Markell v. Markell

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Docket Number

Attorney(S)

Harold Salant Strassfeld & Spielberg, White Plains, N.Y. (Donna E. Abrams of counsel), for appellant. Donna Markell, Cortlandt Manor, N.Y., respondent pro se.

Judges

Mark C. Dillon

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a divorce action involving Donna Markell (plaintiff) and Robert Markell (defendant). The parties entered into a stipulation of settlement dated May 14, 2002, agreeing that the defendant would pay child support on the fifteenth day of each month and that unreimbursed health care expenses for their children would be split equally after the plaintiff paid the initial $500 per child. The Supreme Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 10, 2002, reflecting this agreement. However, the judgment of divorce entered the same day contradicted this by requiring the defendant to pay child support on the first day of each month and two thirds of the unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff's initial $500 payment per child.

Approximately eight years later, on or about December 10, 2010, the defendant moved to modify the judgment of divorce to align it with the stipulation of settlement and the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Supreme Court denied the motion on January 14, 2011, and upon reargument on March 11, 2011, adhered to the original denial. The court based its denial on the doctrine of laches, finding the defendant's delay unreasonable and prejudicial. The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to modify the judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant's motion to modify the judgment of divorce to reflect the stipulation of settlement and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be granted despite the eight-year delay.
Whether the doctrine of laches bars the defendant's motion to modify the judgment of divorce due to unreasonable delay and prejudice to the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The judgment of divorce contains a clerical error inconsistent with the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The parties had been complying with the stipulation terms for approximately eight years, evidencing the error in the judgment.
The defendant moved to correct the judgment to reflect the true agreement and court findings.

Plaintiff's Arguments

Argued that the defendant’s motion was barred by laches due to an eight-year delay in seeking modification.
Implied that the delay caused prejudice or a change in circumstances making modification inequitable.
Conceded that the parties had been following the stipulation terms since 2002.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Skrodelis v. Norbergs, 272 A.D.2d 316, 707 N.Y.S.2d 197	Doctrine of laches: bars enforcement of rights where unreasonable delay causes prejudice and a change in circumstances makes relief inequitable.	Used to analyze whether the defendant’s delay barred his motion to modify the judgment and whether prejudice or changed circumstances existed.
Cohen v. Krantz, 227 A.D.2d 581, 643 N.Y.S.2d 612	Supports the principle that mere lapse of time without prejudice does not sustain laches.	Reinforced the requirement that prejudice must be shown to invoke laches.
Matter of Kuhn v. Town of Johnstown, 248 A.D.2d 828, 669 N.Y.S.2d 757	General principles regarding prejudice and equitable relief.	Referenced in evaluating whether the plaintiff demonstrated prejudice from the delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the doctrine of laches, which requires both an unreasonable and inexcusable delay and resulting prejudice to the opposing party, along with a change in circumstances making relief inequitable. The court found that although the defendant delayed eight years before moving to modify the judgment, the parties had been adhering to the stipulation's terms during that time, indicating no change in circumstances that would render the relief inequitable. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay, such as injury, loss of evidence, or disadvantage. The defendant successfully showed that the judgment contained a clerical error inconsistent with the stipulation and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Accordingly, the court concluded that the doctrine of laches did not bar the defendant's motion to modify the judgment to reflect the parties' original agreement and the court’s findings.

Holding and Implications

The court modified the order entered March 11, 2011, vacating the denial of the defendant’s motion to modify the judgment of divorce. The judgment was corrected to require the defendant to pay child support on the fifteenth day of each month and to pay one half of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff pays the initial $500 per child, consistent with the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

This decision directly affects the parties by aligning the judgment with their original agreement and court findings, thereby correcting the clerical error. The opinion does not establish new precedent but clarifies the application of laches in the context of long-delayed motions to modify judgments where no prejudice or inequitable change in circumstances is shown.

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Donna MARKELL, respondent, v. Robert MARKELL, appellant.

MARK C. DILLON

Harold Salant Strassfeld & Spielberg, White Plains, N.Y. (Donna E. Abrams of counsel), for appellant. Donna Markell, Cortlandt Manor, N.Y., respondent pro se.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, ANITA R. FLORIO, and THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JJ.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.), dated January 14, 2011, which denied his motion to modify stated portions of the parties' judgment of divorce dated December 10, 2002, inter alia, directing him to pay child support on the first of each month and two thirds of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff paid the initial $500 per child, to reflect the terms of the parties' stipulation of settlement dated May 14, 2002, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the same court dated December 10, 2002, among other things, requiring him to pay child support on the fifteenth day of each month and only one half of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff paid the initial sum of $500 per child and (2), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court entered March 11, 2011, as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination in the order dated January 14, 2011.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated January 14, 2011, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order entered March 11, 2011, made upon reargument; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order entered March 11, 2011, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, upon reargument, adhering to the determination in the order dated January 14, 2011, denying those branches of the defendant's motion which were to modify those portions of the parties' judgment of divorce directing him to pay child support on the first day of each month and to pay two thirds of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff paid the initial sum of $500 per child, and substituting therefor a provision, upon reargument, vacating that determination and thereupon granting those branches of the defendant's motion which were to modify the judgment of divorce so as to require him to pay child support on the fifteenth day of every month and only one half of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff pays the initial sum of $500 per child, consistent with the provisions of the stipulation of settlement and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; as so modified, the order entered March 11, 2011, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

In a stipulation of settlement dated May 14, 2002, the plaintiff former wife and the defendant former husband agreed, inter alia, that the defendant would pay child support on the fifteenth day of each month, and that unreimbursed health care expenses for their children would be divided equally after the plaintiff paid the initial sum of $500 per child. The Supreme Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated December 10, 2002, which reflected this agreement. However, the judgment of divorce, which was entered on December 10, 2002, provided that the defendant was to pay child support on the first day of each month and two thirds of the children's unreimbursed health care expenses after the plaintiff paid the initial $500 per child. On or about December 10, 2010, the defendant moved to modify the judgment of divorce to “accurately reflect the provisions of the December 10, 2002 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and [the] parties' May 14, 2002 Stipulation of Settlement.” The Supreme Court denied the motion and, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination. The Supreme Court determined that the husband's motion to modify the judgment was barred by the doctrine of laches, in that he waited eight years to make the motion. The defendant appeals. We modify the order made upon reargument.

“The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine which bars the enforcement of a right where there has been an unreasonable and inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to a party. The mere lapse of time without a showing of prejudice will not sustain a defense of laches. In addition, there must be a change in circumstances making it inequitable to grant the relief sought” ( Skrodelis v. Norbergs, 272 A.D.2d 316, 316, 707 N.Y.S.2d 197 [citations omitted]; see Cohen v. Krantz, 227 A.D.2d 581, 582, 643 N.Y.S.2d 612). Notably, “[p]rejudice may be established by a showing of injury, change of position, loss of evidence, or some other disadvantage resulting from the delay” ( Skrodelis v. Norbergs, 272 A.D.2d at 316–317, 707 N.Y.S.2d 197).

Here, in support of his motion, the defendant demonstrated that the subject provisions of the judgment were the result of a clerical error, as the parties had been adhering to the terms of the stipulation of settlement for approximately eight years, and that the plaintiff had only recently informed him at a Family Court proceeding that the judgment contained terms different from those in the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In opposition, the plaintiff, in effect, conceded that the parties had been complying with their stipulation of settlement since it was executed in May 2002. Since the parties had been operating under the terms of the stipulation of settlement for approximately eight years prior to the husband's motion, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances that would render inequitable the relief sought by the defendant. Further, the plaintiff failed to show that she would be prejudiced by a modification of the judgment to accurately reflect the provisions contained in the stipulation of settlement and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ( see generally Matter of Kuhn v. Town of Johnstown, 248 A.D.2d 828, 669 N.Y.S.2d 757).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.