RUTH C. BALKIN
Luis Trujillo, East Meadow, N.Y., for appellant. Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., Plainview, N.Y. (Edward Rugino of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Efrain Gutierrez appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated November 2, 2011, which denied his motion to vacate his default in appearing or answering and for leave to interpose an answer.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A defendant seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action ( seeCPLR 5015[a][1]; Arias v. First Presbyt. Church in Jamaica, 100 A.D.3d 940, 957 N.Y.S.2d 121;Ramirez v. Islandia Exec. Plaza, LLC, 92 A.D.3d 747, 748, 939 N.Y.S.2d 100;Cooney v. Cambridge Mgt. & Realty Corp., 35 A.D.3d 522, 826 N.Y.S.2d 639). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Star Indus., Inc. v. Innovative Beverages, Inc., 55 A.D.3d 903, 904, 866 N.Y.S.2d 357;Antoine v. Bee, 26 A.D.3d 306, 306, 812 N.Y.S.2d 557).
Here, the appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default in appearing or answering, or for his lengthy delay in moving to vacate the default ( see Garal Wholesalers, Ltd. v. Raven Brands, Inc., 82 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 919 N.Y.S.2d 358;Bethune v. Prioleau, 82 A.D.3d 810, 810–811, 918 N.Y.S.2d 352;Yao Ping Tang v. Grand Estate, LLC, 77 A.D.3d 822, 823, 910 N.Y.S.2d 104). In particular, the defendant's purported reliance upon alleged loan modification negotiations is unsubstantiated and does not constitute a reasonable excuse ( see Jamieson v. Roman, 36 A.D.3d 861, 862, 830 N.Y.S.2d 217;DeRisi v. Santoro, 262 A.D.2d 270, 271, 691 N.Y.S.2d 111;Flora Co. v. Ingilis, 233 A.D.2d 418, 419, 650 N.Y.S.2d 24). In view of the absence of a reasonable excuse, it is unnecessary to consider whether the appellant sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action ( see Assael v. 15 Broad St., LLC, 71 A.D.3d 802, 803, 896 N.Y.S.2d 459; Segovia v. Delcon Constr. Corp., 43 A.D.3d 1143, 1144, 842 N.Y.S.2d 536;Mjahdi v. Maguire, 21 A.D.3d 1067, 1068, 802 N.Y.S.2d 700). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion to vacate his default in appearing or answering and for leave to interpose an answer.