PER CURIAM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Alvarez and Skillman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County, Docket No. DC-014901-10.
Bildner Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (David J. Bildner, on the brief).
Litvak & Trifiolis, attorneys for respondent (Gregory F. McGroarty, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff rented a single-family residence in West Orange from defendant. As provided in the lease, plaintiff gave defendant a $3,000 security deposit at the beginning of his tenancy. The term of plaintiff's lease expired on December 31, 2009. Thereafter, he became a month-to-month holdover tenant. Plaintiff vacated the premises around the end of February 2010.
After the end of his tenancy, plaintiff brought this action in the Special Civil Part under the Rent Security Deposit Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-19 to -21.3, based on defendant's alleged wrongful failure to return his security deposit. Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that plaintiff had removed or damaged various items of property in the house, including a fifty square foot custom made rug. The counterclaim also asserted that plaintiff had failed to pay the $2,200 rent for March 2010.
Based on the evidence presented at a bench trial at which both plaintiff and defendant testified, the trial court found that the only property damage proved by defendant was for damage to a decorative pillow worth $189. The court also found that plaintiff, who was responsible for snow removal under the terms of the lease, was liable to defendant for a $75 fine West Orange imposed upon her for the failure to remove snow on her front sidewalk. Neither of these two findings are contested in this appeal.
The trial court rejected defendant's $4,127 claim for the rug she alleged plaintiff had taken from the house, finding that her testimony regarding the removal of the rug was incredible and that she had not presented satisfactory evidence of the value of the rug in any event. The court also rejected defendant's claim for the March 2010 rent on the ground plaintiff had given proper notice of his intent to vacate the premises as of February 28, 2010.
Based on these rulings, the trial court entered final judgment in plaintiff's favor for $5,472, representing plaintiff's $3,000 security deposit less the $264 awarded defendant, which the court doubled as required by N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1. The court denied plaintiff's application for an award of attorneys fees.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that even plaintiff's own proofs failed to establish he gave timely notice of his intent to vacate the premises as of February 28, 2010. The trial court denied this motion.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider her testimony that the rug plaintiff allegedly removed from the house was worth $4,127. Initially, we note that the trial court stated in the course of its oral opinion:
I just can't believe the removal [of the rug], knowing full well of a rug that this is not something that's laying in the corner that maybe the landlord wouldn't miss. . . .
But even if I were to rule defendant's testimony was more credible than the
plaintiff, there is absolutely nothing in front of me. No evidence as to a value of that.
Although this finding was not as clear as it could have been, the court apparently did not credit defendant's testimony that there was a custom made rug in the house which was missing at the end of plaintiff's tenancy. Therefore, even if the court's exclusion of defendant's testimony concerning the value of that alleged rug had been error, it would be harmless.
In any event, there was no error in the court's evidentiary ruling. Defendant attempted to introduce into evidence an estimate by a carpet company that it would cost $4,127 for a replacement rug. Defendant did not offer any evidence regarding the similarity between the alleged missing rug and the replacement rug, or the cost, date of purchase or condition of the alleged missing rug. Indeed, defendant did not even offer her own estimate of the value of the alleged missing rug. Therefore, the court properly excluded defendant's proffered evidence regarding the value of the rug.
The trial court's finding that plaintiff gave timely notice of his intent to vacate the premises as of February 28, 2010, and therefore was not liable for March rent, was based on a letter from plaintiff to defendant, dated January 30, 2010, transmitting his February rent check, which stated: "I will vacate the home on 2/28/10." Plaintiff testified that he mailed this letter on January 30, 2010. Although defendant denied receiving the letter, the trial court credited plaintiff's testimony.
However, even accepting this factual finding, the letter did not constitute timely notice of plaintiff's intent to vacate as of February 28, 2010. January 31, 2010 was a Sunday. Consequently, the earliest date on which defendant could have received the letter that the trial court found plaintiff had mailed to defendant on January 30, 2010 was Monday, February 1, 2010. The common law rule, which is followed in New Jersey, is that "if the notice [of an intent to quit a month-to-month tenancy] is given during the same month in which the quit is to take place, it will be effective as of the end of the month following the month in which the short notice was given." S.D.G. v. Inventory Control Co., 178 N.J. Super. 411, 415 (App. Div. 1981); accord Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Twp., 89 N.J. 576, 585-87 (1982). Therefore, even accepting the trial court's finding regarding plaintiff's inclusion of the January 30, 2010 letter with his transmittal of the February rent check, plaintiff could not have received the letter before the beginning of February and therefore his tenancy continued until the end of March.
Plaintiff argues that even if he did not give valid notice of his intent to vacate the premises as of February 28, 2010, defendant constructively evicted him by permitting a real estate broker to show the premises to a potential buyer without providing plaintiff with adequate advance notice. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in relaxing the time for defendant to provide answers to his requests for admissions. These arguments are clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Accordingly, we reverse the part of the final judgment that dismissed defendant's counterclaim for the March 2010 rent and conclude that defendant is entitled to that rent. We affirm the judgment in all other respects and remand to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment in conformity with this opinion.