JOHN JONES III, District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, a class of individuals with intellectual disabilities (formerly known as mental retardation) who are institutionalized in state intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation ("ICF/MRs") initiated this litigation in June 2009. Plaintiffs alleged that they were appropriate for, and not opposed to, community-based services, and that Department of Public Welfare and the Secretary of Public Welfare (collectively, "Defendants" or "DPW") violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131- 12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, by failing to provide those services to institutionalized individuals. Plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 27, 2011, the Court resolved cross Motions for Summary Judgment in Plaintiffs' favor, finding that Defendants were violating the integration mandates of the ADA and RA by relegating institutionalized individuals to a class of persons who receive community placements only after another class, those who are not institutionalized, was fully served. ( See Doc. 88.) Because of the exhaustive detail that would be required in any resulting injunctive relief ruling, and mindful that the parties were in a better position to come to closure on an acceptable policy, we encouraged the parties to mediate in aid of seeking a final resolution. The parties thereafter reached a settlement with the commendable assistance of U.S. Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, and, thus, before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement (Doc. 260) and Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Costs (Doc. 262). For the reasons that follow, the Court will approve the proposed settlement and award the requested fees.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
As aforementioned, the Plaintiffs initiated the action on June 22, 2009. Pursuant to an unopposed motion predicated upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), we thereafter certified the following class:
All persons who: (1) currently or in the future will reside in one of Pennsylvania's state-operated intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation; (2) could reside in the community with appropriate services and supports; and (3) do not or would not oppose community placement.
(Doc. 17.) Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) that the Court denied by our Order of January 25, 2010. (Doc. 38.)
While the Motion to Dismiss was pending, a group of individuals filed a Motion to Intervene in the litigation. (Doc. 27.) These individuals, referred to throughout this litigation as the "Springstead Intervenors", alleged that, although they were opposed to community-based services and support, they were nonetheless de facto members of the certified class. The Springstead Intervenors alleged that the resolution of the class action in Plaintiffs' favor would limit the Springstead Intervenors' rights to choose ICF/MR care. We denied the Motion to Intervene on March 10, 2010, finding that the Springstead Intervenors were explicitly excluded from the class by virtue of their opposition to community-based care. (Doc. 41.) The Springstead Intervenors appealed that decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed our denial in April 2011. See Benjamin v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 2011 WL 1243683 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion).
The parties completed extensive discovery and filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 48, 51.) In January 2011 we issued a Memorandum and Order that denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and declared that DPW violated the integration mandates of the ADA and RA. (Doc. 88.) As noted, because at that juncture the Court was reluctant to draft such extensive injunctive relief as would be required, and in effect construct a policy that was better left for the parties to develop in the first instance, we encouraged the parties to attempt to resolve the remedy amicably.
Again, and as noted, we referred the parties to mediation with Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson in February 2011. The parties met twice with Judge Carlson and continued arms-length negotiations on their own. The parties eventually finalized the Proposed Settlement Agreement, and we granted preliminary approval of said Agreement on May 27, 2011. (Doc. 106.) Notice was either hand-delivered to nearly all ICF/MR residents or mailed to involved family and guardians of residents by June 24, 2011, and interested persons had the opportunity to object to the Settlement by August 2, 2011. The Court received numerous objections, discussed in more detail below, and conducted a fairness hearing in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on August 22, 2011.
B. The Proposed Settlement and Attorneys' Fees
Plaintiffs appropriately summarize the salient terms of the Proposed Settlement in their Brief in Support of the Motion for Final Approval (Doc. 261), and we shall highlight the significant points herein.
As articulated in the Agreement and expanded upon during the testimony at the fairness hearing, DPW is in the process of creating, and will continue to create, a Planning List that includes all state ICF/MR residents who are not opposed to discharge — this includes those who wish to be discharged and those who assert no preference. To evaluate who is not opposed to discharge, DPW's Office of Developmental Programs ("ODP") and others will assess residents', guardians', and involved family members' opposition to discharge utilizing the ICF/MR Community Planning List Assessment Protocol (the "Assessment Protocol") that was introduced in the hearing as Exhibit 1. The assessment is intended to be an individualized evaluation, and residents who do not indicate opposition to community placements will be placed on the planning list unless their guardians oppose. DPW will perform this assessment every year in conjunction with the residents' IEPs.
A substitute decision-maker can likewise oppose community placement for an individual who expresses no preference; thus preventing their inclusion on a waiting list. A substitute decision-maker cannot, however, override the decision and prevent inclusion on the list if the resident affirmatively indicates a preference for community placement.
Related to the assessments that will be performed to develop the Planning List, DPW will create a committee to develop a training program to educate residents and their families about community placements. This committee will distribute literature regarding the community placements and will offer visitations to some of the placements.
Thereafter, DPW will develop and implement an Integration Plan to provide community placements in the following order: (1) at least 50 persons on the Planning List in Fiscal Year 2011-2012; (2) at least 75 persons on the Planning List in FY 2012-13; (3) at least 100 persons on the Planning List in each FY 2013-2014 and 2014-2015; and (4) at least 75 persons on the Planning List in FY 2015-16 and every FY thereafter until all persons on the Planning List have been discharged. Throughout the course of the implementation of the Settlement Agreement, DPW will provide to Plaintiffs regular status reports, and the Court will retain continuing jurisdiction over the case for purposes of enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.
The Court received letters of opposition to the Settlement Agreement from at least one (1) state ICF/MR resident and from the families or guardians of approximately 101 other state ICF/MR residents. We likewise received letters of objection from several Commonwealth lawmakers as well as others who will not be directly impacted by the litigation, and several letters of support from state ICF/MR residents and others. Most of the articulated objections clearly stem from two apparent fears: that some state ICF/MR residents will be unable to voice their opposition to community placements and will be wrongly placed in the community and that, ultimately, the Settlement Agreement will result in the closure of all state ICF/MRs because of a decrease in the resident population. Several objectors likewise objected to any award of fees to counsel for Plaintiffs or to the measure of any fees awarded.
Plaintiffs also filed an unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Costs. (Doc. 262.) Plaintiffs seek a total award of $432,500; an amount that is, according to Plaintiffs, only 86.6 percent of their actual fees, litigation expenses, and costs incurred through June 30, 2011. Defendants do not oppose the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Proposed Settlement Agreement
Rule 23(e) provides, in pertinent part:
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court's approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed settlement . . .
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal.
. . . .
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval.
F.R.C.P. 23(e). As noted above, the class was properly certified in September 2009, so the Court need not make a certification determination as it would with a settlement class. Because the Court directed reasonable notice and allowed for objections, the only requisite, but clearly important, step remaining is a determination that the proposal is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
As the Third Circuit has often stressed, when considering a class settlement the district court must "act[] as a fiduciary, guarding the claims and rights of the absent class members." Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010). A "presumption of fairness" applies in a class action settlement if a court finds that the negotiations were conducted at arm's length, that there was sufficient discovery, that the proponents of settlement are experienced, and that only a small percentage of class members object. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, the presumption of fairness attaches to the Proposed Settlement Agreement. First, and as referenced above, the parties did conduct extensive arms-length negotiations between themselves and with the guidance of Magistrate Judge Carlson. Second, because the settlement was reached after the Court entered summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor, extensive discovery — including expert discovery — had already occurred, and the Court and the parties are all well-acquainted with the factual basis for the salient assertions made by Plaintiffs. Third, it is beyond peradventure that Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel are seasoned litigators with decades of combined experience in the subject matter at bar. Finally, the number of objectors are a small fraction of the total population of the state ICF/MRs, and an infinitely smaller fraction of those who meet the strict definition of the class.
1. The Girsh Factors
In Girsh v. Jepson, the Third Circuit articulated nine factors for courts to further consider when determining the fairness of a proposed settlement:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of
maintaining the class through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.
521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975);
see also In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit later identified other factors that are useful to consider, including whether any provisions for attorneys' fees are reasonable. A court
must make findings as to each of the nine
Girsh factors before approving a settlement under Rule 23(e).
See Pet Foods, 629 F.3d at 351. For the reasons articulated below, we find that the Proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and we shall adopt it.
The first factor — the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation weighs in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. Though the litigation is in its latter stages, it would take an extensive hearing, further submissions, and large amounts of the Court's time to develop any sort of injunctive remedy. Not only will the Court expend considerable resources, the parties will incur even greater fees and costs, and those Plaintiffs who wish to live in the community and who have been denied the opportunity to do so would remain institutionalized without recourse for DPW's clear violations as previously determined by us.
"In an effort to measure the class's own reaction to the settlement's terms directly, courts look to the number and voicferousness of the objectors." General Motors Pick-Up Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (1995) (" GM"). Thus, when considering the second Girsh factor, the reaction of the class appears almost entirely favorable. Notably, only one state ICF/MR resident voiced an opposition to the Proposed Settlement Agreement, and it appears that the entirety of his objection was that he wished to continue to live at the Selinsgrove Center. (Doc. 115.) Accordingly, neither this one individual's objection nor the remaining objections from non-class members truly demonstrate the balance of the class's own reaction to the Proposed Settlement Agreement's terms. Indeed, the non-class members oppose any discharge at all. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of approving the Proposed Settlement Agreement.
We understand that all state ICF/MR residents are affected in some way by the Proposed Settlement Agreement because all residents will be subject to evaluation, but any effect on those who wish not to be discharged is negligible compared to the effect that a wholesale denial of the Settlement Agreement will have on those who do not oppose discharge.
Assuming arguendo that the record objections by non-class members were cognizable and demonstrative of the reaction of the actual class members, we nonetheless believe that the objections miss the mark. The objections voice misguided fears that the intended or inevitable consequences of the Proposed Settlement Agreement are that DPW will force ICF/MR residents into community placements against their wishes, and that all state ICF/MRs will close. We do not believe the former to be the case, and find the latter to be pure speculation that is beyond the scope of our fairness evaluation.
The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed weighs in favor of approval of the Proposed Settlement Agreement. The parties must have an "adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating." Id. at 813. To ensure the parties have that appreciation of the merits and the respective consequences of the litigation, it is important to evaluate both the amount and type of discovery conducted. As mentioned before, the parties completed extensive discovery, including expert discovery, for an extensive period before the Proposed Settlement Agreement was submitted for approval by the Court. Indeed, the extensive discovery conducted was sufficient to support cross motions for summary judgment and actual judgment. Further, our decision on the merits clearly supports the inference that the parties adequately appreciated the merits of their respective positions.
The fourth factor, the risks of establishing liability, is not in play relative to our analysis. There are essentially no risks attendant here because the liability of DPW was previously established by the Court's January 27, 2011 Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The fifth factor, which involves the risks of establishing damages, or, more relevant to our case, securing the requested relief, weighs in favor of allowing settlement. Although the Court found for Plaintiffs on the issue of liability, the nature of the relief or precise contours of any injunction that would be crafted by the Court are far from certain. Indeed, it is our reluctance to impose a judge-made policy on Defendants which triggered the mediation that ultimately brought this proposed settlement before us for approval.
The sixth factor — the risks of maintaining the class — calls for the Court to weigh the possibility that a class would be decertified prior to trial. The risk of decertification at this stage, after resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment, is quite negligible. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of the Proposed Settlement Agreement in any significant way.
On August 25, 2011, Carl A. Solano, Esq., who objected on behalf of his sister, Diane Solano, and presented argument at the hearing, submitted a letter and supplemental authority. (Doc. 279.) Specifically, Mr. Solano submitted the Third Circuit's August 25, 2011 Opinion in Gates v. Rohm and Haas, Co., No. 10-2108, in which the Third Circuit held that it would be improper to certify a class if the requirement of cohesiveness was not satisfied. Presumably, Mr. Solano is suggesting that the Court should sua sponte reevaluate its certification decision because of the objections to the Proposed Settlement Agreement. We note, again, that those who oppose the Proposed Settlement Agreement are those who oppose community placement and the certified class includes those who do not, or would not oppose community placement. Thus, although the rights of those who are non-class members must be vigilantly protected, their objections do not destroy the cohesiveness of the class members. We thus find Gates inapt as it relates to the task at hand.
The seventh factor, Defendants' ability to withstand a greater judgment, weighs in favor of settlement because, by any estimation, DPW is subject to significant budgetary constraints as recognized by the Court and the parties throughout this case. The terms of the Proposed Settlement Agreement require DPW to develop and implement phased-in community placements. While these may ultimately result in future cost reduction, they will undoubtedly require upfront costs. Any relief designed by this Court — a body certainly far less well-versed in the intricacies and necessities of planning for community integration than the parties — will almost necessarily result in much greater costs and budgetary burdens on DPW and the Commonwealth.
Finally, the range of reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery by Plaintiffs and the attendant risks of litigation weighs in favor of settlement. As Plaintiffs aptly note, "[a]ssessing the value of a settlement and the `best possible recovery' is particularly difficult in a case seeking injunctive, rather than monetary relief." (Doc. 261 p. 20.) The Proposed Settlement Agreement confers upon Plaintiffs the benefits they sought — the opportunity to have a reasonable prospect of discharge from institutionalization. The Proposed Settlement Agreement develops a reasoned plan to ensure Plaintiffs receive the relief they sought through a process that is rationally measured in scope, duration, and cost. Rejection of the settlement will only result in further delay in implementing relief for the Plaintiffs. As we would then have to return to the proverbial "drawing board", the Court would be tasked to conduct a hearing on remedies in light of the violations, compelled to spend a considerable amount of time deciding the precise relief, and thereafter the parties would presumably spend a substantial amount of time preparing for or conducting the discharge of proper Plaintiffs. Forcing upon the parties an injunction and resulting policy to which they did not agree via arms-length negotiation could also presumably result in further litigation to ensure its enforcement, draining the resources of the Plaintiffs, the Commonwealth, and this Court. Perhaps most importantly, the sooner the Proposed Settlement Agreement can be implemented, the faster Plaintiffs can benefit from its mandate and achieve real consideration for appropriate community placements.
2. Conclusion
Thus, the ultimate balance of the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the Proposed Settlement Agreement, and we find that it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Although we give our approval to Proposed Settlement Agreement and its terms, we advise the parties to implement the settlement with caution. To our admittedly untrained eye, it appears as though the assessment protocol that has been developed to effectuate the Proposed Settlement Agreement may imply an unintended bias towards community placement. Reviewing the questionnaire to be utilized causes us to entertain serious doubts as to whether it is the proper tool for gauging whether the profoundly disabled, and especially those with no guardian to speak for them, are opposed to community placement. Indeed, we wonder about the wisdom of defaulting such individuals into a no preference category without greater analysis. And we have no doubt that the stated fears of many objectors, including those contained in the eloquent presentation by Mr. Solano on behalf of his sister, are heartfelt and entirely real. We urge those responsible for implementing the policy to consider these concerns, and if necessary revise the protocols in question. As to the other oft-articulated objection, that this settlement is simply a stalking-horse for DPW's plan to close all ICF/MRs, we reiterate that this issue is not before us today, nor is it a facet of the settlement. To the extent that any Objectors believe that there is an overarching policy to close ICF/MRs by DPW, their recourse lies not with this Court, but through their elected representatives and those who make policy within DPW. At the end of the day, the Settlement we are approving is the necessary result of violations of class members' legal rights by Defendants. We are thus duty-bound to place our imprimatur on a reasonable resolution that remedies those violations. No remedy in a world such as this, where family members must make wrenching decisions regarding loved ones who are in many cases profoundly impaired, will be perfect. However, the settlement presented to us is worthy of our approval for all of the reasons aforestated.
B. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
When evaluating an award of attorney's fees, in most instances courts apply the "American Rule". This bedrock principle requires that each litigant pays his or her own costs or attorneys fees, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. Often, statutory fee-shifting provisions will deviate from the American Rule and permit a court to award attorney's fees to a "prevailing party." The fee-shifting statutes at issue sub judice, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 under the ADA and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), authorize the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party who has filed suit under these acts. It is within the Court's discretion to award fees to a prevailing party, although "it is well established that a prevailing party should recover an award of attorney's fees absent special circumstances." Truesdell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing and reversing a denial of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Because a plaintiff may be a "prevailing party" for attorney's fees purpose "if they succeed on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit", Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), the Court has no doubt that Plaintiffs sub judice are the "prevailing party" in this litigation because they already fully succeeded on the merits prior to this proceeding to approve a final settlement. Therefore, we shall evaluate whether the requested fees and costs in the amount of $432,500 are reasonable.
1. Calculating the Lodestar
Plaintiffs assert they incurred total attorneys' fees in the amount of $430,715 and, as mentioned, are requesting an award of a portion of that amount. "In general, a reasonable fee is one which is adequate to attract competent counsel, but which does not produce windfalls to the attorneys." Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). A court typically calculates the appropriate award by determining a lodestar. The lodestar is calculated by determining the product of an appropriate hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours expended. The party seeking fees has the burden of producing "sufficient evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate for the essential character and complexity of the legal services rendered. . . ." Knight v. Drye, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82369 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2009) (quoting McCutcheon v. America's Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 1990)). Once the prevailing party's burden has been met, the opposing party bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to challenge that amount. McCutcheon, 560 F.3d at 150. If the opposing party does not challenge the amount, or does not provide sufficient evidence to challenge the amount, the district court need not make an independent lodestar determination, though the calculation of fees nonetheless is within the court's discretion. Id. Notably, Defendants do not oppose the Motion for Fees and Costs and thus do no challenge the reasonableness of the amount petitioned. Indeed, this amount was the result of extensive negotiations as stated by counsel at the fairness hearing. However, in an abundance of caution we will briefly articulate our independent lodestar determination.
a. Reasonable Hourly Rate
A reasonable hourly rate is typically based on the prevailing rates in the relevant community, and "[t]he court should assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party's attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services. . . ." Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001). "Thus determination of the market rate first requires determination of the relevant market." Windall, 51 F.3d at 1186. In determining the reasonable hourly rate, courts can start by considering "the attorney's usual billing rate, but this is not dispositive." Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 185 (quoting Windall, 51 F.3d at 1185). As previously mentioned, the prevailing party bears the burden of establishing "by way of satisfactory evidence in addition to the attorney's own affidavits that the requested hourly rates meet [the above-mentioned] standard." Id. (quoting Washington v. Philadelphia Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation omitted).
Applying the lodestar, Plaintiffs assert the following respective hourly rates charged and hours expended by each attorney from Disability Rights Network:
Attorney Hours Rate Lodestar Robert W. Meek 467.8 $475 $222,205.00 Mark J. Murphy 69.0 $450 $31,050.00 Robin Resnick 443.65 $400 $177,460.00
In considering the expertise and skill of each respective attorney, as well as the relevant market rate, we find that the rates claimed are not excessive. As attorneys Meek, Murphy, and Resnick have demonstrated in their submissions, they have practiced law for approximately 33, 28, and 25 years, respectively. Most of those years were with the Disability Rights Network, or its predecessor, the Disabilities Law Project. ( See Doc. 262, Exhibits E-G.) All counsel have extensive demonstrated experience in the subject matter of this litigation — disabilities law — and have participated in the seminal cases upon which we relied in deciding this action under the ADA's integration mandate. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2004).
With respect to the prevailing market rate, the Third Circuit has previously noted:
In establishing a standardized fee schedule the court will encounter the problem of selecting hourly rates for visiting lawyers from other parts of the country litigating in this forum. The Task Force [appointed by the Third Circuit] reviewed the current practices of the various circuits and concluded that the best rule is the "forum rate" rule. Hence an out-of-town lawyer would receive not the hourly rate prescribed by his district but rather the hourly rate prevailing in the forum in which the litigation is lodged. Deviation from this rule should be permitted only when the need for "the special expertise of counsel from a distant district" is shown or when local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.
Windall, 51 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Third Circuit Task Force,
Court Awarded Attorney Fees,
108 F.R.D. 237, 260-62 (1986)). Thus, the typical measure of a market rate is based upon the forum of the litigation, unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate that they "required the particular expertise of counsel from another vicinage, or that local counsel were unwilling to take on the litigation."
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honey-well Intn'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 2005).
Candidly, the rates requested by Mr. Meek, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Resnick ($475, $450, and $400, respectively), give the Court some pause at first blush when comparing those rates to the prevailing market rates in the Middle District. Mr. Meek declares in his Affidavit (Doc. 262, Exhibit A), and we have no reason to doubt, that these rates are entirely consistent in the Philadelphia legal community. Although the rates are not commensurate with the local market rates, three considerations inform our decision that the rates requested are ultimately reasonable. First, this complex litigation required a very high level of expertise by counsel. As Mr. Meek avers, the litigation "required knowledge of operation and funding of Pennsylvania's mental retardation service system, the Medical Assistance system, and the legal issues under the ADA and the RA." (Doc. 262-1 p. 5.) The learned counsel at DRN quite clearly has this expertise. Second, it is doubtful that local counsel would have been willing or able to take on a class action lawsuit that required as much time and up-front costs with no monetary award even prayed for. Finally, equally importantly, and as noted, this Motion is uncontested and the product of Defendants' searching examination of Plaintiffs' counsels' charges. Therefore, the rates therein are not only uncontested, but have been thoroughly vetted as well. For these reasons, we find the hourly rates represented therein to be reasonable.
b. Reasonable Hours Expended
In addition to determining a reasonable hourly rate, a court is charged with calculating the hours that are reasonably expended by the prevailing party. "Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 802 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). As such, a party should not be responsible for those hours that are not reasonable or are excessive under the circumstances. Counsel for Plaintiffs collectively spent 980.45 hours on this litigation. In reviewing the time sheets attached to the Motion (Docs. 262, Exhibits B-E) and considering the length and development of this vigorously-contested litigation, we find that there were no excessive expenditures of time.
The hours claimed include, inter alia, time spent in pre-complaint investigation, drafting the Complaint, researching and drafting the Motion for Class Certification, responding to the Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Intervene, conducting and responding to discovery, pursuing the Motion for Summary Judgment. Review of the time-sheets likewise demonstrates that counsel consistently strived to avoid duplication of efforts.
c. Other Considerations
The amount reached by employing this framework and calculating the lodestar is typically "presumptively reasonable." Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, after calculating the lodestar, a district court's discretion then comes into play and the court may then increase or decrease the total award based upon other factors such as the relative success of the prevailing party. See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir. 2009).
We do not find it prudent to disturb the amount requested by Plaintiffs. As we have emphasized, the amount of fees requested is a portion of a bargained-for settlement that the Court encouraged the parties to reach. Furthermore, the total fees requested by Plaintiffs are in fact less than Plaintiffs' lodestar. Finally, and very significantly in our view, Plaintiffs are not requesting compensation for fees incurred after June 30, 2011. Therefore, we find the amount requested to be reasonable and shall approve and award the total amount of fees requested by Plaintiffs.
The portion of the total amount requested in the Motion for Fees and Costs attributable to attorney's fees is $363,677.74, and the remainder is attributable to litigation costs incurred by Plaintiffs' counsel. The total amount of fees actually accumulated by Mr. Meek, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Resnick was $430,715.00.
2. Costs
As noted, in addition to the attorney's fees, the $432,500.00 requested also includes $68,822.26 in costs. The litigation expenditures are itemized by Plaintiffs as follows: Expenses Amount Filing Fee $350.00 Depositions $6,074.95 Expert Witnesses $58,883.75 Defendants' Expert Deposition Fee $1,943.00 Postage $9.94 Travel $435.35 Photocopying $1,125.27 Once again, we find that these costs are entirely reasonable considering the length and complexity of the underlying litigation, and will approve the same.
3. Conclusion
Plaintiffs and Defendants engaged in arms-length negotiations with respect to the final relief in this litigation. Plaintiffs agreed to request an award of fees and costs in an amount that was measurably less than what was actually incurred. Defendants have agreed to pay that amount. After calculating the lodestar and considering the complexity of the litigation, the Court can divine no reason to disturb this bargained-for agreement. Therefore, we find that an award of $432,500 to Plaintiffs for fees and costs as the prevailing party in this litigation is reasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
To reiterate, we are placing our imprimatur on this settlement only after much consideration and deliberation. The objections we received were not only numerous, but some were also cogently expressed and many were at times quite eloquent and even poignant. The depth of emotion expressed in these objections could easily lead us to neglect the real task at hand, which is to consider the proposed remedy in light of the violations of Plaintiffs' rights. Our foremost duty, however, is to consider the present posture of those individuals who brought this litigation to vindicate their legal rights. As we have previously found, DPW has consistently marginalized Plaintiffs and relegated them to a class of persons who received integrated services only after every other person who was not in that class was served. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to the remedies as agreed to by the parties. This Settlement Agreement seeks to discontinue practices that have systematically violated Plaintiffs' rights, and we thus find that it is a fair, adequate, and reasonable way to achieve that end, although admittedly imperfect.
In closing however, we note the following for the benefit of the non-class Objectors and for those rightfully concerned citizens and elected officials who have voiced opposition: we are not approving this Settlement Agreement to force individuals who do not wish to live in the community out of the ICF/MRs, and we are certainly not effectuating a closing any of the Commonwealth's ICF/MRs. Rather, we are approving the Settlement Agreement to ensure that the integration mandates of the ADA and related laws are implemented and followed. Accordingly, we shall grant Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement (Doc. 260) and Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses and Costs (Doc. 262). An appropriate Order shall follow.
Complaint Filed June 22, 2009
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
I. Introduction
WHEREAS on June 22, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) by unnecessarily segregating class members in state intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation (ICFs/MR);
WHEREAS the District Court by Order dated September 2, 2009 certified this case to proceed as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) on behalf of all individuals who (1) currently or in the future will reside in one of Pennsylvania's state ICFs/MR; (2) could reside in the community with appropriate supports and services; and (3) do not or would not oppose community placement;
WHEREAS the District Court by Memorandum and Order dated January 27, 2011 ruled that Defendants violated and were liable under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA by failing to offer community services to Plaintiffs and class members;
WHEREAS Plaintiffs and Defendants desire to reach consensus on an appropriate remedy that will resolve this lawsuit amicably and avoid the risks and expense of further litigation;
NOW, THEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Defendants enter into this Settlement Agreement.
II. Definitions
1. "AEs" means the Administrative Entities that contract with the Department of Public Welfare to administer the community intellectual disabilities system in specific geographic areas.
2. "Agreement" means this Settlement Agreement.
3. "Class members" means all persons who: (1) currently or in the future will reside in one of Pennsylvania's state ICFs/MR; (2) could reside in the community with appropriate supports and services; and (3) do not or would not oppose community placement
4. "Community placement" means residential and non-residential services and supports appropriate to meet the needs of the individual. "Residential supports and services" means living independently in one's own home or with family while receiving supportive services; living in a family living ("life-sharing") home licensed under 55 Pa. Code Ch. 6500; or living in a group home licensed under 55 Pa. Code Ch. 6400 that, unless the person chooses otherwise, houses no more than four people and that is not contiguous with other homes that serve people with disabilities or on a campus-type setting that serves people with disabilities.
5. "Community Waiver services" means services provided under the Consolidated Waiver or the Person/Family Directed Support Waiver and any future Medical Assistance programs that might succeed those waivers.
6. "CPP" means the Community Placement Plan that is developed for each resident of a state ICF/MR pursuant to the individual support planning process and that establishes the basic understanding of what services and supports the resident would need if he or she were to move to a community placement.
7. "DRN" means the Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania.
8. "DPW" means the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its officials, employees, agents, and successors.
9. "Effective Date" means the date that the Agreement is signed by all parties.
10. "Facility Advocate" means an individual employed by DRN under contract with DPW who is assigned to each state ICF/MR to advocate for residents.
11. "Facility Director" means the individual designated by ODP to oversee and administer the day-to-day operation of a state ICF/MR, including any interim or acting Facility Director.
12. "Guardian" means an individual appointed by a Pennsylvania court pursuant to 20 Pa. C.S.A. Ch. 55 to serve as the guardian of the person for a resident of a state ICF/MR.
13. "Involved family" means family members of a state ICF/MR resident who are designated as the resident's substitute decision makers in the CPP or other state ICF/MR records.
14. "ISP" means the Individual Support Plan created for each state ICF/MR resident (through a process in which the resident, family members and representatives, and members of the resident's Interdisciplinary Team participate) that assesses, identifies, and coordinates the needed supports and services for the resident.
15. "ODP" means the DPW Office of Developmental Programs, its officials, employees, agents, and successors.
16. "State ICFs/MR" means Ebensburg Center, Hamburg Center, Polk Center, Selinsgrove Center, White Haven Center, and any other facility licensed as an ICF/MR that Pennsylvania may operate or administer in the future.
III. Identification of Class Members
1. DPW will create, maintain, and update as needed a State ICF/MR Planning List that consists of all state ICF/MR residents who have been identified as not opposed to discharge to community placement.
2. To determine who is on the State ICF/MR Planning List, ODP will assess opposition to discharge by state ICF/MR residents and their involved families or guardians no later than September 30, 2011, and at least annually thereafter.
a. With the exception of those state ICF/MR residents identified in Section III.3 of the Agreement, the state ICF/MR resident's social worker or Community Transition Specialist, or both, together with the Facility Advocate, will determine whether the state ICF/MR resident should be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List based on discussions with the resident and involved family or guardians to assess their position as to community placement.
b. If the state ICF/MR resident does not express opposition to considering community placement, the resident will be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List subject to the following exceptions:
(1) If a state ICF/MR resident does not express a preference for community placement and has involved family or a guardian who is opposed to community placement, the resident will not be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List.
(2) If a state ICF/MR resident expresses a preference for community placement and has a guardian who is opposed to community placement, the resident will not be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List.
c. If there is a disagreement among the social worker, Community Transition Specialist, and Facility Advocate as to whether a state ICF/MR resident should be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List, the social worker, Community Transition Specialist, or Facility Advocate will notify the Facility Director, who will make the determination in conjunction with the standards in this Agreement based on review of any relevant documents and interviews with the state ICF/MR resident, the involved family or guardian, the social worker or Community Transition Specialist, and the Facility Advocate.
3. DPW will immediately place on the State ICF/MR Planning List the named Plaintiffs and any other state ICF/MR residents identified by the Facility Directors as having affirmatively expressed their desire to be discharged to the community. If one of these individuals has a guardian who subsequently objects to community placement, he or she will be removed from the State ICF/MR Planning List.
IV. Education about Community Placement Options
1. To assure that all state ICF/MR residents, their involved families, and guardians have access to appropriate information about community placement options, DPW will establish a Community Partnership Steering Committee within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date to develop and implement a program to educate state ICF/MR residents and their involved families and guardians about community placement.
a. The Deputy Secretary of ODP will appoint members of the Steering Committee, including, at minimum: a state ICF/MR resident; an individual with intellectual disabilities who lives in the community; a family member of a state ICF/MR resident; a family member of a person with intellectual disabilities who lives in the community; a representative selected by DRN; a provider representative; a representative from ODP; and a representative from the AEs.
b. The Steering Committee will develop a training curriculum that addresses how the community intellectual disabilities system works; community placement, supports, and services, including specialized programs such as those that serve individuals who are elderly, medically fragile, or have behavioral issues; funding for community services; and opportunities to participate in community life.
c. No later than ninety (90) days after the Effective Date, DPW and Plaintiffs' counsel will agree upon a training schedule. At minimum, DPW will provide trainings at each state ICF/MR at least three times each year as well as outside the state ICFs/MR in each of the four ODP Regions at least two times each year. At least one training each year will be recorded and made available to the public on DPW's website.
d. DPW will provide involved families and guardians with notice of the trainings at the facilities that serve their relatives or wards and in the Regions where they live at least thirty (30) days in advance of the training.
e. The Steering Committee will develop and disseminate to state ICF/MR residents, their involved families, and guardians written materials about community placement options, including how they can get on the State ICF/MR Planning List or find out more information.
f. The Steering Committee will work with the state ICFs/MR to assure that all state ICF/MR residents, their involved families, and guardians are periodically offered the opportunity to visit community placements that serve individuals whose needs are similar to the residents' needs and to meet with community services providers.
2. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, DPW will develop and begin to implement a plan to offer one-to-one outreach to state ICF/MR residents and their involved families and guardians by family members of individuals with intellectual disabilities who currently live in the community.
3. State ICF/MR residents and their involved families and guardians will be given an opportunity after they participate in training events or have outreach contacts to state their position on discharge. To the extent that this results in any changes from their prior position on discharge, DPW will supplement or amend the State ICF/MR Planning List as appropriate.
4. DPW will continue to provide the education and outreach services required by Sections IV.1 and IV.2 of this Agreement during the term of the Agreement.
V. Development and Implementation of a Viable Integration Plan
1. DPW will develop and implement a viable integration plan (Integration Plan) that provides community placements to:
a. at least 50 state ICF/MR residents on the State ICF/MR Planning List in Fiscal Year 2011-2012;
b. at least 75 state ICF/MR residents on the State ICF/MR Planning List in Fiscal Year 2012-2013;
c. at least 100 state ICF/MR residents on the State ICF/MR Planning List in Fiscal Year 2013-2014;
d. at least 100 state ICF/MR residents on the State ICF/MR Planning List in Fiscal Year 2014-2015; and
e. at least 75 individuals on the State ICF/MR Planning List annually in Fiscal Year 2015-2016 and each fiscal year thereafter until all state ICF/MR residents on the State ICF/MR Planning List have been discharged.
2. To facilitate compliance with Section V.1 of this Agreement, DPW will take at least the following necessary steps:
a. In submitting its budget proposal to the Governor, DPW will request as one of its top budget priorities appropriations to fund the development of community placements to meet the Integration Plan's benchmarks specified in Section V.1.
b. DPW will consider the feasibility and propriety of consolidating the budget lines for state ICFs/MR and Community Waiver services;
c. Unless and until DPW consolidates the budget lines for state ICFs/MR and Community Waiver services, DPW to the extent feasible will shift funds from the carry-forward budget for state ICFs/MR to the Community Waiver services budget.
d. DPW will modify its policies and practices to assure that persons on the State ICF/MR Planning List have access to vacancies in existing community placements that match their needs, though DPW will retain discretion to assign vacancies as it deems appropriate.
3. DPW will work with individuals on the State ICF/MR Planning List, their involved families or guardians, their AEs, and the Facility Advocates to develop CPPs and ISPs that specify the community placements, services, and supports the individuals need to successfully transition to the community.
4. All individuals on the State ICF/MR Planning List will be offered community placements in which four (4) or fewer individuals reside, provided, however, that any individual can choose to live in a larger community placement that is funded by the Consolidated Waiver. Whenever an individual chooses to live in a community placement that has more than four (4) residents, DPW will notify Plaintiffs' counsel as soon as practicable after the choice has been made.
5. DPW may divert funding appropriated and allocated to implement the Integration Plan set forth in Section V. 1 of this Agreement to provide community placements to individuals living in the community who it determines are at imminent risk of institutionalization, provided, however, that: (a) DPW may not divert such funding to serve more than five (5) such individuals living in the community in any fiscal year; and (b) to the extent that this diversion of funding results in fewer than the targeted number of state ICF/MR residents identified in Section V.1 receiving community placements in any fiscal year, DPW will increase the number of state ICF/MR residents for whom DPW will provide community placements in the following fiscal year to compensate for the decrease.
VI. Status Reports
1. Beginning January 1, 2012 and every six (6) months thereafter, DPW will provide a status report to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court on its implementation of this Agreement, including: (a) the steps DPW has taken to implement the Integration Plan outlined in Section V.1 of the Agreement (including, but not necessarily limited to, the steps identified in Section V.2 of the Agreement); (b) the number of persons on the State ICF/MR Planning List at the beginning and end of the report period and the number of persons on the State ICF/MR Planning List who were discharged to community placements during the report period; (c) whether DPW diverted funding from the Integration Plan to serve individuals living in the community under Section V.5 of this Agreement and, if so, how many individuals living in the community have been served with such funding; and (d) implementation of the provisions related to education and outreach in Section IV of the Agreement.
2. Beginning January 1, 2012 and every six (6) months thereafter, DPW will provide Plaintiffs' counsel with: (a) a copy of the updated State ICF/MR Planning List; (b) information that identifies all state ICF/MR residents who were discharged during the report period, including their names and addresses in the community and the names of their community residential services providers; and (c) the identity of any class members who, after discharge, were admitted or committed to psychiatric hospitals or state ICFs/MR or were arrested or jailed, and a description for each such person of the circumstances that led to those situations and their current status.
VII. Approval, Enforcement, Jurisdiction, and Attorneys' Fees
1. Plaintiffs will petition the District Court for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement and for permission to provide class notice and to schedule a fairness hearing. If the District Court grants preliminary approval, Plaintiffs will distribute the class notice to state ICF/MR residents and DPW will distribute the class notice to involved families and guardians of the state ICF/MR residents. Plaintiffs will petition for final approval of the Agreement.
2. Plaintiffs may file a motion for specific performance to enforce alleged violations of the Settlement Agreement, provided, however, that at least thirty (30) days before Plaintiffs file any motion for specific performance, they will provide notice of the alleged violation to DPW and offer DPW the opportunity to meet with Plaintiffs to discuss the alleged violation in an effort to resolve the dispute without judicial intervention. Defendants reserve the right to assert any available defense to a claim for specific performance, including lack of funding that is not attributable to Defendants' actions.
3. The Settlement Agreement is not nor is it to be construed as a consent decree. Plaintiffs may not seek a remedy of contempt of court for any violation of the Agreement.
4. The Settlement Agreement will be binding on all parties, as well as their successors, only if the Agreement is approved by the District Court, provided, however, that Defendants agree to comply with the terms of the Agreement beginning on the Effective Date pending the Court's ruling on approval of the Agreement. If the Court denies approval of the Agreement or if final approval is overturned on appeal, the litigation will be reinstated in the same procedural posture as it was at the time the parties executed the Agreement.
5. If the District Court approves the Settlement Agreement, it will retain jurisdiction over the lawsuit for purposes of interpretation and enforcement.
6. The Settlement Agreement will terminate ninety (90) days after the provision of a community placement to the last person on the State ICF/MR Planning List, at which point the Plaintiffs will seek dismissal of the lawsuit.
7. Defendants will pay Plaintiffs' counsel, subject to the District Court's approval, the sum of $432,500 for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs incurred through final District Court approval of the Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement should be construed to entitle Plaintiffs to or preclude Plaintiffs from recovery of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs incurred after the final District Court approval of the Agreement.