Affirmed.
See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 23. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Russell Kussman, Judge. Affirmed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC097218) Tsvetana Yvanova, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Houser & Allison, Robert W. Norman, Jr., Irvine, Patrick S. Ludeman, Long Beach, for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Tsvetana Yvanova, in pro. per., brought an action against numerous financial institutions, alleging the mortgage and deed of trust on her residence were improperly securitized and assigned from the original lender to several successive mortgagees and trustees, and ultimately improperly sold at foreclosure. Plaintiff alleged instances of transfer fraud, claimed several assignments were ineffective, and denied that the ultimate trustee possessed a valid interest in the property. Although the only cause of the action in the operative complaint was entitled “To Quiet Title,” plaintiff also sought restitution, damages, and declaratory relief. Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for quiet title in that she failed to allege she tendered the loan balance. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on that ground.
We affirm.
Plaintiff's essential allegation is that Deutsche Bank's receipt of title from New Century Mortgage's bankruptcy estate was defective for several specified reasons. Deutsche Bank therefore had no proper title to her trust deed and no standing to foreclose. Plaintiff contends this defect permits her to quiet title. Defendants demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, on the ground that plaintiff's default and failure to tender the amount due on her loan deprived her of standing to seek quiet title.
As defendants argued and the trial court found, plaintiff is not entitled to quiet title because she failed to allege she tendered funds to discharge her debt. ( Aguilar v. Bocci (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 475, 477, 114 Cal.Rptr. 91 [a plaintiff may not quiet title in himself without discharging his debt].) But when evaluating a complaint the court must attend to the facts properly alleged therein, not the labels appended to them or the theories for recovery. ( Quan v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 583, 592, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 134.) We construe the complaint liberally, in attempt to attain substantial justice between the parties. ( King v. Central Bank, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 843, 135 Cal.Rptr. 771, 558 P.2d 857.)
In our request for letter briefing we invited the parties to discuss, in essence, whether plaintiff should be given leave to amend to allege a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. Plaintiff responded as follows: “Despite the fact that Plaintiff/Appellant has presented all facts and factual allegations correctly, to support her claim and additional 4–5 causes of action—the core facts remain unchanged. However, a leave to amend will greatly benefit the framing of the case for two reasons: First: New developments in the economic and legal history since 2012 and new annotated case law supporting the issues discussed and Second: following the Supplement brief questions, Appellant/Plaintiff will be able to frame the same issues in a more succinct and focused manner with more appropriate causes of action.” Defendants, on the other hand, argued amendment would be futile because plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for declaratory relief or wrongful foreclosure for the same reasons she may not quiet title in herself: She has no standing to challenge Deutsch Bank's claim to title.
We agree with defendants. “Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument, a borrower must anticipate it can and might be transferred to another creditor. As to plaintiff, an assignment merely substituted one creditor for another, without changing her obligations under the note.” ( Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1507, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 326.) An impropriety in the transfer of a promissory note would therefore affect only the parties to the transaction, not the borrower. The borrower thus lacks standing to enforce any agreements relating to such transactions. ( Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 515, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ( Jenkins ).)
Plaintiff argues the transfer of her promissory note and deed of trust from New Century Mortgage to Deutsch Bank and the subsequent securitization of the note were improper. But even if she is correct, “the relevant parties to such a transaction were the holders (transferors) of the promissory note and the third party acquirers (transferees) of the note.” “As an unrelated third party to the alleged securitization, and any other subsequent transfers of the beneficial interest under the promissory note, [plaintiff] lacks standing to enforce any agreements, including the investment trust's pooling and servicing agreement, relating to such transactions.” ( Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 515, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 912.) Plaintiff would not be the victim of such invalid transfers because her obligations under the note remained unchanged. “Instead, the true victim may be an individual or entity that believes it has a present beneficial interest in the promissory note and may suffer the unauthorized loss of its interest in the note. It is also possible to imagine one or many invalid transfers of the promissory note may cause a string of civil lawsuits between transferors and transferees.” ( Ibid.) But plaintiff “may not assume the theoretical claims of hypothetical transferors and transferees” to assert causes of action for declaratory relief or wrongful foreclosure. ( Ibid.)
Plaintiff argues Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 supports her argument that a borrower may challenge a nonjudicial foreclosure based on allegations that one or more transfers in the chain of title of a trust deed was void. She is correct. There, after concluding that noncompliance with the terms of a pooling and servicing agreement would render an assignment void, the court adopted without analysis the majority rule in Texas that an obligor may resist foreclosure on any ground that renders an assignment in the chain of title void. ( Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (5th Cir.Tex.2013) 722 F.3d 700, 705.)
But no California court has followed Glaski on this point, and many have pointedly rejected it. (See, e.g., Apostol v. Citimortgage, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Nov. 21, 2013) 2013 WL 6328256, *6–7, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 167308, *23–24; Dahnken v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., C 13–2838 PJH (N.D.Cal., Nov. 8, 2013) 2013 WL 5979356, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160686; In re Sandri (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2013) 501 B.R. 369.) And as discussed above, Jenkins is directly to the contrary. We agree with the reasoning in Jenkins, and decline to follow Glaski.
Plaintiff alleges nothing unlawful about the foreclosure process beyond the argument that an allegedly deficient assignment and securitization deprived Deutsche Bank of an interest in the property. She has no standing to make such a claim. Therefore, any cause of action for wrongful foreclosure would fail as a matter of law.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to receive their costs on appeal.