JANE J. BOYLE, District Judge.
Allen Ryan Vaught, Baron & Budd PC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Jared T. S. Pace, Anderson Tobin PLLC, Lauren Nicole Beverly, Settlepou, Dallas, TX, Christine M. White, Christopher E. Moore, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JANE J. BOYLE, District Judge.
Following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on their Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”) claims for unpaid overtime, the parties filed two post-verdict motions now before the Court: Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment (doc. 281) (“Plaintiffs' Motion”) and Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (doc. 283) (“Defendants' Motion”). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion (doc. 281) and
DENIES
Defendants' Motion (doc. 283).
I.
BACKGROUND
As detailed in the Court's prior orders, this is a consolidated action under the FLSA involving a group of dispatchers in one suit, and a group of truck drivers in another, both suing Defendants John Barclay (“Barclay”) and Native Oilfield Services, LLC (“Native”) (together, “Defendants”) for unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA. The parties recently settled the FLSA claims brought by the dispatchers, leaving only the drivers' claims unresolved.
Plaintiffs' remaining FLSA claims are asserted on behalf of Reginald Williams (“Williams”), Donny Hodkinson (“Hodkinson”), Tina McDonald (“McDonald”), and Carol Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”) and 104 similarly situated similarly situated opt-in plaintiffs (as a collective unit, “Plaintiffs” or “Driver Plaintiffs”). See Doc. 281, Pl.'s Mot. 1. As a collective unit, Plaintiffs include “current and former employees of Defendants who delivered sand to Defendants' oilfield customers for use in fracking operations.” Doc. 226, Joint Pre–Trial Or. 5.
At trial, Plaintiffs claimed that, between August 22, 2009 to August 5, 2014, they “were not paid overtime compensation for each every overtime hour worked” in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. Id. More specifically, they argued that Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation for their off-the-clock overtime hours waiting to be assigned a truck or for their trucks to be loaded/unloaded. Id. Defendants countered
that Plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA's overtime pay provisions, and that even if Plaintiffs were not exempt, they “cannot carry their burden of showing that they were not paid overtime.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs could not carry this burden, Defendants argued, because “the hours for which [Plaintiffs sought] additional [overtime] compensation were not hours actually worked, but rather non-compensable ‘wait time.’ ” Id.
On August 5, 2014, the jury, after hearing all the evidence presented at trial, returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. See Doc. 266, Jury Instructions. In doing so, the jury made a number of findings. First, the jury found that Defendants failed to establish “each essential element of the [Motor Carrier Act] Exemption as applied to the [Plaintiffs] as a group [.]” Id. at 17. Second, the jury also concluded that Plaintiffs proved “that Defendants failed to pay” each Named Plaintiff “one and one-half time his or her regular rate of pay for ‘hours worked’ over forty during any 7–day workweek at Native Oilfield[.]” Id. at 12. Third, the jury similarly found that Plaintiffs had also established “that the Defendants failed to pay [Plaintiffs], as a collective unit, overtime pay in accordance with the FLSA [.]” Id. at 14. Fourth, the jury next determined that Plaintiffs proved that they worked the following “number of unpaid overtime hours ... on average during the workweeks in which [they were] employed as [truck drivers]”: Johnson, 11 hours; Hodkinson, 13 hours; Williams, 10 hours; McDonald, 5 hours; and “Plaintiffs as a collective unit,” 18 hours. Id. at 19. Lastly, the jury concluded that Plaintiffs additionally proved “that Defendants' FLSA violation(s) were ‘wilful.’ ” Id. at 21.
Following the trial, the Court ordered the parties to mediate their unresolved disputes regarding the amount of damages owed by Defendants, but no settlement could be reached. See Doc. 269, Mediation Or.; Docs. 274 & 280, ADR Resolution Summs. Thus, in accordance with the Court's instructions, the parties timely filed post-trial motions. See Pl.'s Mot.; Doc. 283, Def.'s Post–Verdict Br. (“Def.'s Mot.”). Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(b), asking the Court to enter final judgment in their favor upon resolving certain issues related to their damages. See Pl.'s Mot. 1–3. Defendants' Motion, on the other hand, is filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and asserts that the Court should grant judgment in their favor, notwithstanding the jury's verdict. See Def.'s Mot. 8–9. In other words, Defendants' Motion is a renewed request for judgment as a matter of law, which the Court previously denied when Defendants moved pursuant to Rule 50(a) at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case-in-chief. See Doc. 299, Trial Tr. Volume IV at 36.
After these post-trial motions were filed, the parties filed timely responses and replies thereto. See Doc. 286, Pl.'s Resp.; Doc. 288, Def.'s Resp.; Doc. 290, Def.'s Reply; Doc. 293, Pl.'s Reply. By March 30, 2015, both post-trial motions became ripe for consideration. Before addressing these motions, the Court begins below with a brief review of the law governing claims under the FLSA.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The FLSA was passed in 1938 in an effort “to ‘protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.’ ” Meza v. Intelligent Mexican Mktg., Inc., 720 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.2013) (quoting Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981)). Given
its remedial purposes, courts generally “construe the FLSA liberally in favor of employees.” McGavock v. City of Water Valley, Miss., 452 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960)).
1 Among its protections, the FLSA requires that employers pay employees “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” of pay for any hours the employees work in excess of forty during the workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). To enforce this rule, the FLSA “gives employees the right to bring a private cause of action on their own behalf and on behalf of ‘other employees similarly situated.’ ” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1527, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Employees who successfully assert a private cause of action for unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA are entitled to collect damages from their employers “in the amount of ... their unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Prevailing plaintiffs may also collect reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with the prosecution of their FLSA claims. See id. Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2006).
III.
ANALYSIS
2 The parties have each filed post-trial motions in connection with the jury verdict returned in favor of Plaintiffs and their FLSA overtime claims. Defendants' Motion, which is filed pursuant to Rule 50(b), can be quickly disposed first. As mentioned, Defendants' Motion merely renews assertions that the Court already rejected in denying Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at trial. Moreover, Defendants' Motion explicitly reserves the “right to seek relief [again] under Rule 50(b) following entry of final judgment,” Def.'s Mot. 8 n. 2, obviating the need to fully readdress matters that Defendants will surely resubmit after this Order. Therefore, the Court hereby
DENIES
Defendants' Motion without any further discussion at this time.
That leaves only Plaintiffs' Motion to consider. As is common in these type of cases, final judgment was not entered immediately after the jury's verdict because certain damages issues remain unresolved. Accordingly, Plaintiffs now move for the Court to resolve these outstanding damages issues, incorporate its rulings in a final judgment, and enter that final judgment pursuant to Rule 58. See Pl.'s Mot. 1–3. In doing so, Plaintiffs set forth four categories of unresolved matters for the Court to decide. First, Plaintiffs request that the Court award them unpaid overtime compensation in accordance with the jury's findings and the Court's determination of the appropriate regular rate of pay and overtime premium multiplier. See id. 3–18. Second, Plaintiffs asks that the Court award them liquidated damages in
an amount equal to their back-pay award. See id. at 18–20. Third, Plaintiffs also seek recovery of the attorneys' fees and costs that they incurred in prevailing on their FLSA claims. See id. at 20–23. Finally, Plaintiffs ask that the Court additionally include post-judgment interest in the final judgment. See id. at 23–24. The Court addresses these requests in turn below.
A. Unpaid Overtime Back–Pay Award
As mentioned, the jury in this case found Defendants liable for failing to pay Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA's overtime pay requirements, see Jury Instructions 14, but they did not determine “the amount of ... unpaid overtime compensation” Plaintiffs are now entitled to collect. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The parties now dispute what role, if any, the Court may undertake in calculating Plaintiffs' back-pay award, and what amount, if any, that award should be.
As noted by Plaintiffs, the jury did make certain findings relevant to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed to Driver Plaintiffs. See Pl.'s Mot. 4. Specifically, the jury determined the average number of unpaid overtime hours worked by the Named Plaintiffs, individually, and the Driver Plaintiffs, collectively, during their respective workweeks. See Jury Instructions 19. In addition, the parties stipulated to the relevant ranges of workweeks for all 108 Driver Plaintiffs. According to Plaintiffs, what remains for the Court to determine in terms of their unpaid overtime compensation are the Driver Plaintiffs' regular rates of pay and overtime premium multiplier. See Pl.'s Mot. 4–5. Based on these determinations, the jury's findings, and the parties' stipulations, Plaintiffs argue that the Court can then calculate their back-pay award. See id.
Defendants counter that the Court cannot award Plaintiffs back-pay as requested, since the jury failed to decide certain factual matters that the Court itself cannot determine. Def.'s Resp. 3–5. Even if the Court can make these determinations, Defendants continue, it should find that Plaintiffs are not entitled to back-pay, because Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of their regular rates and overtime premiums. See id. at 5–9. The Court takes up these assertions below, starting first with the parties' threshold dispute concerning its authority and role in calculating Plaintiffs' unpaid overtime compensation.
1. The Court's Authority to Determine Plaintiffs' Overtime Pay With No Additional Jury Findings
3 The parties, as mentioned, initially dispute the Court's ability to award Plaintiffs back-pay in the absence of certain factual findings made by a jury. Plaintiffs maintain that the Court may award unpaid overtime compensation without any additional jury findings, because it is the Court's duty “to determine, as a matter of law, the regular rate of pay, the method of calculating damages, and the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed.” Pl.'s Mot. 4–5. Defendants, on the other hand, contest the Court's ability to determine Plaintiffs' regular rate of pay. See Def.'s Resp. 3–5. In particular, they argue that “the Court's calculation of [Plaintiffs' regular rate] must be based on factual
findings made by the jury,” including “the actual hours worked and the total wages received for each workweek.” Id. at 3. And since the jury in this case never determined Plaintiffs' actual hours worked or total wages received, Defendants contend that “the Court is unable to calculate the Plaintiffs' regular hourly rate of pay, and thus, unable [to] calculate the total overtime pay owed to the remaining Plaintiffs.” Id. at 5. The Court, as follows, disagrees with Defendants, and finds Plaintiffs' position more consistent with existing law.
The Fifth Circuit holds that “once the fact finder has established that the employee is due unpaid overtime, the proper determination of the regular rate of pay and overtime premium to which an employee is entitled is a question of law.” Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir.2013) (citing Ransom v. M. Patel Enterprises, Inc., 734 F.3d 377, 381–82 (5th Cir.2013); Singer, 324 F.3d at 823) (emphasis added). To be clear, the Fifth Circuit has specifically stated that “the court must determine [these matters] as a matter of law,” upon a finding of liability. Id. (citing Ransom, 734 F.3d at 381; Urnikis–Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 679 (7th Cir.2010)) (emphasis added). Despite acknowledging this binding precedent, Defendants maintain that the Court cannot legally determine Plaintiffs' regular rate in these circumstances. See Def.'s Resp. 3. In Defendants' view, this legal determination cannot be reached by the Court, because it would require the Court to resolve factual issues that underlie the regular rate determination. See id. at 3–4.
But contrary to Defendants' assertions, courts routinely decide factual matters in the process of calculating the unpaid overtime compensation owed to employees as a matter of law. See, e.g., Singer, 324 F.3d at 825 (upholding the district court's factual decision to “credi[t] the account summaries prepared by the [defendant's] accountant over those of the [plaintiff's] accountant” in calculating an FLSA overtime pay award); Black, 732 F.3d at 496, 498 (stating that “the court must determine as a matter of law whether to apply the standard method of calculating” overtime pay versus another, and later indicating that this legal issue turns on a separate “question of fact” determined by the lower court itself); Ransom, 734 F.3d at 381 (same as Black ). Indeed, courts have observed that “the employee's regular rate of pay is a factual matter.” Urnikis–Negro, 616 F.3d at 680 (citing Walling v. Youngerman–Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424–25, 65 S.Ct. 1242, 89 L.Ed. 1705 (1945) (emphasis added)). It seems that the reason for this—why courts, rather than juries, at times resolve ostensibly factual issues connected to the regular rate—is that the regular rate is the “keystone” of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); it drives “the amount of overtime payments which are necessary to effectuate the statutory purposes.” Walling, 325 U.S. at 424, 65 S.Ct. 1242. “The proper determination of that rate is therefore of prime importance,” according to the Supreme Court. Id. Based on this precedent, the Court believes that it has discretion to make the “proper determination” of Plaintiffs' regular rate in these circumstances, despite the seemingly factual nature of this inquiry.
None of the authorities cited by Defendants undermine or contradict the weight of precedent supporting the Court's decision to proceed in this manner. Defendants, for example, lean heavily on a Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation setting forth factual matters—including, “total remuneration for employment” and “total number of hours actually worked”—that generally factor into an employee's regular rate determination.
29 C.F.R. § 778.109. This regulation, however, says nothing about who—courts or juries—should determine these factual predicates to the regulation's regular rate calculation. And as the caselaw discussed above demonstrates, the mere existence of these factual issues in the regular rate determination does not mean that courts must present such issues to the jury as a matter of law. In the end, DOL regulations of this type are mere “interpretive rule[s], ... not [ ] remedial measure[s].” Urnikis–Negro, 616 F.3d at 677–78. In other words, they “sa[y] nothing about how a court is to calculate damages where, as here, the employer has breached its obligation to pay the employee an overtime premium. [Their] focus instead is on how an employer may comply with its statutory obligations in the first instance and avoid liability for breach of those obligations.” Id. at 678. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendants' suggestion that 29 C.F.R. § 778.109 forecloses the Court's determination of the regular rate in these circumstances.
The few cases cited by Defendants are similarly unavailing. The first, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946), is cited by Defendants for the unremarkable proposition that Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of proving damages—a point that is neither disputed nor helpful here. Similarly, Defendants highlight an isolated passage from the dissent in Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, in which Judge Waller makes the straightforward observation that “the number of hours in which any employee may have worked during a period in question is wholly a question of fact.” 146 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir.1944) (Waller, J., dissenting). However, Judge Waller's dissent—while addressing a completely unrelated issue to the one presented here—says nothing about whether such questions are “for the jury to decide,” as Defendants misleadingly suggest. Def.'s Resp. 4. Defendants also cite the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Mitchell v. Denton, upholding a district court's decision to submit the issue of “the exact number of weekly overtime hours worked” to the jury. 224 F.2d 596, 597–98 (5th Cir.1955). Note, however, that the decision at issue in Mitchell was the district court's refusal “to direct a verdict for the unpaid overtime compensation [sought].” 224 F.2d at 597. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, was merely concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence of unpaid overtime hours, not whether the court or jury was the proper judge of this disputed fact.
Ultimately, Defendants' underlying complaint here appears to be that the Court erred in rejecting their proposed jury instructions, which would have required the jury to precisely determine the total weekly pay and total hours worked each week for all 108 Driver Plaintiffs. But whether the Court should have submitted more exacting questions to the jury is an issue Defendants may properly raise in a Rule 50 motion; for present purposes, these issues are not the Court's concern. Instead, the question at hand is whether the Court is permitted to determine Plaintiffs' back-pay award without any further jury findings. Since the weight of authority suggests that it can, the Court rejects Defendants' contentions, and finds that it may appropriately proceed to the issues of Plaintiffs' regular rate of pay and overtime premium, as follows.
2. Determining Plaintiffs' Regular Rate of Pay
4 Having found that it has the requisite authority here, the Court turns now to the issue of Plaintiffs' regular rate. “The FLSA broadly defines ‘regular rate’ as the hourly rate actually paid the employee for ‘all remuneration for employment.’ ” Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir.2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42, 65 S.Ct. 11, 89 L.Ed. 29 (1944)). Ordinarily, determining the regular rate entails a straightforward “mathematical computation” based on “the amount of wages and the mode of payment” agreed to by the parties. Id. (citing Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 461, 68 S.Ct. 1186, 92 L.Ed. 1502 (1948)). In this case, however, Plaintiffs have been unable to produce evidence from which the Court may precisely compute their regular rates of pay. Instead, they could only offer approximations drawn primarily from the testimony offered at trial. See Pl.'s Mot. 12–13; Pl.'s Reply 5–6. On this basis, Plaintiffs ask the Court to set a regular rate of pay at $15 per hour for their entire 108–member collective unit. Pl.'s Mot. 12.
In opposing Plaintiffs' request, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their “burden of providing competent, affirmative evidence of [their] damages.” Def.'s Resp. 5. According to Defendants, the testimony presented at trial is simply “not sufficient to support Plaintiffs' damages calculations.” Id. As such, Defendants ask the Court to altogether deny Plaintiffs damages for failure to satisfy their burden of proof. See id. at 5–9.
As Defendants concede, however, the evidence presented at trial undisputedly shows that they failed to maintain adequate payroll records. Had Defendants lived up to their record keeping obligations—mandated by federal law, see 29 U.S.C. § 211(c)—Plaintiffs could have “easily discharge[d] [their] burden by securing the production of those records.” Mt. Clemens Pottery, 328 U.S. at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187. Under such circumstances, the proper course of action “is not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work,” as Defendants suggest. Id. Rather, the Supreme Court in Mt. Clemens Pottery instructed lower courts faced with such circumstances to apply the following burden-shifting analysis:
[A]n employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or
with evidence *688 to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only approximate.
Id. at 688, 66 S.Ct. 1187. The Court, as follows, applies this analysis to the parties assertions in this case.
i. Plaintiffs' evidence of their $15 per hour regular rate
5 As mentioned, Plaintiffs bear the initial burden in these circumstances to prove their regular rate “as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187. In an effort to satisfy this burden, Plaintiffs presented a variety of testimony and evidence at trial aimed at approximating an appropriate regular rate to apply to the damages calculation for all 108 Driver Plaintiffs.
First, all four of the Named Plaintiffs testified as to their regular rates, along with those of their fellow drivers, working out of Defendants' truck yard in Alvarado, Texas. Carol Johnson testified that she was paid at an hourly rate of $14 per hour during the time she worked as a driver out of the Alvarado yard. Doc. 296, Trial Tr. Volume I at 140–42. While she did not personally know what other drivers were paid, Johnson's $14 per hour rate matched the rate advertised in a job listing that she responded to. Id. at 142. She also heard other drivers mention being paid at an hourly rate. Id. at 159. Donny Hodkinson similarly testified that he was paid around $17 per hour as a driver. Doc. 297, Trial Tr. Volume II at 108, 120. He also stated that he was aware of drivers only being paid on an hourly basis in his time of employment, and that three drivers in particular—each of whom is an opt-in Plaintiff—told him they were paid between $17 and $18 per hour. Id. at 121. Reginald Williams next testified that he was paid $16.30 per hour as a driver. Id. at 145. Williams further indicated that in his subsequent role as a driver trainer, he learned that Defendants were hiring new drivers at $14 per hour, and that he was aware of drivers being paid up to $18 per hour. Id. at 155–56. Additionally, Tina McDonald testified, similar to Johnson, that she was paid $14 per hour during her time as a driver for Defendants, which matched the regular rate at which her job was advertised. Id. at 189, 196. Other new drivers told McDonald that they were also paid at a rate of $14 per hour. Id.