel specifically identified the requests in the second set of discovery to which the documents they were then seeking to exclude had been requested.

Romo also argued that Donoghue, at his deposition, produced all documents related to Romo that were in his possession, and not only the documents on which he relied in forming his opinions and preparing his report. Donoghue did not identify under oath in opposition to the motion in limine what documents he relied on or state that he did not rely on any documents not produced.

The trial court granted motion in limine No. 4 to exclude Donoghue's report as hearsay. Romo does not make any argument regarding this ruling on appeal.

The court later granted motion in limine No. 4 to exclude Donoghue's testimony. The court concluded that Donoghue could not testify regarding any damages caused by the alleged conversion of zippers because at his deposition, that topic of expert testimony was removed by Romo's then counsel. Neither in the trial court nor on appeal does Romo challenge this decision. (Because the conversion cause of action was decided against Romo by the jury, this issue is in any event moot.) The court also concluded that because Donoghue relied on documents that had not been produced in response to proper discovery in making his calculations, his opinion was tainted. Therefore, the court excluded all of Donoghue's testimony.

On appeal, Romo does not provide any specific argument regarding the exclusion of Donoghue's testimony. For the same reasons we set forth ante in connection with motion in limine No. 3, the trial court did not err in granting motion in limine No. 4.

D. Objections to Evidence

Romo argues that the trial court committed reversible error and violated Romo's rights of due process and fundamental fairness by improperly sustaining objections throughout trial. In particular, Romo argues the court "repeatedly sustain[ed] 'foundation' and 'relevance' objections for the defendants."

On several occasions during the trial, the court explained its process for evidentiary objections. During the questioning of the very first witness at trial, the court advised Romo's counsel: "You need to stop arguing in front of the jury, but just state grounds for objections." The court further advised counsel that objections based on lack of foundation, hearsay, or leading the witness would be addressed during breaks without the jury present. Again, the court made the following statement to counsel during trial: "And just to be clear on what's fair game to say in front of the jury, on objections the court expects that counsel's only going to state the legal grounds of the objection, and then the court rules. And if counsel wants to argue it they ask for a side bar, which basically the court will have the side bar at the recess, assuming we can defer the issue until the next break, which we certainly can if it's a witness that's been testifying for a lengthy period. And the jury's not supposed to hear all kinds of this extraneous argument, just grounds. They're supposed to hear the evidence, questions and answers, and not all of this stuff."

In its appellate briefs, Romo points to a few specific instances where it claims the trial court improperly sustained foundational or hearsay objections to evidence. At one point, in addressing Paradise's objections to the admission of Romo's trial exhibits, Romo's counsel argued, "it's incumbent upon the attorney [making the objection], they have to state the grounds for foundation, it's not incumbent upon the attorney raising the question to guess and read minds," to which the court replied, "[t]hat runs afoul of every rule about objecting in front of a jury, that attorneys are supposed to state the grounds only and not specifics with arguments."

Specifically arguing the foundation for Valles's testimony regarding damages, Romo's counsel and the trial court engaged in the following colloquy:

"Mr. Kennedy: We've identified everything. She's gone over her business records, she's gone over—it's not a requirement under law that she brings in all those books, those 50 books. She can calculate, she can do a calculation. That's the best evidence, that's her evidence. Now if he doesn't believe it, he can challenge that, but that's her testimony. She can't be precluded from giving her testimony, in my opinion, as to her calculation. Now, if they want to doubt it, if they want to challenge it, they can do that, but she's explained a very detailed process of how she arrived at those numbers.

"The Court: No, she hasn't. She hasn't said what documents she relied on.

"Mr. Kennedy: Your honor, that's just where I'm missing. Maybe it's just because I'm tired. To me I recall her saying she checked her computer and she checked these 50 volumes. She checked the items that had been sent, she checked the documents reflecting that it had been signed, and she checked the documents showing what garments have come back. I'm not sure what other documents there would be. That's her business record and accounting.

"The Court: How about exhibit 48 that's excluded by virtue of the ruling in limine, maybe she relied on that, and that's your real problem-maker.

"Mr. Kennedy: Oh, that's what you think, I'm trying to get around that? No, your honor, I'm not—number one, the document was excluded for hearsay.

"The Court: No, it wasn't. It was excluded because it wasn't produced when it was obligated to be produced. Hearsay is beside the point. [¶] . . . [¶]

"Mr. Kennedy: If I can clarify that issue, your honor, I think here's where we're not on the same page, I think [it's] important, . . . you can exclude the document. I mean, if you're talking one produced you can exclude it, but that is not a preclusion of her testimony. If her testimony is, 'I went back and did that and here's the number I got,' we're not moving the document into evidence, but you're precluding her testimony based on the fact that you precluded the document. She doesn't need that document. She went back and did the calculation. She knows what it was.

"The Court: She doesn't get to testify as to what documents show without having the documents here.

"Mr. Kennedy: She's not telling what the document shows, your honor, she's showing what her calculation was.

"The Court: From documents.

"Mr. Kennedy: Okay, let's clarify that. Because what we're really doing is fundamentally you're precluding a document—

"The Court: I'm done with this argument. Do you have any other topics to address?"

An objection has no special form, but must state the specific ground on which it is based. While "lack of foundation" might lack the specificity necessary to be reviewed on appeal (People v. Modell (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 724, 729), it is not improper to sustain such an objection if the lack of foundation is obvious. Based on the foregoing exchange between the court and counsel, the lack of foundation for the excluded testimony was obvious. The testimony was based on documents that had been excluded by the ruling on a motion in limine.

Again, during Romo's counsel's questioning of Valles, the following occurred:

"Q Okay. Using your brains, your eyes and your fingers to use a calculator, did all three of those processes lead you to a calculation of what these [damages] are?

"A Yes.

"Q Okay. And that was a truthful and accurate number; correct?

"A Yes.

"Q Okay. And what was that number?

"Mr. Chapin: Lacks foundation, hearsay.

"The Court: Sustained.

"Mr. Kennedy: Your honor, I have a question as to what's missing in the foundation.

"The Court: If you want to argue it, you'll skip over this and we'll argue it outside the presence of the jury." The testimony counsel was seeking from Valles was lacking in foundation because her damage calculations were based on documents that had been excluded or that Romo had failed to produce in discovery. The additional examples Romo provides as to which it claims objections based on hearsay or lack of foundation were improperly sustained were also attempts to have Valles testify as to the damages caused by the loss of the Drifire business using Valles's calculations from the documents that were excluded.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY ROMO ARE DEEMED FORFEITED

"'Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."' [Citation.] 'We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.'" (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)

Romo raises several other issues in its appellate briefs, but fails to develop any argument regarding them. We deem the following issues to have been forfeited by Romo on appeal: (1) the denial of Romo's motions for continuance of the trial; (2) the trial court's orders granting motion in limine Nos. 2 and 5; (3) the nonsuit of Romo's causes of action for intentional interference, declaratory relief, an accounting, and conversion as to Torpipat; (4) the denial of Romo's request to call Paradise's trial counsel as a witness; and (5) the award of attorney fees and costs to Paradise.

IV. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

After briefing was complete, Paradise filed a motion for monetary sanctions in the amount of at least $47,000 against both Romo and its counsel, J. Grant Kennedy. Paradise argues sanctions are permitted under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(2) and (4) because Romo included matters not reasonably material to the appeal's determination in the record, and committed unreasonable violations of the rules of court. Notably, Paradise does not argue that Romo's appeal was frivolous pursuant to rule 8.276(a)(1).

Paradise argues that Romo's opening brief violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) and (2)(C) because it fails to support references to the record by proper record citations and fails to provide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record. Romo's opening brief summarizes multiple factual statements with a single citation to multiple pages from the transcript. In addition, many factual statements are without any citation to the record. Under rule 8.204(e)(2), this court has the discretion to order a noncomplying appellate brief returned for corrections and refiling, stricken with leave to file a new brief, or simply to disregard the noncompliance. We opted to disregard Romo's briefs' noncompliance.

"We may impose monetary sanctions for '"any unreasonable infraction of the rules governing appeals . . . as the circumstances of the case and the discouragement of like conduct in the future may require."'" (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) The court in Pierotti sanctioned the appellant not only because of the deficiencies in its appellate briefs, but also because the appeal was frivolous, a claim Paradise does not raise here.

We do not condone the failure of Romo's counsel to ensure the briefs' compliance with the California Rules of Court. An experienced appellate attorney knows that, especially when the issues on appeal are fact-intensive, it is in the appealing party's best interest to set forth the facts, with citations to the record, clearly and specifically. And we express our displeasure with the repeated, unfounded attacks on the integrity of the trial court and Paradise's counsel that permeate Romo's briefs, and especially Romo's opposition to the sanctions motion. However, we do not believe that sanctions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 are appropriate in addition to any attorney fees that may be awarded by the trial court. The motion for sanctions is denied.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal, including but not limited to attorney fees pursuant to contract.

FYBEL, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: THOMPSON, J. GOETHALS, J.

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Romo Prods., Inc. v. Paradise Sewing, Inc.
(May 22, 2018)