Betty Wells v. Edwin Edwards

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Docket Number

72-621

Judges

Justice WHITE
Justice DOUGLAS
Justice MARSHALL

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'[W]hile the office of junior college trustee differs in certain respects from those offices considered in prior cases, it is exactly the same in the one crucial factorâthese officials are elected by popular vote.

'When a court is asked to decide whether a State is required by the Constitution to give each qualified voter the same power in an election open to all, there is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election. If one person's vote is given less weight through unequal apportionment, his right to equal voting participation is impaired just as much when he votes for a school board member as when he votes for a state legislator. While there are differences in the powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the right of each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process. It should be remembered that in cases like this one we are asked by voters to insure that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm from unequal treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials selected.'

The judgment of the District Court is questionable under a decade of this Court's decisions. It as least warrants plenary review here.

The record indicates that in 1970 the election districts ranged in population from 369,485 to 682,072. The two-justice district had a total population of 1,007,449.

There is language in other district court opinions to the effect that one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to the judiciary. See, e. g., Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928 (MDNC 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 807, 93 S. Ct. 43, 34, L.Ed.2d 68 (1972); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860 (ND Ohio), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 385 U.S. 3, 87 S. Ct. 33, 17 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1966); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (ND Ga. 1964). See also New York State Assn. of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (SDNY 1967). The statutory schemes involved in those cases, however, differ materially from the Louisiana provisions at issue here. For example, in Holshouser and Stokes, district Judges were nominated through primaries in districts with varying populations; the judges were elected, however, on a statewide basis that conformed to the one-person, one-vote principle. In this context, the district courts rejected the claim that plaintiffs' primary votes were 'diluted' by the general election. Cf. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S. Ct. 1549, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S. Ct. 1554, 18 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1967). In Buchanan, plaintiffs claimed that the apportionment of trial judges in the State resulted in fewer judges per capita in urban districts than in rural districts. Plaintiffs challenged the apportionment on the ground that it denied them speedy justice, not on the ground that their vote in statewide elections was diluted.

See generally Note, The Equal-Population Principle: Does It Apply To Elected Judges?, 47 Notre Dame L. 316 (1971).

For example, in Hadley, Mr. Justice Black conceded the possibility 'that there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds . . . might not be required.' 397 U.S., at 56, 90 S. Ct. 791. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483-484, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968).

Betty Wells v. Edwin Edwards

Betty Wells v. Edwin Edwards

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