RICHARD J. LEON
District's motion granted; plaintiff's motion denied.
Nicholas Ryan Ostrem, Ostrem Firm, LLC, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff. Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
[Dkt. ## 10, 11]
RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Latonya Boose (“plaintiff”) filed this action on behalf of her minor child, A.G., against the District of Columbia (“defendant”) on March 8, 2013 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”). See Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶ 1 [Dkt. # 1]. Now before the Court are the parties' Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment. See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Mot.”) [Dkt. # 10]; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”) [Dkt. # 11]. Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, the entire record in this case, and relevant law, the Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
Following a formal request from plaintiff asking DCPS to evaluate A.G. for potential special education services, DCPS provided a comprehensive psychological evaluation on February 1, 2013. See Ex. A to PL's Mot. at 2 [Dkt. # 10–3]; Ex. B to PL's Mot. at 1 [Dkt. # 10–4]. A multidisciplinary team (“MDT”) met and determined that A.G. was eligible for special education services, but that compensatory education was not warranted. See Ex. C to PL's Mot. at 3–4 [Dkt. # 10–5]. The MDT also developed an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for A.G. See id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, stipulations, affidavits. and admissions in a case show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must accept as true the evidence of, and draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue exists only where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
When a party challenges an administrative decision under the IDEA, the court “shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings ... shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and ... basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1451(i)(2)(C)(i)–(iii). The standard of review under the IDEA “is less deferential than that applied under the traditional substantial evidence test used in ordinary administrative review cases.” Scorah v. District of Columbia, 322 F.Supp.2d 12, 18 (D.D.C.2004) (citing Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C.Cir.1988) and Kroot v. District of Columbia, 800 F.Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C.1992)).
When neither party requests that the reviewing court hear additional evidence, as is the case here, the “motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that plaintiff's claims are moot, and thus must be dismissed. See Def.'s Mot. at 10–12. Article III of the Constitution permits the courts to adjudicate only “actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 894 (D.C.Cir.2010). A case is moot, and “a federal court [should] refrain from deciding it if events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C.Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted). That is exactly the situation here.
Plaintiff seeks redress for alleged violations by DCPS of the “child find” provision of the IDEA. See Compl. at ¶¶ 29–30, 34–35. If it were granted, such redress from this Court would consist of an order requiring DCPS to evaluate A.G. in order to determine his eligibility for special education and other related services. However, since December 8, 2012, when the HOD was issued, DCPS has conducted a comprehensive psychological evaluation of A.G., after which an MDT determined that A.G. was eligible for special education. Moreover, by March 11, 2013, DCPS developed an IEP for A.G., which plaintiff has not challenged. Indeed, the fact that plaintiff has not challenged the IEP developed by DCPS for seven months supports a strong inference that she fully approves of the services A.G. is receiving.
Thus, as “events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future,” this Court can find no remaining justiciable issue in this case, and plaintiff's claim must therefore fail as moot. Clarke, 915 F.2d at 701.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. -------- Notes: