PER CURIAM.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge.
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., HILL, J., and ALLEN R. SLATER, District Judge, assigned.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Charles A. Chambers appeals his conviction of possession of methamphetamine. He claims the district court erred in failing to exclude evidence obtained in a search of his truck following a traffic stop. We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress this evidence.
Officers Joseph Springob and Clayton Schuler were conducting surveillance of a residence whose occupants were suspected on being involved in identity theft and the distribution of drugs. Springob was in an unmarked car, and Schuler was nearby in a marked police car. At about 10 p.m., Springob saw a pickup truck stop at the residence. Two occupants exited the truck and went inside. A short time later, one returned to the truck and drove off. Finding the short stay rather suspicious, Springob followed with the hope that the driver would commit a traffic infraction that would allow him to stop the vehicle.
Chambers, the driver, left the residence and drove to a grocery store. He then drove to a liquor store where he stopped, went into the store, and then returned to the truck. Chambers committed a traffic infraction while leaving the liquor store parking lot so Springob radioed Schuler, who had been following in his marked police car, and Schuler made the traffic stop.
A check of Schuler's onboard computer disclosed that Chambers was identified as a habitual violator for drug offenses. Schuler filled out the traffic citation and called for a drug dog. After giving Chambers the traffic citation, Schuler told him that he was free to go. As Chambers started to walk towards his truck, Schuler asked him if he would answer a few more questions. Chambers agreed, and when asked whether Schuler could search the truck, Chambers said he could not. It is undisputed that at this point Chambers was not free to leave. About 5 to 10 minutes later, Deputy Sheriff Ben Romero arrived with the drug dog. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics inside the truck. Schuler searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine underneath the driver's seat. Chambers was arrested and charged.
Following an evidentiary hearing on Chambers' pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his truck, the district court denied relief. Chambers was later tried and convicted, and this appeal followed.
Chambers concedes that the officer had reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate the traffic stop, in spite of its pretextural nature; and the State concedes that Chambers was involuntarily detained past the time necessary to conduct a routine traffic stop. The issue for us is whether Schuler had reasonable suspicion of illicit conduct to justify extending the traffic stop. Chambers argues on appeal that the circumstances did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity; therefore, it was unlawful to detain him involuntarily beyond the time necessary to issue a traffic citation.
In our review of this claim, we examine the district court's findings to determine if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. We review de novo the legal conclusion drawn from those facts. State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 985, 218 P.3d 801 (2009).
Here, the police were required to limit Chambers' traffic stop to the time necessary for the officer to request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue the citation, unless extending the stop was justified because the police had a reasonable suspicion that Chambers was engaged in further illegal activity. See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 8, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007).
A “reasonable and articulable suspicion” is “a minimum level of objective justification which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” but “more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, Syl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 154 P.3d 1 (2007). It is arrived at by examining the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734–35, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). In our review, we use a common-sense approach based on ordinary human experience, giving reasonable deference to a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011); see United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.1997). Further, it is important to remember that a reasonable suspicion determination “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
Here, Chambers' traffic stop was extended based on the articulable suspicion that Chambers had been involved in a drug transaction at the home the police had been watching. The district court determined that the following facts rendered that suspicion reasonable. The police were watching the home of a family known to be involved in drug activity. Chambers was a habitual drug offender. Chambers engaged in a quick in-and-out of the home when he dropped off his passenger at approximately 10 p.m., consistent with a person engaging in a drug transaction there. Chambers took an unusual route from the drug house to the scene of the traffic stop.
Chambers argues that the facts here supporting reasonable suspicion are fewer than those in State v. Griffin, 31 Kan.App.2d 149, 61 P.3d 112,rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003), a case relied upon by the district court. But there is no magic number of indicia of illegal activity necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. In our examination of the totality of the circumstances, we give reasonable deference to the ability of the police to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. Other drug transactions observed at the house under surveillance before Chambers arrived would have heightened police suspicion when Chambers made his stop. But the fact that Chambers was the first does not negate the suspicious nature of his stop. Further, the fact that Chambers did not have an active drug charge pending against him at the time, as Chambers argues, does not negate the fact that he was a habitual drug offender.
Chambers argues that the police could not identify him at the time as the person who made the quick in-and-out at the drug house and that the officer lost sight of Chambers' truck for a short time when he stopped at the grocery store. Chambers does not pursue the alternative scenario this would force him to construct. The only possible one we can think of is as follows: Chambers was stopped while driving his truck, the same white pickup truck seen stopping at the drug house a short time earlier. How can this be? Someone other than Chambers must have done the quick in-and-out at the drug house and then drove the truck to the grocery store where, unseen by the following police, the previous driver got out and Chambers (who had been waiting at the grocery store) got in and drove to the liquor store. We are not persuaded that such a remote possibility negated the officer's reasonable suspicion.
Finally, Chambers argues that the unusual route taken from the drug house to the scene of the traffic stop does not support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Chambers argues that Officer Schuler did not know where the truck was going, so how could he say that the truck was taking an unusual route? It is true that Schuler apparently did not know Chambers' final destination until the time of the traffic stop when Chambers told Schuler that he was headed home. But that would have occurred before the traffic stop was extended upon completion of the ticketing process. So before the stop was extended, the crucial time for our analysis, Schuler knew where Chambers lived. Schuler testified:
“He'd kind of gone out of his way a little bit to hit a liquor store when he had one right next to his home. To me, through my experience, the kind of—seems like he's going out of his way to either see if he's being followed—I'm sure he probably saw me in my patrol car before. When he first left he pulled into the Dillons lot. He may have seen if I was still back there, seeing if he was still being followed by me to avoid police contact. Through my experience of watching drug complaints, people involved with drug activity, that's often something they do.”
There may have been a perfectly innocent explanation for the route Chambers took, and the route he chose may have led directly to his home, but a reasonable suspicion determination “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Under the circumstances, at the time the traffic stop was extended to investigate for criminal drug activity, Officer Schuler had reason to suspect that Chambers had been trying to evade him, as persons involved in recent drug transactions often do.
Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, giving the police reasonable deference as to their ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions, and being mindful that a reasonable suspicion determination need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to extend Chambers' traffic stop to investigate for recent illegal drug activity. The district court did not err in denying Chambers' suppression motion and in convicting Chambers based upon evidence obtained during the extension of the traffic stop.
Affirmed.