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Docket Number

Docket No. 305468.

Judges

Kurtis T. Wilder

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Smart Summary

Wilson v. King, Mich. App., Docket No. 305468 (Nov. 6, 2012)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Marquita Wilson (in propria persona, appearing as next friend of her minor son Mac Sconi) is the biological mother of three older children whose parental rights were terminated in a separate case on February 22, 2008. Defendant Diane King subsequently adopted those three older children. Plaintiff gave birth to Mac on September 11, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that defendant initially allowed Mac to visit the three older biological siblings but later prohibited visitation.

On May 10, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking sibling visitation for Mac under the Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.), asking the trial court to set a reasonable visitation schedule. On June 20, 2011, plaintiff moved for a default judgment because defendant allegedly failed to respond within 21 days of service. At the default motion hearing both parties appeared pro se. The trial court denied the default motion and sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that Michigan law does not recognize a cause of action for sibling visitation. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Michigan law provides a cause of action for sibling visitation (as argued by plaintiff).
Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for default judgment and in dismissing the case.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff argued that Michigan law provides for a cause of action permitting sibling visitation, and therefore the trial court improperly dismissed her case seeking visitation between Mac and his three older biological siblings.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of defendant's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Verna's Tavern, Inc. v. Heite, 243 Mich.App. 578, 584–585, 624 N.W.2d 738 (2000)	That failure to identify a particular subrule for summary disposition at the trial court does not preclude appellate review if the record is sufficient.	The court relied on this precedent to justify treating the trial court's dismissal (which did not cite a specific subrule) as a summary disposition that could be reviewed on appeal.
Al–Maliki v. LaGrant, 286 Mich.App. 483, 485, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009)	That MCR 2.116(I)(1) permits a trial court to grant summary disposition sua sponte.	The court cited Al–Maliki to support treating the trial court's sua sponte dismissal as a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1).
Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118–119, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999)	Standards for de novo review of summary disposition and the legal test under MCR 2.116(C)(8): pleadings alone are tested, well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and C(8) may be granted only when claims are unenforceable as a matter of law.	The court applied Maiden to frame its standard of review and to explain the legal sufficiency test governing the dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Jones v. Slick, 242 Mich.App. 715, 720, 619 N.W.2d 733 (2000)	Characterized MCL 710.60 as the "effect-of-adoption" statute.	The court cited Jones to introduce and contextualize MCL 710.60 as the statutory provision governing the legal effect of adoption.
In re Toth, 227 Mich.App. 548, 553, 577 N.W.2d 111 (1998)	That MCL 710.60(1) effectually severs, at law, prior natural family relationships upon adoption and creates a new, complete substitute relationship such that statutes like the grandparent visitation statute cease to apply to adopted children.	The court relied on In re Toth's articulation of the adoption statute's effect to conclude that adoption by the defendant legally severed the sibling relationship between Mac and the three older children.
In re Wilson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued Oct. 21, 2008 (Docket Nos. 284357, 284358, 284359, 284360), 2008 WL 4649088	Affirmation of the trial court's termination of plaintiff's parental rights in the prior termination case.	The opinion notes this earlier affirmance to establish the background fact that plaintiff's parental rights were previously terminated.
Klooster v. City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich. 289, 310, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011)	That an appellate court may affirm a trial court's decision on a different basis supported by the record.	The court invoked Klooster to justify affirming the trial court's dismissal even though the appellate court relied on a different legal rationale (the effect of adoption) than the trial court's stated reason.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals treated the trial court's sua sponte statement that plaintiff had not stated a "recognized cause of action" as equivalent to a dismissal for failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and therefore considered the dismissal as summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1) and MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Applying de novo review and the MCR 2.116(C)(8) standard (accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff), the court examined the legal effect of defendant's prior adoptions under MCL 710.60 (the "effect-of-adoption" statute). Relying on precedent construing MCL 710.60, the court explained that adoption creates a new, complete substitute parent–child relationship and severs, as a legal matter, prior natural family ties.

Because defendant legally adopted the three older children, the court concluded that, for purposes of the law, those children were the adoptive parent's children and that their prior natural sibling relationship with Mac had been severed by operation of the adoption statute. Consequently, even assuming (without deciding) that a sibling-visitation cause of action exists under Michigan law, plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim because the individuals with whom Mac sought visitation were not his siblings as a matter of law. The court therefore held that no factual development could cure that defect and affirmed the dismissal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Implications:

The direct effect is that plaintiff's complaint for sibling visitation was dismissed and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
The court explicitly declined to decide whether Michigan law recognizes a cause of action for sibling visitation and stated it was offering no opinion on the viability of such a claim; the dismissal rests on the legal effect of the prior adoptions severing the sibling relationship.
No broader change in precedent on the existence of a sibling-visitation cause of action was announced by the opinion; the court affirmed the dismissal based on the legal status of the putative siblings after adoption.

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WILSON v. KING.

WILDER

Marquita Wilson in propria persona for Mac Sconi.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and TALBOT and WILDER, JJ.

WILDER, J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order denying her motion for default judgment and dismissing her case. We affirm.

Although the minor, Mac Sconi, is seeking visitation rights with his biological siblings, we refer to his mother, Marquita Wilson, as plaintiff throughout the opinion.

Plaintiff is the biological mother of three older children. On February 22, 2008, in a separate case, the trial court terminated plaintiff's parental rights to these three children. Defendant, Diane King, subsequently adopted the three older children. On September 11, 2008, plaintiff gave birth to Mac Sconi. According to plaintiff, defendant initially allowed Mac to visit with his three older biological siblings, i.e., defendant's adopted children. However, plaintiff claims that defendant eventually prohibited this visitation. Thereafter, on May 10, 2011, plaintiff, as next friend of Mac, filed a complaint for sibling visitation pursuant to the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq. Plaintiff requested that the trial court “set a reasonable visitation schedule” for Mac and his three older biological siblings. On June 20, 2011, plaintiff moved for the trial court to enter an order of default against defendant for failure to respond within 21 days of service. Plaintiff and defendant both appeared in propria persona at the subsequent default motion hearing. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and sua sponte dismissed her lawsuit on the basis that Michigan law does not recognize a cause of action for sibling visitation. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

We affirmed the trial court's termination in In re Wilson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 21, 2008 (Docket Nos. 284357, 284358, 284359, and 284360), 2008 WL 4649088.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that Michigan law provides for a cause of action for sibling visitation and, thus, the trial court improperly dismissed her case. Without determining whether Michigan provides for a cause of action for sibling visitation, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's case.

At the motion hearing on plaintiff's request for a default judgment, the trial court sua sponte dismissed plaintiff's case because the court concluded that Michigan law did not recognize a cause of action for sibling visitation. Even though the trial court never cited any court rule, we conclude that the trial court's pronouncement that plaintiff had failed to state a “recognized cause of action” is synonymous with failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Therefore, we will treat the trial court's actions as a sua sponte granting of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(1) and MCR 2.116(C)(8). See Verna's Tavern, Inc. v. Heite, 243 Mich.App. 578, 584–585, 624 N.W.2d 738 (2000) (stating that the failure to identify a particular subrule in regard to summary disposition at the trial court does not preclude appellate review as long as the reviewing court has a sufficient record to rule properly).

.MCR 2.116(C)(8) provides that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff “has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”

.MCR 2.116(I)(1) allows a trial court to sua sponte grant summary disposition. Al–Maliki v. LaGrant, 286 Mich.App. 483, 485, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009).

We review a trial court's granting of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint by the pleadings alone. Id. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

MCL 710.60 is “commonly referred to as the effect-of-adoption statute,” Jones v. Slick, 242 Mich.App. 715, 720, 619 N.W.2d 733 (2000), and it currently provides, in relevant part:

After the entry of an order of adoption, if the adoptee's name is changed, the adoptee shall be known and called by the new name. The person or persons adopting the adoptee then become the parent or parents of the adoptee under the law as though the adopted person had been born to the adopting parents and are liable for all the duties and entitled to all the rights of parents. [MCL 710.60(1), as amended by 2006 PA 352.]

Jones addressed MCL 710.60(1) as amended by 1996 PA 409, but the changes made by the 2006 amendment were essentially stylistic and would not have affected the analysis.

In analyzing MCL 710.60 in light of the CCA in a case involving grandparent visitation, this Court held:

The effect of MCL 710.60(1) is to make the adopted child, as much as possible, a natural child of the adopting parents, and to make the adopting parents, as much as possible, the natural parents of the child. The Michigan adoption scheme expresses a policy of severing, at law, the prior, natural family relationship and creating a new and complete substitute relationship after adoption. Once a child has a new, complete family as evidenced by adoption, the grandparent visitation statute, MCL 722.27b, ceases to apply. [In re Toth, 227 Mich.App. 548, 553, 577 N.W.2d 111 (1998) (citations omitted).]

It is undisputed in this case that defendant legally adopted Mac's three older biological siblings. This adoption legally severed, at law, the three older children's “prior, natural family relationship” and created “a new and complete substitute relationship after adoption.” Id. At law, it is as though the three older children had been born to defendant. MCL 710.60(1). Thus, defendant's adoption of the three older children legally severed their sibling relationship with Mac. Consequently, even if a cause of action to obtain sibling visitation exists, plaintiff's complaint is deficient because the children with whom Mac seeks visitation are not his siblings. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim. The fact that the trial court used different reasoning to reach its decision does not preclude us from affirming the decision because we conclude that the trial court ultimately reached the correct result. See Klooster v. City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich. 289, 310, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011).

We stress that we are offering no opinion on the viability of such a claim.

Affirmed. OWENS, P.J., and TALBOT, J., concurred with WILDER, J.
-------- Notes:

Wilson v. King