PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
Leonard Lato, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant–Appellant. Peter A. Norling; Charles N. Rose, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, KEARSE and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant–Appellant Shane Morrison appeals from a February 6, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.) sentencing Morrison to, inter alia, eighteen months' imprisonment following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Morrison argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c) bars the district court's reliance on positive results on drug tests administered by the Pretrial Services Agency (“pretrial services”) to enhance his term of imprisonment. Because the district court did not violate § 3153(c) by relying on the information from pretrial services in determining Morrison's sentence, we affirm the judgment.
The exception relevant on this appeal is § 3153(c)(2)(C), which affords probation officers access to § 3153(c)(1) information for the purpose of compiling presentence reports. But probation officers do not compile presentence reports for their own benefit. Rather, they do so under a statutory mandate intended to ensure that district judges have all information necessary to make an appropriate sentencing determination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552; Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)-(e). Thus, implicit in the § 3153(c)(2)(C) exception affording probation officers access to § 3153(c)(1) information for the purposes of compiling presentence reports is the expectation that district judges will receive and use that information in determining a defendant's sentence. Nor is a different conclusion warranted when, as in this case, the district judge receives § 3153(c)(1) information directly from pretrial services, rather than through a probation officer. Indeed, it would be more than curious to conclude that a district judge might receive and use pretrial services information in determining a sentence only when the judge receives it through an intermediary, rather than directly from the source. Thus, we conclude that a district judge's use of otherwise confidential pretrial services information in determining a sentence is not barred by § 3153(c)(1) because the judge's receipt and use of such information for sentencing purposes is contemplated by the § 3153(c)(2)(C) exception.
Our conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which states that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” Our Court, en Banc, has construed this emphatic language to preclude categorical proscriptions on “ any factor concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, with the exception of invidious factors.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when we consider § 3661's mandate together with Congress's specific authorization for probation officers' access to pretrial services information for the purpose of compiling presentence reports for district judges, we conclude that § 3153(c)(1) confidentiality cannot be construed, as Morrison urges, to bar district judge consideration of pretrial services information in determining a defendant's sentence.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of Morrison's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.