United States v. Farrell

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

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Docket Number

NO. CR15-029RAJ

Motions

Motion to compel : Denied

Judges

Richard A. Jones

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Brian Farrell, is charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine through his alleged role as an administrator of the online marketplace "Silk Road 2.0," which operated on the Tor network. The government identified the defendant's IP address through research conducted by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), which was funded by the Department of Defense (DOD). SEI operated nodes on the Tor network and collected IP addresses, including that of the defendant. The government obtained this information pursuant to a subpoena served on SEI-CMU and disclosed relevant details about SEI's techniques and its relationship with the DOD to the defense. The defendant moved to compel additional discovery concerning SEI's relationship with federal law enforcement and the methods used to identify his IP address.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant is entitled to additional discovery about the technical methods SEI used to identify his IP address on the Tor network.
Whether the defendant is entitled to further disclosure regarding communications and relationships between SEI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and federal law enforcement agencies.
Whether SEI's identification of the defendant's IP address constitutes a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant seeks detailed disclosure of SEI's methods for identifying his IP address on the Tor network.
The defendant requests information about the relationship and communications between SEI and federal law enforcement, including the DOJ, before and after SEI's research.
The defendant implies that additional discovery may reveal more information relevant to his defense beyond the mere identification of his IP address.

Government's Arguments

The government contends it has fulfilled its discovery obligations by producing basic information about SEI's techniques, the funding and structural relationship between SEI and DOD, and publicly available materials on the Tor network.
The government argues that only the defendant's IP address was collected by SEI and provided to law enforcement, and there is no evidence that more information was obtained or is relevant.
The government maintains that SEI's identification of the IP address did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent.
The government asserts that broader discovery requests are overbroad, irrelevant, or moot, and that relevant contracts and communications have already been disclosed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 2007)	Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses of websites they visit because such information is necessarily disclosed to Internet service providers for routing purposes.	The Court relied primarily on this precedent to conclude that SEI's identification of the defendant's IP address on the Tor network did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, thereby precluding the defendant's suppression and discovery claims.
United States v. Michaud, W.D. Wash. No. 15-cr-05351, Dkt. #140	IP addresses are considered public information.	The Court cited this district court ruling in support of its determination that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address while using the Tor network.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the defendant's motion by first considering the nature of the information collected by SEI—specifically, the defendant's IP address identified while using the Tor network. The Court found that the only information provided to law enforcement was the IP address itself, with no indication that SEI obtained additional information relevant to the defendant's defense. The Court relied on Ninth Circuit authority, particularly United States v. Forrester, to hold that users of the Internet, including those on the Tor network, lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses because such information is necessarily disclosed to facilitate Internet communications.

The Court further reasoned that Tor users must disclose identifying information, including IP addresses, to unknown operators of Tor nodes, thereby diminishing any expectation of privacy. The Court also referenced a similar ruling by Judge Robert Bryan in United States v. Michaud, affirming the public nature of IP addresses.

Regarding the defendant's requests for additional discovery about SEI's methods and its relationship with federal law enforcement, the Court concluded that the government had met its discovery obligations by providing relevant information and that further disclosures were unnecessary. The Court denied other discovery requests as moot, overbroad, or irrelevant.

Holding and Implications

The Court DENIED the defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery.

This decision directly impacts the parties by limiting the defendant's access to additional discovery related to SEI's methods and communications with federal law enforcement. The ruling affirms the principle that IP addresses disclosed in the course of using the Tor network are not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectations. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing Ninth Circuit authority and district court rulings.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff v. BRIAN FARRELL, Defendant.

Judge Richard A. Jones

Judge Richard A. Jones ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery. (Dkt. #48). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery.

The defendant is charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine by virtue of his alleged operation as an administrator with the online "Silk Road 2.0" website. According to the government, the site operated on the Tor network with the ostensible purpose of its operation being to mask Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses of users of the network.

The record demonstrates that the defendant's IP address was identified by the Software Engineering Institute ("SEI") of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU") when SEI was conducting research on the Tor network which was funded by the Department of Defense ("DOD"). The government previously produced information to the defense that Farrell's IP address was observed when SEI was operating its computers on the Tor network. This information was obtained by law enforcement pursuant to a subpoena served on SEI-CMU.

Based upon the submissions of the parties, it is clear to the court the government has provided to the defendant basic information about the technique used by SEI to obtain IP addresses of Tor users, including the defendant. Among other items, the government's disclosures included information regarding the funding and structure relationship between SEI and DOD, as well as directing the defendant to publicly available materials regarding the Tor network.

The defendant seeks to compel disclosure of additional material pertaining to the relationship between SEI and federal law enforcement and the methods used by SEI to identify the defendant's IP address. The detailed specifics of the request are reflected in Exhibit A to the defendant's motion.

II. ANALYSIS

The record before the Court suggests that the only information associated with the defendant and collected by SEI subject to a suppression motion is his IP address. Yet, the defendant seeks additional technical details as to how SEI operated and captured the information. From the record, it appears the only information passed on to law enforcement about the defendant was his IP address. There is nothing presented by the defense, other than rank speculation, that anything more was obtained by SEI and provided to law enforcement to identify the defendant.

The Court agrees with the government that applicable Ninth Circuit authority precludes the defendant's success on his motion. SEI's identification of the defendant's IP address because of his use of the Tor network did not constitute a search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The Court reaches this conclusion primarily upon reliance on United States v. Forrester, 512 F.2d 500 (9 Cir. 2007). In Forrester, the court clearly enunciated that: "Internet users have no expectation of privacy in ...the IP address of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information." Id. at 510.

In the instant case, it is the Court's understanding that in order for a prospective user to use the Tor network they must disclose information, including their IP addresses, to unknown individuals running Tor nodes, so that their communications can be directed toward their destinations. Under such a system, an individual would necessarily be disclosing his identifying information to complete strangers. Again, according to the parties' submissions, such a submission is made despite the understanding communicated by the Tor Project that the Tor network has vulnerabilities and that users might not remain anonymous. Under these circumstances Tor users clearly lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses while using the Tor network. In other words, they are taking a significant gamble on any real expectation of privacy under these circumstances.

Equally supportive of this determination, which this Court agrees with, is Judge Robert Bryan's ruling in United States v. Michaud, W.D. Wa. No. 15-cr-05351, Dkt. #140, p. 14, where the court held that the IP address was public information.

The evidence before this Court indicates that SEI obtained the defendant's IP address while he was using the Tor network and SEI was operating nodes on that network, and not by any access to his computer. For these reasons, any other discovery about the methodology or technique used to identify the defendant's IP address is not material to his defense.

In addition, the defendant seeks disclosures regarding contacts between SEI, the Department of Justice, and federal law enforcement. This request includes the period before and after SEI performed the subject research, with the thrust of the request premised upon the substance of meetings between DOJ and SEI. The Court is satisfied that the government has met its discovery obligations on this request. The government provided the extent of the relationship between DOJ and SEI, and the substance of meetings in which representatives from DOJ and SEI were present. Nothing further is required.

As to the remaining discovery requests, they are denied. Request No. 1 is moot in light of the government's observation that it is irrelevant to the defendant's case. Request No. 2 is overbroad and certainly not narrowly tailored, as it calls for documents related to the entire federal government and SEI during a two-year period. Moreover, the government (according to the attachments to the government's response) has provided the relevant contracts at issue between SEI, DOJ, and DOD. As to Request Nos. 3 and 4, nothing further is required to be produced. Request Nos. 5 through 9 are the subject of this Order and require no further explanation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery. (Dkt. #48).

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2016.

/s/_________

The Honorable Richard A. Jones

United States District Judge