Grasso
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, John A. Mostyn and Joseph E. Corcoran (hereinafter Corcoran), are owners of a beachfront lot in Brewster abutting the Sea Pines condominium complex. In 2008, the Land Court ruled that Corcoran and his neighbor, Mary S. Stripling, hold easements to use a 300-foot long segment of the approximately 1,100-foot long Sea Pines beach.
John A. Mostyn is trustee of a nominee trust holding title to the land; Joseph E. Corcoran is the beneficiary of the trust. We hereinafter, as the parties have done, refer simply to Corcoran as the plaintiff, as he is the real party in interest.
The Sea Pines complex actually consists of four separate condominiums with some degree of collective management. Two of them own the beach at issue in this case, and the other two have easements permitting any unit owner to use the beach. For simplicity, we treat all of the defendants as a single entity, Sea Pines.
Sea Pines residents have for years kept kayaks and other such boats in front of Corcoran's lot; with the encouragement and approval of the Brewster conservation commission and the Department of Environmental Protection, the boats are now kept in a wooden rack on a dune between Corcoran's house and the beach. Sea Pines residents have placed boat moorings in front of Corcoran's house; Corcoran also has a boat mooring there. Soon after the Land Court decision, Corcoran filed the instant action alleging that the placement of the boats and kayaks materially interfered with his easement. The trial judge found that Corcoran had not proved a material interference, and entered a declaration that storage of the kayaks and mooring of the boats in the easement do not materially interfere with the use of the easement. On appeal, Corcoran argues that the trial judge employed an unnecessarily restrictive test and should have explicitly balanced his rights against those of Sea Pines. Because the trial judge applied appropriate standards and his findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
We reject Corcoran's contention that this declaration was not specific enough. Such a declaration need not provide further details given the absence of material interference.
The standard for determining the rights of an easement holder relative to the owner of a servient property is straightforward: the owner of the servient estate is 'entitled to make such use of the estate as is consistent with the easement, or, as sometimes stated, such an owner may use the land for all purposes which are not inconsistent with the easement, or which do not materially interfere with its use.' Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. Sambo's of Mass., Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 818 (1979) (citations omitted). While Corcoran attempts to frame this formulation as setting forth three distinct tests, the quoted language merely includes different statements of the same principle, which ultimately boils down to 'what is reasonable in the exercise of [the parties'] respective privileges.' Shapiro v. Burton, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 334 (1987). The trial judge correctly recognized and applied the rule of Western Mass. Elec. Co., supra.
The facts found by the trial judge are conclusive unless clearly erroneous. See Stucchi v. Colonna, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 851, 851 (1980); Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). The trial judge concluded that neither the placement of the kayak rack nor the boat moorings materially interfere with Corcoran's use of the beach easement. The evidence amply supports the trial judge's findings that Corcoran can use the beach, swim, and boat in most of the easement area; indeed, the record includes photographs of a man who may be Corcoran relaxing on the beach in front of the stairway he uses to access the beach, some distance away from the kayaks. Therefore, for substantially the reasons found by the trial judge, we affirm.
Corcoran also contends that he is entitled to use the entire 300-foot length of the easement without any interference by Sea Pines, citing right of way cases such as Carter v. Sullivan, 281 Mass. 217, 223 (1932). However, these cases do not stand for the proposition that no interference with an easement by the servient land owner is ever permitted. The standard is material interference. See World Species List - Natural Features Registry Inst. v. Reading, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 310 (2009), citing Western Mass. Elec. Co., supra. Where Corcoran has ample room within the 300 feet to use the beach, swim, and boat without interference, and can share even the most concentrated areas of activity with Sea Pines, the trial judge's finding of no material interference was supported.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Grasso, Kafker & Milkey, JJ.),