PER CURIAM.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Daniel Cahill, Judge.
J. Shane Rockey, of Kansas City, for appellant natural mother. Devon Doyle, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
L.B. (natural mother) appeals the district court's decision terminating her parental rights to N.B. and H.B. On appeal, L.B. argues that she was not given an adequate opportunity to reintegrate with the children. She also argues that the evidence presented by the State at the termination hearing was less than clear and convincing. Based on our review of the record, we find there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable person could find that L.B. was given sufficient time to reintegrate with N.B. and H.B., and we are convinced that a rational factfinder would have found it highly probable, by clear and convincing evidence, that L.B.'s right to parent N.B. and H.B should be terminated. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision.
Facts
On November 22, 2000, L.B. gave birth to N.B., and on June 19, 2004, she gave birth to H.B. At the time of H.B.'s birth, L.B. and N .B. lived with L.B.'s mother. Approximately a month later, L.B. left her mother's house with H.B. Subsequently, N.B. also went to live with L.B.
In 2007, L.B. became pregnant with twins. Around this time, L.B. married her long-time boyfriend, Marlon Davis, who is a registered sex offender. Evidently, L.B. believed the circumstances in her life had become overwhelming. So she sent N.B. to temporarily live with her grandmother and H.B. to temporary live with her great aunt.
In April 2011, the district court adjudicated N.B. and H.B.—who were still living with their custodians—to be in children in need of care. The district court also ordered the children into the custody of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), allowing them to reside with their current custodians. Moreover, SRS established a permanency plan with the objective of reintegrating N.B. and H.B. with their mother.
The permanency plan contained a number of objectives for L.B. to fulfill, and it placed the children into therapy to determine how they were coping in their current living environments and whether reintegration with L.B. was a viable option. A few months later, SRS evaluated the case and concluded that reintegration was not viable. As such, SRS recommended the termination of L.B.'s parental rights to N.B. and H.B. Thereafter, on June 24, 2011, the district court preliminarily found that reintegration was not a viable option.
On January 11, 2012, the district court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the termination of L.B.'s parental rights. After considering the evidence, the district court issued a memorandum decision in which it concluded “by clear and convincing evidence [that] the natural mother is an unfit parent by reason of conduct or condition which renders her unable to properly care for a child and that conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” The district court also concluded that reintegration with L.B. was “no longer a viable alternative.” Further, the district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate L.B.'s parental rights.
Analysis
L.B. contends on appeal that there was not clear and convincing evidence presented to the district court to support the termination of her parental rights to H.B. and N.B. Primarily, L.B. argues that the district court failed to give her proper guidance regarding reintegration and failed to give her sufficient time to complete the requirements necessary for reintegration. Under the circumstances presented, we disagree.
“[W]hen an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination that [a parent's rights should be terminated,] it should consider whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, [that the parent's rights should have been terminated.]” In re B.D.-Y, 286 Kan. 686, 705, 187 P .3d 594 (2008).
And when reviewing the evidence, we do “not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact.” 286 Kan. at 705.
Here, the record reveals that the district court ordered the children into the custody of SRS on March 2, 2011. SRS established a permanency plan for the children on March 22, 2011, which was within the proper time frame pursuant to K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2263(b). At that time, the permanency goal was reintegration of the children with L.B.
The first permanency objective was to ensure that the children's “physical, medical, emotional, developmental, and educational needs will be met.” The second permanency objective was to reintegrate the children with L.B. “in a safe and timely manner.” Although L.B. claims on appeal that the district court “failed to enter any orders,” the permanency plan indicates that the court made several orders regarding areas of L.B.'s life on which she needed to work.
Specifically, the permanency plan indicates that the court ordered L.B. to “demonstrate the ability to provide for sufficient income to meet her family needs” and to “maintain sanitary and appropriate stable housing.” Moreover, L.B. was ordered to “participate in individual therapy [and] follow all recommendations made by her therapist, including but not limited to medication.” Additionally, while not court ordered, L.B. was to ensure that the children have no contact with her husband because he is a registered sex offender. It should also be noted that L.B. signed the permanency plan, signifying that she “participated in the development of the plan.”
On May 23, 2011, the district court continued the case at the State's request so that more information could be obtained from the professionals evaluating the children. In doing so, the district court kept all the permanency plan orders in place. In a report dated June 21, 2011, KVC Behavioral Healthcare provided an update to the court. In the report, the social workers noted that 10–year–old N.B. had lived with her grandmother almost her entire life, was happy living with her grandmother, and was scared of L.B. and her husband. The report also noted that 7–year–old H.B had lived with her great aunt for almost 4 years, was uncomfortable visiting her mother, and was scared of L.B.'s husband.
The report also noted that the children's therapist believed that individual therapy should be discontinued. As well, the therapist believed that family therapy and visitation with L.B. was not in the children's best interest. Additionally, the report noted that L.B.'s living conditions could not be verified because she was still living with her husband in Missouri. Further, the reported indicated that L.B. had not provided proof of her income, had participated in therapy only sporadically, and had not been taking medication as prescribed.
While the children had not had any contact with L.B.'s husband since the permanency plan had been put in place, the report noted that was only because the children's custodians had removed them from their regularly attended church on Easter Sunday after noticing Davis at the service. Ultimately, the report recommended “that due to the significant time the children have lived with these relatives and that the mother maintains a relationship with a registered sex offender, of whom the children are very fearful, that it is not reasonable at this time to reintegrate the family.” Thus, the report concluded “that permanency for the girls be of utmost importance and that the termination of parental rights be pursued at this time.”
After considering the report, the district court found that reintegration was not a viable alternative. Although the record does not contain the specific statutory findings on which the district court based its decision, our review of the record reveals that several applied. The evidence shows that L.B. failed to diligently work towards reintegration. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2255(e)(5). Specifically, L.B. failed to follow recommendations made by her therapist. She also failed to furnish proof of income. Moreover, continued to reside with her husband—a registered sex offender—and failed to take action to ensure that N.B. and H.B. had no contact with him.
H.B. and N.B.'s needs are the decisive consideration under the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2201(b)(3). And reintegration is not viable when it is not expected “to occur within a time frame consistent with the child's developmental needs.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2255(e)(7). In the report, the social worker noted that both children have lived with their current custodians for the majority of their lives. Moreover, L.B. “continued to place her needs and desires above the safety and well being of the children.” She was still living with and married to Davis, a registered sex offender, and had been with him since her senior year of high school. The children were afraid of seeing L.B., and individual therapy was disrupting their otherwise stable lives. Given that L.B. had nearly 4 years without the children to get her life together and had not made any notable changes, the evidence established that reintegration was unlikely to occur in a time frame consistent with N.B.'s and H.B's developmental needs. Accordingly, although reintegration was the initial goal, the district court properly determined that reintegration was not a viable alternative.
Both N.B. and H.B. had been adjudicated children in need of care. As such, the district court could terminate L.B.'s parental rights if it found “by clear and convincing evidence that [L.B. was] unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders [her] unable to care properly for [the children] and the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(a). After a hearing in early January 2012, the district court terminated L.B.'s rights to N.B. and H.B., finding that L.B. (1) failed to adjust her circumstances, conduct, and conditions to meet the needs of the children under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(b)(8); (2) chose not to provide for the children using funds available to her in accordance with K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(c)(1), (c)(4); and (3) failed to maintain regular visitation or contact with the children pursuant to K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(c)(2). The evidence, which we will discuss, supported each of these factors.
The record shows that L.B. failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the children. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(b)(8). L.B. asked her mother and her aunt to take N.B. and H.B. 4 years prior to trial expressly so L.B. could get her life back together. Yet at trial, she was unemployed, still married to a sex offender, and not actively involved in therapy. She testified that she was working towards remedying these situations, but the years the children spent out of her care provided her with more than enough time to adjust her circumstances and get in an appropriate position to care for N.B and H.B.
L.B. chose not to provide for N.B. and H.B. using funds available to her. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(c)(1), (c)(4). Tellingly, she claimed N.B. and H.B. for her disability award, and a portion of her financial award was specifically for their care. Yet L.B. never sent her mother or her aunt any money to support the children.
Additionally, L.B. failed to maintain contact with both N.B. and H.B. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(c)(2). L.B. brought N.B. to her grandmother's house 1 night and told N.B.'s grandmother, in front of N.B., that she did not want her. After that, L.B. admitted that she had not seen N.B. in 4 years. She did not call or send any gifts or cards for N.B.'s birthdays or any holidays. And in individual therapy, N.B. said she did not want to see her mother because she did not know her.
As to H.B., L.B. had not seen her in nearly 4 years, aside from a couple brief visits that the district court, within its discretion, deemed to be incidental. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(c). And when L.B. did make incidental contacts, which occurred around Christmas time the first 2 years that H.B. lived with her great aunt, H.B. regressed to wetting the bed and had to be potty trained again. Further, when her therapist asked her to draw a picture of her mother, H.B. said she did not remember what L.B. looked like, became frightened, and said she did not want to see L.B.
The record reveals clear and convincing evidence upon which a reasonable person could conclude that L.B. was unfit and that the conditions making her unfit were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(a). Importantly, we must view the foreseeable future from the perspective of N.B. and H.B.—not L.B. See In re M.B., 39 Kan.App.2d 31, Syl. ¶ 9, 176 P.3d 977 (2008) (“the foreseeable future should be viewed from the child's perspective, not the parent's, as time perception of a child differs from that of an adult”). Here, L.B. had 4 years to try to make the changes necessary so that N.B. and H.B. could be returned to her. Yet, at the time of the evidentiary hearing held in January 2012, L.B. was still only planning to take the steps required by the district court for reintegration. Viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we are convinced a rational factfinder could find it highly probable that L .B.'s parental rights to N.B. and H.B. should have been terminated.
Affirmed.