TROUP BONDING COMPANY v. STATE OF GEORGIA

This appeal is from an order denying the appellant's motion to cancel a lien recorded against it in connection with a judgment entered on the forfeiture of an appearance bond in the amount of $2,000. Appellant was the surety on the bond. It appears from the evidence adduced at the hearing that after the principal, Walter H. Blackwell, failed to appear to answer an indictment for burglary at the August, 1968, term of the Troup County Superior Court, his bond was forfeited and a judgment absolute was entered in the November term. Appellant's agent made a concerted effort to locate Blackwell, which included furnishing investigative leads to local, State and Federal law enforcement agents. This assistance contributed to Blackwell's eventual apprehension in Fulton County by Federal authorities who retained custody of him as Blackwell was also a fugitive on a Federal offense. Thereafter appellant's agent sought Blackwell's release to him for the purpose of surrendering him to the Superior Court of Troup County. The agent was informed by a U.S. marshal that a court order was required as Blackwell was then under a Federal sentence. Appellant's attorney caused the issuance of the necessary court order. Blackwell was delivered by a United States marshal to the Superior Court of Troup County, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. All known costs were paid by appellant at the time of the hearing on the present motion. It developed during the hearing that the district attorney had received a bill by the Federal Government for the cost of transporting Blackwell from Fulton to Troup County. Appellant tendered payment for this expense at the hearing.

BELL, Chief Judge.

1. Code Ann. § 27-904 makes it mandatory to relieve the surety from liability after final judgment when the surety has surrendered the principal and paid all the costs in the forfeiture proceeding. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491 (2) ( 34 S.E.2d 692). In Arnold v. State, 92 Ga. App. 647 ( 89 S.E.2d 556), in a similar situation, we held that where a surety located the principal in another county of the State, had him arrested and the sheriff of the county where the warrant was pending caused the return of the principal, the surety was entitled to be relieved of the penalty in the bond on the theory that the police who made the arrest and delivery over to the sheriff were acting as agents of the surety. While the evidence in this case does not show that the appellant in fact located Blackwell, it does show that appellant's agent gave assistance to police officials which contributed to his arrest. Additionally appellant initiated action for the issuance of a court order which resulted in his appearance in Troup County for his trial. Under these circumstances, the holding in Arnall (which we are bound to follow) suggests that the Federal agents involved in the arrest and delivery of Blackwell were acting as agents of the appellant. Appellant is entitled to the relief sought and the trial court erred in denying the motion.

2. The remaining enumeration is moot.

Judgment reversed. Deen, J., concurs. Eberhardt, J., concurs in the judgment.