PETER B. SKELOS
Golderg Segalla LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Marianne Arcieri and Paul S. Devine of counsel), for appellants. Dinkes & Schwitzer, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Naomi Skura and Jacob Galperin of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, ARIEL E. BELEN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, Jr., J.), dated October 3, 2011, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing evidence establishing that the plaintiff pedestrian entered a roadway from “between stopped cars,” began crossing the roadway at a “fast” pace, and came into contact with the right, rear side of a moving bus, and thus crossed the roadway in such a manner that the defendant bus driver was unable to avoid contact with the plaintiff ( see Mancia v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. Long Is. Bus, 14 A.D.3d 665, 790 N.Y.S.2d 31;Blazer v. Tri–County Ambulette Serv., 285 A.D.2d 575, 576, 728 N.Y.S.2d 742;Carrasco v. Monteforte, 266 A.D.2d 330, 331, 698 N.Y.S.2d 326; Brown v. City of New York, 237 A.D.2d 398, 398–399, 655 N.Y.S.2d 567). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant bus driver operated the bus in a negligent manner ( see Mancia v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. Long Is. Bus, 14 A.D.3d at 665, 790 N.Y.S.2d 31). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.