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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs, The New Kayak Pool Corporation (now Kayak Pool Corporation), commenced a legal malpractice action against defendants Kavinoky Cook LLP and Hodgson Russ, LLP, who each represented plaintiffs in a federal trademark infringement lawsuit. Hodgson Russ LLP was substituted for Kavinoky Cook LLP as legal counsel seven months before the federal action settled. The federal action resulted in injunctive relief and a $150,000 settlement paid by an insurance company. Plaintiffs allege that defendants committed malpractice by failing to investigate the federal defendants’ insurance coverage, which, if known, would have led to a higher settlement amount.

Following discovery, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, while defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims. The Supreme Court granted defendants’ motions, which was affirmed on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether defendants’ alleged failure to investigate the insurance coverage of the federal defendants constituted legal malpractice.
  2. Whether plaintiffs suffered actual and ascertainable damages as a result of defendants’ alleged negligence.
  3. Whether Kavinoky Cook LLP’s actions or inactions were the proximate cause of any damages, given the substitution of Hodgson Russ LLP as counsel prior to settlement.
  4. Whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the malpractice claims based on the absence of proof of damages and causation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs’ Arguments

  • Defendants failed to inquire into the insurance coverage of the federal defendants, which was a breach of their duty.
  • Had plaintiffs been aware of the insurance coverage, they would not have settled for only $150,000.
  • The failure to investigate insurance coverage caused plaintiffs to accept a less favorable settlement.

Defendants’ Arguments

  • Plaintiffs’ damages claims are speculative and lack evidentiary support.
  • Kavinoky Cook LLP was not the proximate cause of any damages because it was replaced by Hodgson Russ LLP prior to settlement negotiations.
  • Hodgson Russ LLP had sufficient time and opportunity to investigate insurance coverage and protect plaintiffs’ interests.
  • Settlement was favorable to plaintiffs and there is no evidence that knowledge of insurance coverage would have changed the settlement amount.
  • Defendants met their burden to show plaintiffs cannot prove an essential element of legal malpractice—actual damages caused by negligence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
New Kayak Pool Corp. v. Kavinoky Cook LLP, 74 A.D.3d 1852, 902 N.Y.S.2d 497 Doctrine of law of the case does not bar a second summary judgment motion based on new discovery. Court allowed defendants’ second summary judgment motion based on new information obtained during discovery.
Schriptek Mktg. v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 187 A.D.2d 800, 589 N.Y.S.2d 656 Second summary judgment motions based on new information are not repetitive and may be ruled on merits. Supported the court’s decision to consider defendants’ renewed summary judgment motions.
Lincoln Trust v. Spaziano, 118 A.D.3d 1399, 989 N.Y.S.2d 197 Legal malpractice requires proof of actual and ascertainable damages caused by attorney’s negligence. Court found plaintiffs’ damages claims too speculative to survive summary judgment.
Oot v. Arno, 275 A.D.2d 1023, 713 N.Y.S.2d 382 Proximate cause is a necessary element in legal malpractice claims. Court held Kavinoky’s failure to investigate insurance coverage was not proximate cause of damages.
Boglia v. Greenberg, 63 A.D.3d 973, 882 N.Y.S.2d 215 Defendant meets burden on summary judgment by showing plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of claim. Supported granting defendants’ summary judgment due to plaintiffs’ inability to prove damages.
Bua v. Purcell & Ingrao, P.C., 99 A.D.3d 843, 952 N.Y.S.2d 592 Conclusory or speculative allegations of damages are insufficient for malpractice claims. Applied to find plaintiffs’ damages claims speculative and insufficient.
Katz v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., 48 A.D.3d 640, 853 N.Y.S.2d 104 Subsequent counsel’s opportunity to protect client’s rights can negate proximate cause from prior counsel’s negligence. Used to conclude Kavinoky’s negligence was not proximate cause since Hodgson had sufficient time to investigate.
Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 Standard for summary judgment requires plaintiff to raise triable issues of fact. Referenced in assessing whether plaintiffs raised triable issues on damages and causation.
Val Tech Holdings, Inc. v. Wilson Manifolds, Inc., 119 A.D.3d 1327, 990 N.Y.S.2d 379 Gaps in proof do not automatically entitle defendants to summary judgment. Dissent cited this to argue defendants failed to meet initial burden on damages showing.
Harris Beach PLLC v. Eber Bros. Wine & Liq. Corp., 121 A.D.3d 1524, 994 N.Y.S.2d 207 Defendants bear burden on summary judgment to show plaintiff cannot prove essential elements of malpractice. Dissent used to argue defendants failed to satisfy burden on damages and causation.
Sevey v. Friedlander, 83 A.D.3d 1226, 920 N.Y.S.2d 831 Settlement favorable to plaintiff can establish defendant’s prima facie showing of no damages. Defendants relied on this to argue settlement was favorable and no damages exist.
Maksimiak v. Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 A.D.3d 652, 919 N.Y.S.2d 330 Successor counsel’s opportunity to protect client’s rights relevant to proximate cause analysis. Discussed in relation to whether Hodgson had sufficient opportunity to remedy alleged negligence.
Maheshwari v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 288, 778 N.Y.S.2d 442, 810 N.E.2d 894 Interruption of causal chain by subsequent events may or may not sever proximate cause. Referenced in discussing whether Hodgson’s involvement breaks causation link to Kavinoky.
Hahn v. Tops Mkts., LLC, 94 A.D.3d 1546, 943 N.Y.S.2d 361 Issues of proximate cause, including superseding cause, are generally for the trier of fact. Dissent cited to support triable issues of fact on proximate cause.
Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 General principles on proximate cause and superseding cause issues for factfinder. Referenced in dissent to emphasize factual nature of proximate cause determination.
Country Club Partners, LLC v. Goldman, 79 A.D.3d 1389, 913 N.Y.S.2d 803 Failure to prove actual damages justifies summary judgment for defendants in malpractice claims. Applied by majority to affirm summary judgment dismissing malpractice claims.
Charos v. Esseks, Hefter & Angel, 216 A.D.2d 511, 628 N.Y.S.2d 566 Same as above regarding damages requirement for malpractice claims. Applied by majority in affirming dismissal.
Golden v. Cascione, Chechanover & Purcigliotti, 286 A.D.2d 281, 729 N.Y.S.2d 140 Subsequent counsel’s opportunity to protect client’s rights may negate proximate cause. Used to support conclusion that Hodgson’s involvement breaks causation link to Kavinoky.
Tooma v. Grossbarth, 121 A.D.3d 1093, 995 N.Y.S.2d 593 Same principle regarding proximate cause and subsequent counsel’s role. Referenced in causation analysis.
Grant v. LaTrace, 119 A.D.3d 646, 990 N.Y.S.2d 227 Same as above. Referenced in causation discussion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the legal malpractice claim by focusing on two essential elements: causation and damages. It emphasized that to succeed, plaintiffs must prove that defendants’ negligence caused actual and ascertainable damages. The court found plaintiffs’ damages claims speculative because they failed to provide nonspeculative evidence that knowledge of insurance coverage would have produced a better settlement.

Regarding causation, the court held that Kavinoky Cook LLP’s failure to investigate insurance coverage was not the proximate cause of damages because Kavinoky was discharged before settlement negotiations began and Hodgson Russ LLP had over seven months to investigate and protect plaintiffs’ interests. The lack of continuity in legal representation and Hodgson’s opportunity to remedy any oversight severed the causal link to Kavinoky.

The court also addressed procedural issues, noting that defendants were entitled to file a second summary judgment motion based on new discovery and that the prior denial did not bar this motion. The court concluded that defendants met their burden to show plaintiffs could not prove an essential element of their malpractice claim and thus granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims.

The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that triable issues of fact exist regarding proximate cause and damages. The dissent highlighted that Kavinoky worked extensively on the matter for several years and that Hodgson’s opportunity to investigate insurance coverage before settlement was uncertain, given the timing of the settlement conference and plaintiffs’ instructions to settle at minimal cost. The dissent also noted the absence of discovery on damages prevented defendants from meeting their initial burden on summary judgment.

Holding and Implications

The order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, is affirmed without costs.

The court’s decision results in dismissal of plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims against defendants Kavinoky Cook LLP and Hodgson Russ LLP on summary judgment grounds. The ruling rests on plaintiffs’ failure to prove actual damages and proximate cause. No new legal precedent was established; the decision applies settled principles requiring proof of causation and damages in malpractice actions and confirms that successor counsel’s opportunity to rectify prior counsel’s errors can negate proximate cause.

The NEW KAYAK POOL CORPORATION, now Known as Kayak Pool Corporation and Kayak Katalogue Corp., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. KAVINOKY COOK LLP, and Hodgson Russ, LLP, Defendants–Respondents.

Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo (Michael B. Powers of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Damon Morey LLP, Buffalo (Michael J. Willett of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent Kavinoky Cook LLP.

Hagerty & Brady, Buffalo (Michael A. Brady of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent Hodgson Russ, LLP.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM:

Plaintiffs commenced this legal malpractice action against defendants, Kavinoky Cook LLP (Kavinoky) and Hodgson Russ, LLP (Hodgson), each having represented plaintiff The New Kayak Pool Corporation, now known as Kayak Pool Corporation (Kayak Pool) in a federal trademark infringement action. Seven months after Hodgson was substituted for Kavinoky as legal counsel for Kayak Pool, the federal action settled, and Kayak Pool received, inter alia, injunctive relief and $150,000 in full settlement of all its claims in that action. The settlement check was issued by an insurance company, and plaintiffs now allege that Kavinoky and Hodgson committed malpractice by failing to inquire as to the federal defendants' insurance coverage. Plaintiffs further allege that, had Kayak Pool been aware that the federal defendants had insurance coverage, Kayak Pool would not have settled for only $150,000.

Following discovery in this action, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, and each of the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims asserted against them. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motions.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Kavinoky previously moved for summary judgment, and the order denying that motion was affirmed by this Court (New Kayak Pool Corp. v. Kavinoky Cook LLP, 74 A.D.3d 1852, 1852–1853, 902 N.Y.S.2d 497 ). Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, which is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 63 A.D.2d 893, 894, 405 N.Y.S.2d 726 ), Kavinoky was not barred by the doctrine of law of the case from filing a second motion for summary judgment. Discovery was not completed at the time of the first motion, and “[w]here, as here, the second motion is based upon new information obtained during disclosure, the second motion is not repetitive of the first and the court may rule on the merits of the second motion” (Schriptek Mktg. v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 187 A.D.2d 800, 801–802, 589 N.Y.S.2d 656, lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 704, 595 N.Y.S.2d 399, 611 N.E.2d 300 ; see Taillie v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 68 A.D.3d 1808, 1809–1810, 891 N.Y.S.2d 786 ). In any event, “a subsequent summary judgment motion may be properly entertained when it is substantively valid and

when the granting of the motion will further the ends of justice while eliminating an unnecessary burden on the resources of the courts” (Valley Natl. Bank v. INI Holding, LLC, 95 A.D.3d 1108, 1108, 945 N.Y.S.2d 97 ; see Town of Angelica v. Smith, 89 A.D.3d 1547, 1549, 933 N.Y.S.2d 480 ).

Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the court properly granted defendants' motions because a necessary element of a cause of action for legal malpractice is that the attorney's negligence caused “a loss that resulted in actual and ascertainable damages” (Lincoln Trust v. Spaziano, 118 A.D.3d 1399, 1401, 989 N.Y.S.2d 197 ; see Oot v. Arno, 275 A.D.2d 1023, 1023–1024, 713 N.Y.S.2d 382 ), and defendants established as a matter of law that plaintiffs' claims of damages are entirely speculative. Thus, defendants are entitled to summary judgment because they met their burden of establishing that plaintiffs are “unable to prove at least one of the essential elements of [their] legal malpractice cause of action” (Boglia v. Greenberg, 63 A.D.3d 973, 974, 882 N.Y.S.2d 215 [emphasis added]; see Grace v. Law, 108 A.D.3d 1173, 1174–1175, 969 N.Y.S.2d 661, affd. 24 N.Y.3d 203, 997 N.Y.S.2d 334, 21 N.E.3d 995 ;

Wilk v. Lewis & Lewis, P.C., 75 A.D.3d 1063, 1065, 905 N.Y.S.2d 410 ). “Conclusory allegations of damages or injuries predicated on speculation cannot suffice for a malpractice action” (Bua v. Purcell & Ingrao, P.C., 99 A.D.3d 843, 848, 952 N.Y.S.2d 592, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 857, 2013 WL 452171 ). Here, as in Lincoln Trust, plaintiffs' theory of damages “is too speculative to survive defendants' motion[s] for summary judgment” (Lincoln Trust, 118 A.D.3d at 1401, 989 N.Y.S.2d 197 ), and plaintiffs “failed to submit nonspeculative evidence in support of [their] damages claims” in opposition to defendants' motions (G & M Realty, L.P. v. Masyr, 96 A.D.3d 689, 690, 948 N.Y.S.2d 256 ). Indeed, defendants established that the damages claimed by plaintiffs are “ ‘incapable of being proven with any reasonable certainty’ ” (Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 184 A.D.2d 385, 388, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379 [emphasis added] ).

We understand the concern of our dissenting colleague that we are awarding defendants summary judgment based on gaps in plaintiffs' proof (see Val Tech Holdings, Inc. v. Wilson Manifolds, Inc., 119 A.D.3d 1327, 1329, 990 N.Y.S.2d 379 ) but, as noted, the inability of plaintiffs to establish actual damages is a sufficient basis to grant summary judgment to defendants in this legal malpractice action (see e.g. Country Club Partners, LLC v. Goldman, 79 A.D.3d 1389, 1392, 913 N.Y.S.2d 803 ; Charos v. Esseks, Hefter & Angel, 216 A.D.2d 511, 511, 628 N.Y.S.2d 566 ).

Contrary to plaintiffs' contention with respect to Kavinoky, the court properly determined that Kavinoky's failure to determine the existence of the federal defendants' insurance coverage was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' alleged damages,

which is a necessary element of a cause of action for legal malpractice (see Oot, 275 A.D.2d at 1023, 713 N.Y.S.2d 382 ). As noted by the court, “[i]t is undisputed that Kavinoky was discharged as [Kayak Pool's] counsel, and Hodgson was substituted in as [Kayak Pool's] counsel, prior to the time that any settlement negotiations began and that Kavinoky had no role whatsoever in those negotiations.” Moreover, although plaintiffs substituted Hodgson as their legal counsel only after the attorney who had initially represented plaintiffs left Kavinoky to join Hodgson (see New Kayak Pool Corp., 74 A.D.3d at 1852–1853, 902 N.Y.S.2d 497 ), Kavinoky established that a different attorney at Hodgson overtook responsibility for representing plaintiffs once Hodgson was substituted as counsel. Therefore, despite the connection between the two law firms, there was no actual continuity of legal representation. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Kavinoky, through the actions of the first attorney, was negligent in failing to investigate the matter of insurance coverage, we note that Hodgson, through the newly assigned attorney, had over seven months in which to conduct its own investigation before settling the federal action on behalf of Kayak Pool. We thus conclude that Kavinoky established as a matter of law “that its actions did not proximately cause the plaintiffs' alleged damages, and that subsequent counsel had a sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiffs' rights by pursuing any remedies it deemed appropriate on their behalf” (Katz v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., 48 A.D.3d 640, 641, 853 N.Y.S.2d 104 ; see e.g. Somma v. Dansker & Aspromonte Assoc., 44 A.D.3d 376, 377, 843 N.Y.S.2d 577 ; Golden v. Cascione, Chechanover & Purcigliotti, 286 A.D.2d 281, 281, 729 N.Y.S.2d 140 ; cf. Tooma v. Grossbarth, 121 A.D.3d 1093, 1096–1097, 995 N.Y.S.2d 593 ; Grant v. LaTrace, 119 A.D.3d 646, 647, 990 N.Y.S.2d 227 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman

v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 ).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is affirmed without costs.

All concur except Fahey, J., who dissents and votes to modify in accordance with the following Memorandum:

I respectfully dissent and would modify the order by denying the motions of defendants Kavinoky Cook LLP (Kavinoky) and Hodgson Russ, LLP (Hodgson) for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims against them. In my view, there are triable issues of fact whether Kavinoky's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries complained of, and whether plaintiffs suffered ascertainable damages as a result of the alleged negligence of Kavinoky and Hodgson.

Plaintiff was represented by defendants for approximately 4 ½ years. It is alleged that during that period neither defendant

determined the amount of insurance coverage available in the underlying action.

Turning first to Kavinoky's motion, Kavinoky contends that there is no link between its negligence in failing to determine whether the defendants in the federal trademark infringement action had insurance coverage with respect to that action and the damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff The New Kayak Pool Corporation, now known as Kayak Pool Corporation (Kayak Pool) as a result of the settlement of that lawsuit without knowledge of that insurance coverage. In that vein, Kavinoky specifically contends that, because Hodgson succeeded Kavinoky as the law firm representing Kayak Pool before that settlement occurred, Kavinoky is disconnected from that failure to investigate the insurance coverage available to the defendants in the federal action. This issue essentially turns on the question whether Hodgson “had sufficient time and opportunity to adequately protect [the] rights ” of Kayak Pool (Maksimiak v. Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 A.D.3d 652, 652, 919 N.Y.S.2d 330 [emphasis added] ). Put differently, the operative question is whether Hodgson, as the successor to Kavinoky, had sufficient time and opportunity to perform the act, i.e., determining whether the defendants in the federal action had insurance coverage, that Kavinoky was allegedly negligent in failing to perform (cf. e.g. Alden v. Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz [“The People's Lawyer”], 91 A.D.3d 1311, 1311, 937 N.Y.S.2d 784 ; Perks v. Lauto & Garabedian, 306 A.D.2d 261, 261–262, 760 N.Y.S.2d 231 ). Indeed, Kavinoky seeks to avoid liability for its negligence in failing to investigate the insurance coverage question based on its theory that Hodgson's failure to engage in precisely the same activity interrupted the link between Kavinoky's negligence and the alleged injury of plaintiffs. Such interruption, of course, may but does not automatically sever such a causal link (see Maheshwari v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 288, 295, 778 N.Y.S.2d 442, 810 N.E.2d 894 ) and, “[a]s a general rule, issues of proximate cause[, including superseding cause,] are for the trier of fact” (Hahn v. Tops Mkts., LLC, 94 A.D.3d 1546, 1548, 943 N.Y.S.2d 361 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666, rearg. denied 52 N.Y.2d 784, 829, 436 N.Y.S.2d 622, 417 N.E.2d 1010 ; Prystajko v. Western N.Y. Pub. Broadcasting Assn., 57 A.D.3d 1401, 1403, 871 N.Y.S.2d 556 ).

Here, in my view, the question whether Kavinoky's negligence was a cause of the injuries complained of is for a trier of fact. The record establishes that in the 3 ½ years after this action was commenced Kavinoky worked this matter so extensively as to bill

between $350,000 and approximately $770,000

in legal fees; that the representation of Kayak Pool in the federal action was transferred to Hodgson on June 20, 2003; and that the federal action ultimately settled on February 5, 2004. The record, however, also contains evidence that almost immediately after Hodgson began to represent Kayak Pool in the federal action, and potentially even before, there was an order for a settlement conference in that matter. Moreover, the record contains evidence that, after receiving the settlement conference notice, Kayak Pool instructed Hodgson to settle the matter “at as little [further] cost as possible.” In view of that evidence, whether Hodgson had sufficient time and opportunity to investigate the issue of the insurance coverage available to the defendants in the federal action is for a trier of fact to decide, along with which law firm, if any, is responsible for the oversight.

As to the damages question, I note that the analysis of this issue applies equally to Kavinoky and Hodgson. To establish legal malpractice by defendants, plaintiffs “must demonstrate that [defendants] failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that [defendants'] breach of this duty caused [plaintiffs] to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (Harris Beach PLLC v. Eber Bros. Wine & Liq. Corp., 121 A.D.3d 1524, 1525, 994 N.Y.S.2d 207 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). “In the context of [these] motion[s] by [defendants] for ... summary judgment, the burden was on [defendants] to present evidence ... in admissible form establishing that [plaintiffs are] unable to prove at least one of [the] essential elements of a malpractice cause of action” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted] [emphasis added] ).

Regarding damages, Kavinoky relies on, inter alia, Sevey v. Friedlander, 83 A.D.3d 1226, 1227, 920 N.Y.S.2d 831, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 707, 2011 WL 3925257, which stands for the proposition that a defendant in a legal malpractice action makes a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is unable to prove damages by demonstrating that the settlement was favorable to the plaintiff. Kavinoky relies on an expert's affidavit, who contends that, based on his review of the record, there was “no evidence to indicate that [the defendants in the federal action], or [their] insurer, would have made a different settlement offer if discovery on insurance coverage had occurred in this case.” Hodgson's appellate attorney took a similar approach in arguing this appeal, noting that plaintiffs “obtained no discovery from [the defendants in the federal action, their insurer, or their attorney, and thus] presented nothing more than their assumption [that Kayak

Pool] would have received more in [the] settlement [of the underlying action].”

In my view, that approach is basically a “gaps in proof” tack by which defendants cannot meet their initial burdens on their motions for summary judgment (see Val Tech Holdings, Inc. v. Wilson Manifolds, Inc., 119 A.D.3d 1327, 1329, 990 N.Y.S.2d 379 ; see also Harris Beach PLLC, 121 A.D.3d at 1525–1526, 994 N.Y.S.2d 207 ). It is defendants' burden to show that knowledge of insurance coverage would not affect settlement, not plaintiffs' burden.

I also note that the reason for the absence of evidence on damages is clear: although many hours were billed by Kavinoky before the transfer to Hodgson, very little discovery had been done and, apparently, none had been done on the issue of damages. Given the absence of evidence as to the value of Kayak Pool's claim and

the possibility that the threat of the bankruptcy of the defendants in the federal action motivated the settlement, I cannot agree with Kavinoky that the record establishes that Kayak Pool was well-disposed in that action. To the extent Hodgson contends that the impetus for the settlement was the injunctive relief and that Kayak Pool resolved the underlying matter favorably by obtaining that injunctive relief, I conclude that defendants still are not entitled to summary judgment because there is at least a factual question as to whether the injunctive relief drove the settlement, or whether the settlement was motivated by the desire for injunctive relief and a collectible sum of money designed to offset Kayak Pool's legal fees in the underlying matter.

Put more simply, and more bluntly, in the absence of discovery on damages I question how defendants could meet their initial burden on these parts of their motions by demonstrating that the settlement was favorable to Kayak Pool. The absence of discovery on the damages question in the federal action does not mean that defendants are entitled to summary judgment here. Rather, it means that defendants are responsible both for conducting that discovery in this action and for affirmatively proving their present contention that plaintiffs did not sustain ascertainable damages as a result of defendants' negligence. Defendants have not met that burden, and thus I would deny their respective motions for summary judgment (see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 ).

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New Kayak Pool Corp. v. Kavinoky Cook LLP
(Feb 6, 2015)