MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Andrew J. Lievense, U.S. Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE (ECF # 14)
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On October 11, 2014, Defendant Antonio Fuller (“Fuller”) was walking alongside a road in Superior Township when two Washtenaw County Sheriff Deputies stopped him for questioning. The deputies were seeking to execute an outstanding arrest warrant against a man named Gerald Warlix (“Warlix”), and one of the deputies mistakenly believed that Fuller was Warlix. Fuller informed the deputies that he was not Warlix and produced identification confirming that fact. Nonetheless, the deputies continued to detain Fuller in order to check whether there were any outstanding warrants for Fuller. While one of the deputies conducted the warrant check, the other deputy approached Fuller to perform a pat down search. Fuller stated that he did not consent to being patted down, and when the deputy touched Fuller's arm, Fuller fled on foot. The deputies eventually caught Fuller, subdued him, and found a loaded handgun in Fuller's pocket. Because Fuller had previously been convicted of a felony, he was not permitted to possess the gun.
The government has charged Fuller with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (See ECF # 7.) Fuller has now moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from his person on October 11, 2014 (the “Motion to Suppress”). (See ECF # 14.) The Court concludes that the deputies had no lawful basis to continue detaining
Fuller after they determined that he was not Warlix and that the evidence seized from Fuller was the fruit of the unlawful continued detention. The Court further determines that suppression is the appropriate remedy for this Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Fuller's Motion to Suppress.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court held evidentiary hearings on the Motion to Suppress on February 6 and March 9, 2015. (See Hearing Transcript I, ECF # 23, and Hearing Transcript II, ECF # 24.) Fuller was present for the hearing, but he did not testify. Based on all of the evidence presented at the hearings, the Court makes the following factual findings:
A. While Looking for Warlix, the Deputies Detained Fuller and Quickly Determined That He Was Not Warlix
1. On the evening of October 11, 2014, Washtenaw County Sheriff Deputies Joseph Montgomery (“Deputy Montgomery”) and Paul Corrie (“Deputy Corrie,” collectively the “Deputies”) were on patrol near MacArthur Boulevard and Wiard Boulevard in Superior Township, Michigan. (See Tr. I at 7–10, 67; Pg. ID 132–35, 192.) They were in full uniform and were driving a marked Washtenaw County Sheriff's vehicle. (See id. at 11–12, Pg. ID 136–37.)
2. The Deputies were looking for a man named Gerald Warlix. (See id.) Warlix was a suspect in a stolen vehicle investigation, and a warrant had been issued for Warlix's arrest. (See id.)
3. Deputy Montgomery was familiar with Warlix because he had previously arrested Warlix on Wiard Boulevard. (See id. at 12–13, Pg. ID 137–38.)
4. As Deputy Corrie drove the vehicle on Wiard Boulevard, Deputy Montgomery observed a black man walking along the side of the road. (See id. at 12, Pg. ID 137.)
5. Deputy Montgomery thought that the pedestrian was Warlix. (See id. at 13, Pg. ID 138.) The pedestrian was the same race and approximately the same height, weight, and age as Warlix, and the pedestrian was walking in approximately the same area as Montgomery's prior interaction with Warlix. (See id. at 13, Pg. ID 138.)
6. Deputy Montgomery told Deputy Corrie that he thought that the pedestrian was Warlix. (See id. at 14, Pg. ID 139.)
7. The pedestrian was not Warlix; he was Fuller. (See id. at 19, Pg. ID 144.)
8. Deputy Corrie pulled the vehicle to the side of the road and parked the vehicle in front of Fuller. (See id. at 14–15, Pg. ID 139–40.) Deputy Montgomery then exited the vehicle, approached Fuller, and began speaking to him. (See id. at 15, Pg. ID 140.)
9. The manner in which Deputy Montgomery communicated with Fuller indicated to Fuller—from the very beginning of their encounter—that Fuller was required to engage with him (Deputy Montgomery). (See id. at 62, Pg. ID 187.)
10. Deputy Montgomery addressed Fuller as “Gerald Warlix.” (See id. at 15, Pg. ID 140.)
11. Fuller responded that he was not Warlix, and he identified himself as “Antonio Fuller.” (See id. at 15, Pg. ID 140.)
12. Deputy Montgomery, who had been joined by Deputy Corrie on the side of Wiard Boulevard, asked Fuller to produce identification. (See id. at 16–17, Pg. ID 141–42.)
13. Fuller handed Deputy Montgomery his identification, and Deputy Montgomery reviewed the identification. (See id. at 18–19, Pg. ID 143–44.) The identification indicated to Deputy Montgomery that the person to whom he was speaking was Fuller. (See id.)
14. As soon as Deputy Montgomery completed his review of Fuller's identification, he was satisfied that person with whom he was speaking was Fuller and was not Warlix. (See id.; see also id. at 45, Pg. ID 170.) At that point, Deputy Montgomery had completed the task that he set out to accomplish when he initiated the stop.
15. Deputy Corrie heard Fuller identify himself as Fuller and not Warlix. (See id. at 74–75, Pg. ID 199–200.) Deputy Corrie was also satisfied that the person with whom Deputy Montgomery was speaking was Fuller and not Warlix. (See id.; see also id. at 95, Pg. ID 220.) Deputy Corrie had never met Fuller and was not familiar with Fuller's name. (See id. at 74, Pg. ID 199.)
B. Deputy Montgomery Recognized Fuller's Name Because One Year Earlier Deputy Montgomery Had Investigated Assault Allegations Against Fuller. But at the Time the Deputies Stopped Fuller, Deputy Montgomery Did Not Know Whether Fuller Had Ever Been Charged for the Alleged Assault
16. Deputy Montgomery recognized Fuller's name. (See id. at 18, Pg. ID 143.) Deputy Montgomery recalled that he had been the officer in charge of an investigation in which Fuller had been a suspect. (See id. at 19, Pg. ID 144.)
17. Specifically, Deputy Montgomery remembered that in November 2013, he received a complaint that Fuller had physically assaulted a young man during a game of pick-up basketball (the “November 2013 Incident”). (See id. at 21–22, Pg. ID 146–47.) The complaint also alleged that Fuller threatened the young man by wielding a knife and lifting up his shirt to reveal a handgun in the waistband of his pants. (See id.) Deputy Montgomery took the statements of witnesses and submitted a report about the November 2013 Incident to the Washtenaw County Prosecuting Attorney (the “Prosecuting Attorney”). (See id. at 22, Pg. ID 147.)
18. By March 2014, the Prosecuting Attorney still had not issued any charges against Fuller in connection with the November 2013 Incident. That month, the Prosecuting Attorney asked Deputy Montgomery to conduct additional investigative work on the case. Specifically, the Prosecuting Attorney directed Deputy Montgomery to contact the alleged victim and obtain a better description of the knife that Fuller allegedly brandished. (See id. at 24, Pg. ID 149.)
19. The March 2014 request from the Prosecuting Attorney—asking Deputy Montgomery to gather additional information—was the last thing that Deputy Montgomery recalled hearing from the Prosecuting Attorney about the November 2013 Incident. (See id. at 46, Pg. ID 171.)
C. Even Though Deputy Montgomery Had No Idea Whether Fuller Had Been Charged With Any Crime Nor Whether There Was an Outstanding Warrant for Fuller, Deputy Montgomery Decided to Continue to Detain Fuller to Run a Warrant Check
20. As Deputy Montgomery spoke to Fuller on the side of Wiard Boulevard on
October 11, 2014, Deputy Montgomery had no idea whether Fuller had been charged with any crime in connection with the November 2013 Incident. (See Tr. II at 17, Pg. ID 288.) In fact, Deputy Montgomery asked Fuller about the status of the investigation because he (Deputy Montgomery) did not know whether there was an outstanding warrant for Fuller. (See Tr. I at 25, Pg. ID 150; see also Tr. II at 28, Pg. ID 299.)
21. Deputy Montgomery nonetheless decided to continue to detain, and did continue to detain, Fuller in order to check whether Fuller had an outstanding arrest warrant. (See Tr. I at 49, Pg. ID 174; see also id. at 44, Pg. ID 169 (“he's not free to leave until I determine [whether] he has a warrant”).)
22. At the time Deputy Montgomery decided to conduct the warrant check, he did not affirmatively believe that there was an outstanding warrant for Fuller; he simply did not know whether Fuller was the subject of an outstanding warrant. (See, e.g., Tr. I at 24, 46, 49; Pg. ID 149, 171, 174; see also Tr. II at 26, 28–29, Pg. ID 297, 299–300.)
23. At the point Deputy Montgomery decided to continue his detention of Fuller to run the warrant check, the Deputies had no reason to believe that Fuller had committed any criminal conduct on the day of the encounter—i.e., on October 11, 2014. (See id. at 49, 95; Pg. ID 174, 220.) Fuller's behavior during the encounter did not make the Deputies suspicious that Fuller was engaged in criminal activity. (See id.)
24. Moreover, Fuller complied with all of Deputy Montgomery's instructions up to the point that Deputy Montgomery decided to run the warrant check. (See id.)
D. Deputy Montgomery Began to Conduct a Pat Down Search of Fuller, Fuller Fled on Foot, and the Deputies Caught and Arrested Him
25. Deputy Montgomery handed Fuller's identification to Deputy Corrie so that Deputy Corrie could run the warrant check. (See Tr. I at 18, Pg. ID 143.)
26. While Deputy Corrie began running the warrant check, Deputy Montgomery informed Fuller that he was going to conduct a pat down for weapons. (See id. at 25, Pg. ID 150.) Based on his recollection
of the allegations about the November 2013 Incident, Deputy Montgomery thought it was possible that Fuller might be carrying a weapon at the time of their encounter on Wiard Boulevard. (Id.)
27. Fuller then backed away from Deputy Montgomery, looked to his left and right, and extended his hands in front of himself. (See id.)
28. Deputy Montgomery became concerned that Fuller was going to either fight or flee. (Id.)
29. Deputy Montgomery instructed Fuller to relax, and he moved around to Fuller's side. (See id.) Deputy Montgomery then placed one of his hands on Fuller's shoulder and one hand on Fuller's elbow in order to calm Fuller down. (See id. at 26, Pg. ID 151.)
30. Fuller informed Deputy Montgomery that he did not consent to being searched. (See id.)
31. Fuller then broke free from Deputy Montgomery's grip and began running down Wiard Boulevard. (See id. at 26–27, Pg. ID 151–52.)
32. Deputy Montgomery yelled to Deputy Corrie that Fuller was fleeing, and both Deputies pursued Fuller on foot. (See id. at 27, Pg. ID 152.) Deputy Corrie commanded Fuller to stop, but Fuller continued running. (See id. at 28, Pg. ID 153.) Deputy Corrie ultimately caught up to Fuller and tackled him to the ground. (See id. at 29, Pg. ID 154.) Deputy Montgomery handcuffed Fuller while Fuller was laying face-down on the ground. (See id. at 30, Pg. ID 155.)
33. Deputy Montgomery then conducted a pat down of Fuller and found a loaded handgun in Fuller's back pocket. (See id.) Deputy Montgomery placed Fuller under arrest. (See id. at 31, Pg. ID 156.)
34. The Deputies escorted Fuller back to their patrol vehicle. (See id.) Once the Deputies secured Fuller in the patrol vehicle, Deputy Montgomery finished running the warrant check on Fuller and determined that there was no outstanding warrant for Fuller. (See id. at 31–32, Pg. ID 156–57.)
ANALYSIS
Fuller now seeks suppression of the evidence seized from him on the ground that the evidence was the fruit of his unlawful detention. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that suppression of the evidence is warranted.
A. Fuller Was Seized Immediately When Deputy Montgomery Began Questioning Him
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” by government officials. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when a government official, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained [his] liberty.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The test for whether a seizure has occurred is whether “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). “[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). “In addition, an individual must actually submit to the show of authority to be seized within the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 615 F.3d 657, 663 (6th Cir.2010).
The Government contends that the encounter between Fuller and Deputy Montgomery was a purely consensual one, not a seizure. (See ECF # 26 at 14–18; Pg. ID 364–68.) But Deputy Montgomery's own testimony belies that argument. Deputy Montgomery never testified that the encounter was consensual; that Fuller could have chosen not to respond to his questions; nor that Fuller was free to leave at any time. On the contrary, Deputy Montgomery repeatedly testified that Fuller was not free to leave. (See Tr. I at 44, 48–49, 65; Pg. ID 169, 173–74, 190.)
More importantly, while Deputy Montgomery testified that his initial encounter with Fuller was “cooperative” (Id. at 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, Pg. ID 143), he expressly conceded—and the Court finds as a matter of fact—that “the manner in which [Deputy Montgomery] initially communicated with Fuller” indicated to Fuller that Fuller was “required to engage” with him. (I d. at 62, Pg. ID 187; emphasis added.) Deputy Montgomery did not merely ask Fuller if he was “willing to answer some questions,” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (no seizure if officer asks person if he will answer questions); instead, as Deputy Montgomery admitted, his words, tone, and actions—“the manner in which [he] communicated with Fuller”—conveyed to Fuller that Fuller was obligated to stop and speak with him. Accordingly, a reasonable person in Fuller's position would have believed that he was not free to leave. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (a seizure occurs where an officer uses “language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.”) Indeed, the Government has not cited a single case in which any court has found a citizen-officer encounter to have been consensual where, as here, the officer admitted that the citizen was not free to leave and admitted that his manner of communication conveyed that fact to the citizen.
The Government counters that Deputy Montgomery's testimony merely revealed his subjective intent concerning whether Fuller was free to leave and that his intent is irrelevant to a proper seizure analysis. (See ECF # 26 at 16–17, Pg. ID 366–67.) While it is generally true that an officer's subjective intent in detaining an individual is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis, see United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir.2007), the subjective intent of an officer is relevant “to the extent that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted.” United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir.1989). Here, Deputy Montgomery not only subjectively intended to detain Fuller, but he also conveyed that intention to Fuller:
THE COURT: ... [I]s it fair to say that your—the manner in which you communicated with Mr. Fuller from the beginning indicated to him that he was required to engage with you ?
DEPUTY MONTGOMERY: Yes, your Honor.
(Tr. I at 62, Pg. ID 187; emphasis added.) Because Fuller submitted to Deputy Montgomery as “required” when the questioning began, Fuller was seized under the Fourth Amendment from that point forward.
B. The First Portion of the Seizure—to Determine Whether Fuller was Warlix—Was Lawful Because It Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a temporary investigatory seizure—known as a Terry stop—if the officer “reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). More than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” is needed to justify a Terry stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Rather, the officer must have a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity based on “specific and articulable facts.” Id.
Deputy Montgomery had reasonable suspicion to stop Fuller for the sole purpose of determining whether he was Warlix. The Deputies were actively looking for Warlix because he was a suspect in a stolen vehicle investigation, and there was an outstanding warrant for Warlix's arrest. (See Tr. I at 12, Pg. ID 137.) Deputy Montgomery was familiar with Warlix because he had previously arrested Warlix on Wiard Boulevard. (See id. at 12–13, Pg. ID 137–38.) Deputy Montgomery believed that Fuller was Warlix because Fuller was the same race and approximately the same height, weight, and age as Warlix, and because Fuller was walking in approximately the same area as Deputy Montgomery's prior interaction with Warlix. (See id. at 13, Pg. ID 138.) Under these circumstances, Deputy Montgomery had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Fuller was Warlix and that Warlix had engaged in criminal activity. Deputy Montgomery's initial seizure of Fuller was therefore justified. Cf. United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 532–33 (5th Cir.1993) (police officer had reasonable suspicion justifying Terry stop where officer knew that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest).
C. Deputy Montgomery's Continued Detention of Fuller—After He Determined that Fuller Was Not Warlix—Was Unlawful
1. An Officer May Not Extend a Seizure to Conduct Additional Investigation After the Officer's Reasonable Suspicion is Dispelled
“The Fourth Amendment allows police to detain a suspect on reasonable suspicion only for as long as it takes for the police to test the validity of their suspicions.” United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 357 (6th Cir.2005). “Officers may not detain citizens once their suspicions, however reasonable initially, have been dispelled.” Center for Bio–Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 829 (6th Cir.2007). Accordingly, “once ... any underlying reasonable suspicion [is] dispelled, the ... detention generally must end without undue delay.” United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1047 (10th Cir.2006). More specifically, an officer may not extend an investigatory stop in order to obtain additional information about an individual—such as by requesting/reviewing paperwork or running a warrant check—after the officer's reasonable suspicion for the stop has been