People v. Davis

EGAN JR., J.

Terrence M. Kelly, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L. Grome of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion

EGAN JR., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch, J.), rendered March 26, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal contempt in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child (three counts).

Defendant was charged in an eight-count indictment with identity theft in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (two counts), aggravated criminal contempt and endangering the welfare of a child (three counts). The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred in June 2012, during the course of which defendant—in violation of an admittedly valid order of protection—entered the home of his former girlfriend (hereinafter the victim) and assaulted her in front of her three minor children. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal contempt in the first degree and three counts of endangering

the welfare of a child and was acquitted of the remaining charges. Defendant thereafter was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 1 ½ to 3 years. This appeal ensued.

Defendant initially contends that the underlying convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence and, further, are against the weight of the evidence. Inasmuch as defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal was expressly limited to the three counts of the indictment charging him with endangering the welfare of a child, defendant's legal sufficiency claim relative to his conviction of criminal contempt in the first degree is unpreserved for our review (see People v. Simmons, 115 A.D.3d 1018, 1019, 981 N.Y.S.2d 475 2014 ). That said, our weight of the evidence review “necessarily includes our verification that the elements of the crime were established” (People v. Wingo, 103 A.D.3d 1036, 1036, 962 N.Y.S.2d 422 2013, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1021, 971 N.Y.S.2d 503, 994 N.E.2d 399 2013; see People v. Pine, 126 A.D.3d 1112, 1114, 4 N.Y.S.3d 746 2015 ). As is relevant here, “[a] person is guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree when ... in violation of a duly served order of protection, or

such order of which the defendant has actual knowledge because he or she was present in court when such order was issued, ... he or she ... with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm a person for whose protection such order was issued, strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact or attempts or threatens to do the same” (Penal Law § 215.51[b] [v]; see People v. Dixon, 118 A.D.3d 1188, 1188–1189, 987 N.Y.S.2d 704 2014 ). Additionally, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when, among other things, “[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than 17 years old” (Penal Law § 260.101 ).

Preliminarily, defendant does not dispute that he violated a valid no-contact order of protection by appearing at the victim's home on the day in question. Rather, defendant argues that the record fails to establish that—with the requisite intent—he subjected the victim to physical contact or threatened to do the same. We disagree.

The victim testified at length regarding the details of the underlying assault. Specifically, the victim recounted that, on the day in question, she confronted defendant regarding certain moneys that were missing from her bank accounts. As the conversation, which began in the victim's bedroom, progressed, “[t]hings escalated,” and defendant slapped the victim in the face. The victim then called 911, in response to which defendant slapped her again, grabbed her, threw her on the bed and began hitting and choking her. The victim's three minor children, who had been watching television in their bedroom, heard the commotion and began screaming and begging defendant to let go of their

mother. According to the victim, defendant then dragged her out into the hallway of the residence, where he slapped her and slammed her up against the wall. When defendant heard the police at the door, he punched the victim's jaw and ear, pushed the victim's children aside and fled through a bedroom window. The victim's testimony made clear that each of her children witnessed much of what transpired, including “watching their mother get the life beat out of her” by defendant. The victim's testimony was corroborated in certain respects by the testimony of the responding police officers, as well as the victim's medical records.

As noted previously, defendant concedes that he violated the underlying order of protection by being present in the victim's residence on the day in question. As to the remaining elements, intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances (cf. Matter of

Vanita UU. v. Mahender VV., 130 A.D.3d 1161, 1166, 12 N.Y.S.3d 661 2015; see generally People v. McLean, 128 A.D.3d 1106, 1108, 8 N.Y.S.3d 696 2015, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1204, 16 N.Y.S.3d 526, 37 N.E.3d 1169 2015 ) and, in light of the victim's testimony as to the manner in which defendant slapped, hit, choked and/or punched her, which the jury was entitled to credit as to the sustained charges (see People v. Beliard, 101 A.D.3d 1236, 1239, 956 N.Y.S.2d 234 2012, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1096, 965 N.Y.S.2d 791, 988 N.E.2d 529 2013; People v. Hoppe, 96 A.D.3d 1157, 1159, 946 N.Y.S.2d 671 2012, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 1026, 953 N.Y.S.2d 559, 978 N.E.2d 111 2012 ), we discern no basis upon which to disturb the jury's verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal contempt in the first degree (see People v. Dixon, 118 A.D.3d at 1188–1189, 987 N.Y.S.2d 704) and endangering the welfare of a child (three counts) (see People v. Lawing, 110 A.D.3d 1354, 1355–1356, 975 N.Y.S.2d 778 2013, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1200, 986 N.Y.S.2d 420, 9 N.E.3d 915 2014; People v. Bell, 80 A.D.3d 891, 891, 914 N.Y.S.2d 422 2011; People v. Bray, 46 A.D.3d 1232, 1234, 848 N.Y.S.2d 738 2007 ).

Finally, to the extent that defendant takes issue with the scope of the missing witness charge given by County Court, we need note only that, inasmuch as defendant “did not object to the charge that was given or request different language,” this issue is unpreserved for our review (People v. Watkins, 121 A.D.3d 1425, 1427, 995 N.Y.S.2d 803 2014, lvs. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1123, 1124, 3 N.Y.S.3d 765, 27 N.E.3d 479 2015; cf. People v. Quinones, 41 A.D.3d 868, 868, 840 N.Y.S.2d 804 2007, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 1008, 850 N.Y.S.2d 396, 880 N.E.2d 882 2007 ), and we decline defendant's invitation to set aside the jury's verdict in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

LAHTINEN, J.P., DEVINE and CLARK, JJ., concur.

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Notes:

see People v. Hira, 100 A.D.3d 922, 924, 954 N.Y.S.2d 193 2012, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 943, 968 N.Y.S.2d 6, 990 N.E.2d 140 2013; People v. Wilmore, 305 A.D.2d 117, 118, 761 N.Y.S.2d 597 2003, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 589, 764 N.Y.S.2d 401, 796 N.E.2d 493 2003 ) and, therefore, County Court inaccurately characterized the offense as such in its charge to the jury. Defendant, however, failed to object to the charge as given and, therefore, has waived any issue in this regard (see People v. Ford, 62 N.Y.2d 275, 282–283, 476 N.Y.S.2d 783, 465 N.E.2d 322 1984; see also People v. Mitchell, 39 A.D.3d 357, 358, 833 N.Y.S.2d 488 2007, affd. 10 N.Y.3d 819, 859 N.Y.S.2d 99, 888 N.E.2d 1041 2008; People v. Cuadrado, 37 A.D.3d 218, 220, 830 N.Y.S.2d 65 2007, affd. 9 N.Y.3d 362, 850 N.Y.S.2d 375, 880 N.E.2d 861 2007 ).

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