Chatman v. Pierce

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Docket Number

No. 14-1108

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Generally — Civil Action For Deprivation Of Rights

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

William Chatman, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, filed a grievance accusing correctional officer John Heath of smuggling cigarettes into the prison to trade with inmates. Approximately three weeks later, Chatman was transferred to a cell block monitored by Heath, who allegedly began threatening Chatman and referencing the grievance. Heath issued Chatman two disciplinary tickets for "insolence" and "intimidation or threats," which led to disciplinary hearings resulting in segregation and restrictions on privileges. Chatman also claimed ongoing harassment including tampered food and mail interference. Despite grievances filed against Heath, prison officials denied them. Chatman then brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Heath retaliated against him for filing the grievance and that officials Gladyse Taylor and Guy Pierce were aware but ignored the retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of retaliation and no personal involvement by Taylor and Pierce. Chatman appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether correctional officer John Heath retaliated against William Chatman for filing a grievance by issuing false disciplinary tickets and engaging in harassment in violation of Chatman’s First Amendment rights.
Whether prison officials Gladyse Taylor and Guy Pierce are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly ignoring Heath’s retaliatory conduct.
Whether summary judgment was properly granted before discovery was complete.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Heath retaliated against Chatman by fabricating disciplinary tickets and harassing him after Chatman filed a grievance accusing Heath of smuggling cigarettes.
Heath’s alleged threats and visits to Chatman’s cell shortly after the grievance support an inference of retaliatory motive beyond mere timing.
Prison officials Taylor and Pierce were personally involved by turning a "blind eye" to Heath’s misconduct despite being on notice through subsequent grievances.
The district court erred by granting summary judgment before discovery was complete without a proper Rule 56(d) motion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2014)	Standard for construing facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment.	The court applied this standard to assess the evidence in favor of Chatman.
Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966-67 (7th Cir. 2012)	Circumstantial evidence can support an inference of retaliatory motive in First Amendment retaliation claims.	The court found that Heath’s alleged threats could be circumstantial evidence of retaliation.
Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2004)	Retaliatory motive may be inferred from circumstantial evidence including statements and timing.	Supported the inference of retaliation based on Heath’s conduct and statements.
Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2009)	Chronology and context of events can support an inference of retaliation.	Used to emphasize that timing combined with threats supports retaliation claim.
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2009)	§ 1983 does not impose liability based on respondeat superior (vicarious liability).	Rejected liability of Taylor and Pierce for Heath’s actions absent personal involvement.
Anderson v. Cornejo, 355 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2004)	Deliberate indifference standard for supervisory liability under § 1983.	Found no evidence Taylor and Pierce deliberately ignored Heath’s misconduct.
Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2006)	Requirement to file a Rule 56(d) motion to obtain additional discovery before summary judgment.	Held that Chatman’s failure to move under Rule 56(d) justified summary judgment before discovery completion.
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010)	Application of Rule 56(d) to pro se litigants seeking discovery before summary judgment.	Supported the court’s reasoning on discovery procedures.
Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2008)	Same as above; Rule 56(d) procedural requirements.	Reinforced the necessity of a Rule 56(d) motion before denying discovery.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to Chatman and found that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim against Heath. While the district court emphasized the four-week gap between the grievance and disciplinary ticket as too long to infer causation, it overlooked Heath’s alleged threatening statements, which constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive. The court reasoned that a reasonable juror could infer Heath punished Chatman because of protected activity based on the totality of circumstances, including the threats and chronology of events.

Regarding Taylor and Pierce, the court affirmed summary judgment because Chatman failed to show their personal involvement or deliberate indifference. The court noted that these officials responded to grievances by initiating an investigation and forwarding complaints to the Administrative Review Board, negating the claim that they "turned a blind eye." The court reiterated that § 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors absent evidence of personal participation or deliberate indifference.

Finally, the court addressed Chatman’s argument about premature summary judgment, explaining that without a Rule 56(d) motion demonstrating the need for further discovery, the district court did not err in proceeding with summary judgment.

Holding and Implications

The court VACATED the grant of summary judgment on Chatman’s retaliation claim against Heath and REMANDED for further proceedings on that claim. In all other respects, including claims against Taylor and Pierce and the issue of discovery, the court AFFIRMED the district court’s judgment.

This decision directly affects the parties by allowing Chatman’s retaliation claim against Heath to proceed, while ending claims against the supervisory officials. The opinion does not establish new precedent but clarifies the evidentiary threshold for retaliation claims and supervisory liability under § 1983.

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WILLIAM CHATMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GUY PIERCE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 11-1257 Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

ORDER

William Chatman, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, appeals the grant of summary judgment on his claim that a prison guard violated his First Amendment rights by filing false disciplinary charges against him in retaliation for a grievance he submitted regarding the guard's allegedly illicit activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.

We construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Chatman, the non-movant. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2014). On August 22, 2010, Chatman set in motion a series of events when he filed a grievance that accused correctional officer John Heath of smuggling cigarettes into Pontiac to trade with an inmate. Nearly three weeks later, the prison transferred Chatman to a cell block monitored by Heath. Almost immediately Heath began visiting Chatman's cell, telling Chatman that he was going to "get" him, and asking him about the August 22 grievance. One week after the move, Heath issued Chatman a disciplinary ticket for "insolence" and "intimidation of threats." The following week Heath wrote up Chatman again for the same offenses. A prison adjustment committee held two separate disciplinary hearings, found Chatman guilty of the alleged infractions, and disciplined him with segregation and restrictions on television and audio usage. But, according to Chatman, the harassment continued—Chatman received food that appeared to be tampered with and he had difficulty receiving and sending mail. Chatman complained about these matters in grievances that he filed against Heath, but grievance officers denied those grievances as baseless. He also complained in writing to the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Gladyse Taylor, and Pontiac's warden, Guy Pierce. Pierce ordered an investigation into Chatman's allegations of Heath's cigarette smuggling, and Taylor referred Chatman's grievances to the prison's Administrative Review Board for further consideration.

Chatman then brought this suit, claiming that Heath retaliated against him for filing the August 22 grievance by fabricating disciplinary tickets and tampering with his food and mail, and that Taylor and Pierce knew about the retaliation but "turned a blind eye" by allowing Heath to be stationed at his same cell block.

The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials. First, with regard to Chatman's claims against Heath, the court determined that Chatman presented neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of retaliation, adding that the "four-week plus gap" between Chatman's August 22 grievance and the September 17 disciplinary report was "too long to raise an inference of causation sufficient to preclude summary judgment." With regard to Chatman's claims against Pierce and Taylor, the court (1) noted Chatman's acknowledgment that neither official personally harassed him or tampered with his food or mail; (2) explained that respondeat superior did not apply to § 1983 actions; and (3) determined that Chatman presented no evidence that either official "approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye toward Heath's unconstitutional behavior."

On appeal Chatman maintains that Heath's actions were based on retaliatory motive, and relies mainly on his declaration, in which he recounts Heath's visiting his cell on September 20 and threatening to "get" him, and then later reprimanding him for informing the warden that he was "bringing in cigarettes." The district court, however, did not address these comments and focused on the disciplinary tickets. But Heath's alleged statements are circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive that the district court determined was absent. Under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could interpret Heath's statements to be sufficient to show that Heath punished Chatman because of protected activity. See Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966-66 (7th Cir. 2012); Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2004). Contrary to the district court's suggestion, Chatman does not try to show retaliation merely with regard to the suspicious timing of Heath's actions; rather he sets forth a chronology of events, supported by Heath's alleged threats, and from those circumstances a retaliatory motive could be inferred. See Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2009). The grant of summary judgment on Chatman's claim against Heath is therefore vacated.

Next Chatman disputes the district court's conclusion that Pierce and Taylor lacked personal involvement in the case and maintains that his subsequent grievances put them on notice of Heath's actions, but they nevertheless "turned a blind eye." But § 1983 does not provide for vicarious liability, see Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2009), and Chatman has not provided evidence that Taylor and Pierce deliberately ignored Heath's actions toward him. See Anderson v. Cornejo, 355 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2004). Pierce and Taylor in fact responded to letters that Chatman sent them about Heath's actions: Pierce ordered an investigation into Chatman's allegations that Heath was smuggling cigarettes into the prison, and Taylor forwarded Chatman's grievances to the Administrative Review Board—the agency authorized to handle inmate grievances.

Finally Chatman argues that the court should not have entered summary judgment before discovery was complete. But if Chatman needed further discovery, he should have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), explaining why he could not yet present facts essential to his opposition. See Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying rule to pro se litigant); Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2008) (same).

Accordingly, we VACATE the grant of summary judgment on Chatman's claim against Heath and REMAND that claim for further proceedings. In all other respects the judgment is AFFIRMED.