Following our decision in Godfrey, we vacated the judgments in these and several other cases insofar as they left undisturbed the sentences of death. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court has treated every case in exactly the same way: it has reviewed the record to discern whether the jury, if properly instructed, could still have found the existence of this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. On the basis of this review, that court affirmed the death sentences imposed without a proper jury instruction. I would have thought that Godfrey made clear that this sort of appellate speculation is impermissible. What I took to be the rule of Godfrey is that it is the discretion of the sentencer that must be properly narrowed. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932-2933, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Westbrook v. Balkcom, 449 U.S. 999, 1001, 101 S. Ct. 541, 541-542, 66 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (STEWART, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In murder cases in the State of Georgia, only the trier of fact may impose a sentence of death. Consequently, it is the discretion of the trier of fact—in these cases, the jury—that must be narrowed. And no matter what facts the jury might find, it always retains under Georgia law the ultimate discretion to refuse to impose the penalty at all. An appellate court can do no more than guess at what a jury might have done. Thus only a new sentencing hearing before a properly instructed jury can accomplish the purpose of our remands for reconsideration in light of Godfrey. The decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in these cases to substitute its own judgment for that of the sentencer, is, in my view, contrary to the mandates of this Court. I would therefore grant the petitions for certiorari in these cases and vacate the judgments below on this additional ground as well.