Grossman v. Composto–Longhi

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Docket Number

Attorney(S)

Maria Composto–Longhi, Kings Park, N.Y., appellant pro se. David Grossman, Smithtown, N.Y., respondent pro se.

Judges

Reinaldo E. Rivera

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered on August 16, 2005. Pursuant to a stipulation of settlement incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, the plaintiff agreed to pay child support to the defendant in the amount of $3,000 per month. The Family Court granted the defendant's petition for an upward modification of child support, increasing the obligation to $4,340 per month in an order dated September 29, 2008. The plaintiff then moved in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a downward modification of his child support obligation. The Supreme Court granted this motion after a hearing in an order dated July 20, 2009. Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion to transfer a Family Court proceeding to Supreme Court and to vacate Family Court orders awarding the defendant a retroactive increase in child support in an order dated April 8, 2010. The defendant moved for sanctions against the plaintiff and his counsel, which the Supreme Court denied in an order dated May 11, 2010. The defendant now appeals from these orders.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for a downward modification of his child support obligation.
Whether the Supreme Court had authority to vacate Family Court orders awarding the defendant a retroactive increase in child support.
Whether sanctions should have been imposed on the plaintiff and his counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130–1.1.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gandolfi v. Gandolfi, 66 A.D.3d 834, 886 N.Y.S.2d 617	Requirement that an appellant using the appendix method must file an appendix containing all relevant portions of the record to enable informed decision-making.	The court found the plaintiff’s appendix and supplemental appendix adequate to determine the issues on appeal.
NYCTL 1998–1 Trust v. Shahipour, 29 A.D.3d 965, 815 N.Y.S.2d 479	Supports the requirement for a complete appendix in appeals.	Referenced to affirm the adequacy of the appendix filed.
Mure v. Mure, 92 A.D.3d 653, 937 N.Y.S.2d 870	Same as above regarding appendix requirements.	Used to support the adequacy of the appendix.
Christian v. Graham, 73 A.D.3d 676, 899 N.Y.S.2d 671	Same as above regarding appendix requirements.	Used to support the adequacy of the appendix.
Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b][1]	Standard for downward modification of child support: showing substantial change in circumstances and best efforts to obtain suitable employment.	The court applied this standard to find the plaintiff entitled to downward modification.
Matter of Rodriguez v. Mendoza–Gonzalez, 96 A.D.3d 766, 946 N.Y.S.2d 204	Legal standard for modification of child support obligations.	Supported the court’s finding that plaintiff met the burden for downward modification.
Matter of Atabay v. Cinar, 96 A.D.3d 832, 946 N.Y.S.2d 224	Same as above regarding modification standards.	Reinforced the plaintiff’s entitlement to downward modification.
Matter of DeLanoy v. O'Rourke, 276 A.D.2d 728, 715 N.Y.S.2d 150	Principle that a court of coordinate jurisdiction cannot overrule decisions made by another court of equal authority.	The court held that Supreme Court lacked authority to vacate Family Court orders.
Doscher v. Doscher, 54 A.D.3d 890, 865 N.Y.S.2d 238	Same principle regarding coordinate jurisdiction and authority.	Supported the limitation on Supreme Court’s power to vacate Family Court orders.
Nong Yaw Trakansook v. 39 Wood Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 633, 796 N.Y.S.2d 367	Same principle on coordinate jurisdiction.	Reinforced the court’s ruling on jurisdictional limits.
Matter of Guidroz v. Bochenski, 170 A.D.2d 1042, 566 N.Y.S.2d 110	Same principle on coordinate jurisdiction.	Supported the court’s conclusion on jurisdictional boundaries.
Hasegawa v. Hasegawa, 290 A.D.2d 488, 736 N.Y.S.2d 398	Supreme Court has no discretion to reduce or cancel arrears accrued before an application for downward modification.	The court ruled the Supreme Court erred in vacating retroactive child support increases.
Matter of Dox v. Tynon, 90 N.Y.2d 166, 659 N.Y.S.2d 231, 681 N.E.2d 398	Same principle regarding arrears and modification limits.	Applied to uphold Family Court orders and limit Supreme Court’s authority.
Dembitzer v. Rindenow, 35 A.D.3d 791, 828 N.Y.S.2d 139	Same as above regarding arrears and modification.	Supported the court’s decision to deny vacatur of retroactive increases.
Matter of Jenkins v. McKinney, 21 A.D.3d 558, 799 N.Y.S.2d 904	Same as above regarding arrears and modification.	Reinforced the court’s holding on arrears and jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the procedural adequacy of the plaintiff’s appendix, finding it sufficient to consider the appeal’s merits. It then confirmed that the Supreme Court properly exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Court to hear the plaintiff’s motion for downward modification of child support.

On the merits, the court applied the established legal standard requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances and diligent efforts to secure employment consistent with his qualifications. The plaintiff met this burden by showing that his prior employment was terminated without fault and that he could only obtain lower-paying work despite his efforts.

However, the court held that the Supreme Court erred in vacating the Family Court’s retroactive child support increase orders. It emphasized the principle that courts of coordinate jurisdiction cannot overturn decisions made by another court of equal authority. Additionally, the court noted that the Supreme Court lacks discretion to reduce or cancel arrears accrued before a downward modification application.

The defendant’s other contentions were deemed either without merit or not properly before the court because they concerned matters outside the scope of the appealed orders.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the Supreme Court’s orders dated July 20, 2009, and May 11, 2010, without costs or disbursements. It modified the April 8, 2010 order by deleting the provision vacating the Family Court’s retroactive child support orders and substituting a denial of that branch of the plaintiff’s motion. As so modified, the April 8, 2010 order was affirmed without costs or disbursements.

Holding: The plaintiff’s motion for downward modification of child support was properly granted; the Supreme Court lacked authority to vacate Family Court orders awarding retroactive child support increases; the defendant’s motion for sanctions was properly denied.

Implications: This decision affirms the principle of coordinate jurisdiction limits between Family and Supreme Courts in child support matters and upholds the established standards for modification of child support obligations. No new precedent was established; the ruling directly affects the parties by confirming the downward modification while preserving the Family Court’s retroactive awards and denying sanctions.

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Da v. d GROSSMAN, respondent,

REINALDO E. RIVERA

Maria Composto–Longhi, Kings Park, N.Y., appellant pro se. David Grossman, Smithtown, N.Y., respondent pro se.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered August 16, 2005, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Buetow, Ct.Atty.Ref.), dated July 20, 2009, which, after a hearing, granted the plaintiff's motion for a downward modification of his child support obligation, (2) an order of the same court (Garguilo, J.) dated April 8, 2010, which granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to transfer a proceeding entitled Matter of Composto–Longhi v. Grossman, pending in Family Court, Suffolk County, under Docket No. F–06377–08, to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, and to vacate orders of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated September 29, 2008, and April 10, 2009, respectively, awarding the defendant a retroactive increase in child support, and (3) an order of the same court (Garguilo, J.) dated May 11, 2010, which denied her motion, inter alia, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 to impose sanctions upon the plaintiff and his counsel.

ORDERED that the orders dated July 20, 2009, and May 11, 2010, are affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated April 8, 2010, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to vacate orders of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated September 29, 2008, and April 10, 2009, respectively, awarding the defendant a retroactive increase in child support, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order dated April 8, 2010, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation of settlement dated April 22, 2005, which was incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce entered August 16, 2005, the plaintiff agreed to pay child support to the defendant in the sum of $3,000 per month. In an order dated September 29, 2008, the Family Court granted the defendant's petition for an upward modification and increased the plaintiff's child support obligation to $4,340 per month. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for a downward modification of his child support obligation in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County. In an order dated July 20, 2009, the Supreme Court, after a hearing, granted the plaintiff's motion for a downward modification of his child support obligation. Thereafter, in an order dated April 8, 2010, the Supreme Court granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to transfer a proceeding entitled Matter of Composti–Longhi v. Grossman, which was pending in Family Court, Suffolk County, under Docket No. F–06377–08, to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, and to vacate orders of the Family Court dated September 29, 2008, and April 10, 2009, respectively, granting the defendant a retroactive increase in child support. Additionally, in an order dated May 11, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion, inter alia, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 to impose sanctions upon the plaintiff and his counsel.

“ ‘An appellant who perfects an appeal by using the appendix method must file an appendix that contains all the relevant portions of the record in order to enable the court to render an informed decision on the merits of the appeal’ ” ( Gandolfi v. Gandolfi, 66 A.D.3d 834, 835, 886 N.Y.S.2d 617, quoting NYCTL 1998–1 Trust v. Shahipour, 29 A.D.3d 965, 965, 815 N.Y.S.2d 479 [some internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mure v. Mure, 92 A.D.3d 653, 937 N.Y.S.2d 870;Christian v. Graham, 73 A.D.3d 676, 677, 899 N.Y.S.2d 671). “The appendix shall contain those portions of the record necessary to permit the court to fully consider the issues which will be raised by the appellant and the respondent” (22 NYCRR 670.10–b [c][1]; seeCPLR 5528[a][5] ). Here, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the appendix and supplemental appendix, which contain copies of the notices of motion and the affidavits/affirmations filed in support, opposition, and reply thereto, are adequate to determine the issues raised on the instant appeals ( see Love v. Rockwell's Intl. Enters., LLC, 83 A.D.3d 914, 916, 922 N.Y.S.2d 131).

The Supreme Court properly exercised its concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Court ( see N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 7 [a] ) in entertaining the plaintiff's motion for a downward modification of his child support obligation. Moreover, on the merits, the plaintiff demonstrated his entitlement to a downward modification of his child support obligation. A party seeking downward modification of a support obligation has the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances and that he used his best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience ( seeDomestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b][1]; Matter of Rodriguez v. Mendoza–Gonzalez, 96 A.D.3d 766, 946 N.Y.S.2d 204 [2d Dept. 2012];Matter of Atabay v. Cinar, 96 A.D.3d 832, 946 N.Y.S.2d 224 [2d Dept. 2012] ). Here, the plaintiff showed that his prior employment was terminated through no fault of his own and that, despite his efforts to secure employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience, he was only able to obtain a position at a much lower salary.

However, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to vacate orders of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated September 29, 2008, and April 10, 2009, granting the defendant a retroactive increase in child support. “A court of coordinate jurisdiction has no authority to rule on a matter already reviewed by another Judge of equal authority” (Matter of DeLanoy v. O'Rourke, 276 A.D.2d 728, 729, 715 N.Y.S.2d 150;see Doscher v. Doscher, 54 A.D.3d 890, 891, 865 N.Y.S.2d 238;Nong Yaw Trakansook v. 39 Wood Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 633, 634, 796 N.Y.S.2d 367;Matter of Guidroz v. Bochenski, 170 A.D.2d 1042, 566 N.Y.S.2d 110). Additionally, the Supreme Court had “no discretion to reduce or cancel arrears of child support which accrue before an application for downward modification of the child support obligation” ( Hasegawa v. Hasegawa, 290 A.D.2d 488, 490, 736 N.Y.S.2d 398;see Matter of Dox v. Tynon, 90 N.Y.2d 166, 175–176, 659 N.Y.S.2d 231, 681 N.E.2d 398;Dembitzer v. Rindenow, 35 A.D.3d 791, 793, 828 N.Y.S.2d 139;Matter of Jenkins v. McKinney, 21 A.D.3d 558, 799 N.Y.S.2d 904).

The defendant's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court on these appeals, as they involve matters that were not the subject of the orders appealed from.