McGEE
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 13 May 2010 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Superior Court, Caldwell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 2011, and opinion filed 6 March 2012, reversing the trial court. Judge Steelman, by separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. On remand to this Court by the North Carolina Supreme Court by opinion entered 14 December 2012, reversing for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion and remanding for consideration of the remaining issues. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tenisha S. Jacobs, for the State. James N. Freeman, Jr. for Defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
For a full factual background to this case, see State v. Lindsey, –––N.C.App. ––––, 725 S.E.2d 350 (2012)(Lindsey I). In Lindsey I, the majority reversed all three of Defendant's convictions: possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and felony fleeing to elude arrest. Id. Judge Steelman concurred with respect to the conviction for possession of cocaine, but dissented on the remaining convictions, arguing that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the charges of possession of marijuana and felony fleeing to elude arrest. Id. at ––––, 725 S.E.2d at 358–60. Our Supreme Court reversed Lindsey I in part, for the reasons stated in Judge Steelman's dissent, and remanded for consideration of Defendant's arguments unaddressed in Lindsey I. State v. Lindsey, ––– N.C. ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (14 December 2012) (Lindsey II).
Those arguments were that the trial court erred in denying: (1) Defendant's motion to continue and (2) Defendant's attorneys' motions to withdraw. Defendant contends that he moved to continue the proceedings, and that his attorneys moved to withdraw. Defendant further contends that these motions were denied. We note that the trial transcript that would have included these motions has not been provided to this Court. It is Defendant's responsibility to insure that the record on appeal is complete and sufficient for appellate review of all relevant issues. State v. Brown, 142 N.C.App. 491, 492–93, 543 S.E.2d 192, 193 (2001). Because we have no record evidence of Defendant or his counsel having made these motions, the motions have not been preserved for appellate review. N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(1) (2011).
Assuming arguendo that we had record evidence of Defendant's motions, his arguments would still be without merit because Defendant does not show, or even argue, how denial of those motions has prejudiced him.
First, Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his attorneys' motions to withdraw.
In order to establish prejudicial error arising from the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw, a defendant must show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must satisfy a two-prong test which was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). We reviewed the operation of this test in the recent case of State v. Lee:
[D]efendant must first show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as defined by professional norms. Second, once defendant satisfies the first prong, he must show that the error committed was so serious that a reasonable probability exists that the trial result would have been different absent the error. Thus, defendant must show that the error committed was so grave that it deprived him of a fair trial because the result itself is considered unreliable.
348 N.C. 474, 491, 348 N.C. 474, 501 S.E.2d 334, 345 (1998).
State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 328, 514 S.E.2d 486, 495 (1999) (some citations omitted).
Defendant fails completely in his burden to show that the denial of his attorneys' motions to withdraw prejudiced him in any manner. Defendant does not argue any specific prejudice in his brief, much less show that the result of the trial was unreliable. Id. A simple statement that Defendant had a “falling out” with his attorneys, without more, is not sufficient. See Id. at 328–29, 514 S.E.2d 486, 494–95. Defendant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his attorneys' motions to withdraw is without merit.
Defendant also contends that, because he did not have the opportunity to review before trial all police footage recorded at the scene, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue. “[T]he denial of a motion to continue ... is sufficient grounds for the granting of a new trial only when the defendant is able to show that the denial was erroneous and that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error.” State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 124, 529 S.E.2d 671, 675 (2000). Defendant has failed to argue that any prejudice occurred as a result of the trial court's denial of his motion to continue. Defendant contends that he did not have time before trial to review all the DVD evidence, but he does not state how this damaged his defense, or how the result of the trial might have been impacted had his motion to continue been granted. Because Defendant has failed to argue prejudice occurred as a result of the denial of his motion to continue, Defendant's argument fails. Id.
Conclusion
We find no error for the arguments this Court was directed to address by our Supreme Court in Lindsey II. Our Supreme Court's adoption of the dissent in Lindsey I determined there was no error in Defendant's convictions for felony fleeing to elude arrest and possession of marijuana. The portion of Lindsey I reversing the conviction for felony possession of cocaine, based upon a lack of evidence as agreed upon by the dissent in Lindsey I, has not been affected by Lindsey II, or this present opinion, and remains in force.
No error in part, reversed in part. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).