State v. Coleman

JOHNSON, Chief Justice

Letty S. DiGiulio, Gary Patrick Clements, Matilde Jean Carbia, for appellant.

Louisiana Department of Justice, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Caddo Parish District Attorney's Office, Dale G. Cox, Jr., District Attorney, Suzanne Lynn Owen, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion

JOHNSON, Chief Justice

On February 14, 2003, a Caddo Parish grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant, Robert Glen Coleman, with the January 1, 2003, first degree murder of 70–year–old Julian L. Brandon, Jr. and the attempted first degree murder of his wife, 69–year–old Alice Brandon. Counsel was appointed and defendant entered a plea of not guilty. On January 21, 2005, the state filed an amended indictment, severing the non-capital offense, and proceeded to trial on one count of first degree murder as to decedent Julian Brandon. On February

17, 2005, a Caddo Parish jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged, and, two days later, voted unanimously to impose the death penalty, having found all four aggravating circumstances urged by the state, namely that: defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery, La. C.Cr. P. art. 905.4(A)(1); the victim was older than 65 years of age, La. C.Cr. P. art. 905.4(A)(10); defendant created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person, La. C.Cr. P. art. 905.4(A)(4); and defendant had been previously convicted of armed robbery, La. C.Cr. P. art. 905.4(A)(3). On appeal, this court found a violation of the rule in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which forbids racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during jury selection, and vacated defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Coleman, 06–0518 (La.11/2/07), 970 So.2d 511.

Jury selection for defendant's second trial commenced on January 23, 2012, and the guilt phase began on January 30, 2012. On February 3, 2012, a Caddo Parish jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and on February 7, 2012, having found the same four aggravating circumstances as found at his first trial, unanimously agreed to impose the death penalty. Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and, on May 3, 2012, formally imposed the death sentence in accord with the jury's determination.

This is a direct appeal under La. Const. art. V, § 5(D). Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence raising 38 assignments of error, variously combined into 21 arguments. We will address the most significant of these assignments of error in this opinion, and the remaining assignments of error will be addressed in an unpublished appendix. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, we find no merit in any of the assignments of error relative to the issue of guilt. Therefore, we affirm the defendant's first-degree murder conviction. However, we find error relative to the state's failure to provide sufficient notice of evidence of an unadjudicated murder introduced in the penalty phase. Thus, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.

FACTS

During the early evening hours of January 1, 2003, 70–year–old retired minister, Julian Brandon, and his 68–year–old wife, Alice Brandon, were attacked in their home. Crime scene investigators determined that the perpetrators shoved their way into the Brandon home through the front door and that Mr. Brandon was forced into his dining room where he was shot through the chin at contact or near—contact range. A portion of the bullet lodged in his brain and a portion exited and embedded in the ceiling above him. Mr. Brandon was repeatedly stabbed and cut at some point thereafter. Mr. Brandon was killed in the attack. Mrs. Brandon was found in a bedroom of the home, where the perpetrators had placed a pillow over her face and shot her in the head. Mrs. Brandon survived the attack, although she remained permanently disabled until she died several years later.

Months earlier, Tammy Holmes was living with her husband, John Holmes, in Tylertown, Mississippi. In August 2002, John's daughter, Brandy Holmes, stayed with the couple a short time before moving

in with her new boyfriend, defendant Robert Coleman. During that time, John owned a .380 pistol which he used regularly to target shoot in a remote wooded area in Lumberton, Mississippi. Brandy and defendant visited John and Tammy just before Christmas in 2002. While at their home, defendant stayed outside to work on his truck, but Brandy made several trips back and forth between the yard and the home, using a back door near the nightstand on which John kept his gun. The day after their visit, John noticed his gun was missing and, despite exhaustive searches, never located it.

On Christmas Eve 2002, defendant and Brandy left Mississippi to visit Brandy's mother, Brenda Bruce, in Shreveport. After settling in at Ms. Bruce's trailer home, the pair decided to host a New Year's Eve party. Terrance Barnes, an acquaintance of Brandy's, attended the party and, at some point during the night, observed defendant receive a gun, which Barnes described as a “revolver,” from Brandy's younger brother, Sean George, in a back bedroom. Later that night, defendant asked Barnes if he knew where he could “hit-a-lick,” which Barnes understood to mean that defendant was asking where he could rob someone.

The Brandons were not discovered for four days, on January 5, 2003, when a concerned friend, Calvin Hudson, went to check on them. Mr. Hudson observed Mr. Brandon's body in a pool of blood through the glass back door of the house and immediately went to a neighbor's house to call police. While waiting for police to arrive, the neighbor, retired Caddo Parish Deputy Sheriff Danny Kent, walked over to observe the scene for himself. Deputy Kent found the Brandons' back door unlocked and entered to check Mr. Brandon's pulse. Deputy Kent maintained he did not touch anything in the home—except to check Mr. Brandon's pulse—and that police arrived shortly thereafter and secured the scene.

Sergeant William Gaines was first to respond to the 911 dispatch and also entered through the back door. According to Sgt. Gaines, it was apparent that Mr. Brandon had been dead more than a day. After surveying the scene around Mr. Brandon, Sgt. Gaines followed bloody footprints down the hallway where he heard a sound coming from the first bedroom and discovered an incapacitated Mrs. Brandon. There was a bloodstain on the bed and Mrs. Brandon was lying face up on the floor in a pool of dried blood. Sgt. Gaines notified Mrs. Brandon that he was a police officer there to help, called for EMT assistance, and cleared the remainder of the house. According to Sgt. Gaines, although it seemed Mrs. Brandon wanted to say something, she could not speak and her eyes could only track from side to side. Sgt. Gaines waited for investigators to arrive and photograph the scene before moving anything, but noted a jewelry box in disarray and a piece of jewelry on the kitchen floor. After Mrs. Brandon received initial medical attention from the EMTs, Sgt. Gaines recalled that she was able to answer simple questions, but he did not hear her say anything of significance to the investigation.

Deputy Chief Jefferson Akes of the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office was another among the first to respond. Having observed that Mrs. Brandon had suffered a head wound of indeterminate cause, he immediately dispatched emergency air transport. Deputy Chief Akes also recalled that although she was initially unresponsive, Mrs. Brandon began to mumble after EMTs cleaned her mouth but she was unable to give specific responses.

The flight medic crew arrived at the scene to transport Mrs. Brandon to the

hospital. While on board the helicopter, paramedic Tommy Adams questioned Mrs. Brandon about her attackers and she stated that two white persons were responsible. Mrs. Brandon was admitted into intensive care and remained there several weeks. She had a “trach” implanted shortly after being admitted and never spoke again. After Mrs. Brandon was discharged from the hospital, her daughter, Dawn Finley, a nurse, provided round–the–clock care until Mrs. Brandon passed away in 2008.

Crime scene investigator Corporal Charlotte Hammontree arrived at the Brandons' home shortly after the 911 dispatch and immediately began taking photographs of the scene. She also collected several samples for DNA testing and documented everything of apparent significance. In addition, she noted the absence of spent bullet casings on the premises. Mr. Brandon's wallet, debit and credit cards, along with at least four pieces of Mrs. Brandon's jewelry—including a pearl bracelet and a gold bracelet with multicolored stones—were missing. Latent prints expert, Lt. Owen McDonnell, brushed five or six areas at the scene for fingerprints, including the knife blades used on Mr. Brandon and the killers' apparent points of entry and exit, but none of the fingerprints lifted at the scene were matched with any person of interest. On the door leading to the garage, however, detectives documented an area of dried blood containing a small diamond pattern.

After securing and surveying the Brandon home, Caddo Parish investigators gathered information which led them to suspect that Brandy, Sean, and a third person named Johnny Wright were involved. Captain Bobby Abraham, Sergeant Gary Frake, Lieutenant Bill Duncan, and lead investigators Sheila Hostnick and Kay Ward, traveled to the Bruce trailer to locate Brandy and Sean. Ms. Bruce allowed the officers inside, where they encountered Brandy, Sean, and defendant, along with Ms. Bruce's three young grandchildren. Defendant was first observed in a rear bedroom, where he was not wearing shoes. Brandy, defendant, Sean, and Ms. Bruce voluntarily accompanied officers to the station for interviews. When asked to come along to the station, defendant proceeded to put on a pair of black boots that had been on the floor right next to him. Brandy and defendant were taken in separate cars, and Sean, who was a minor, went with his mother. Defendant, who was not yet a suspect, traveled unrestrained in the front seat of Capt. Abraham's car. Upon arrival at the station, Capt. Abraham directed defendant to take a seat in the conference room while Brandy was taken into an interview room.

After defendant indicated he understood his rights and signed a written waiver, Det. Ward and Deputy Hostnick interviewed him at 11:20 p.m. Defendant told the officers he had no knowledge of the murder, he and Brandy had been boyfriend and girlfriend just a few months, he came with her to Shreveport just before Christmas, and they had been inseparable

since their arrival. Defendant then returned to the conference room. Some time thereafter, defendant asked to speak with Capt. Abraham. Capt. Abraham brought defendant into his office and the two spoke alone. Defendant inquired as to “what was going on,” and repeated that he did not know anything about the homicide. He volunteered further that he did not believe Brandy was involved either, stating again that they had been at each other's sides since arriving in Shreveport on December 24, 2002. During the conversation, Capt. Abraham observed a “fresh injury” on defendant's right hand, which defendant claimed he sustained while working on a bicycle. Defendant agreed to have his hands photographed and then asked to step outside for a cigarette. Capt. Abraham agreed and accompanied him. After the cigarette, defendant returned to the conference room.

Capt. Abraham did not record defendant's initial statements because, in his experience, a recording device generally tends to keep a subject from speaking openly, but Capt. Abraham verified that each of defendant's pre-arrest statements were voluntary. Defendant appeared lucid, relaxed, and extraordinarily calm while at the station.

Lt. McDonnell subsequently observed what appeared to be blood on defendant's boots and, when he advised defendant as much, defendant claimed the boots were not his but actually belonged to Brandy's brother, Sean. Up until that point, defendant had not said anything to indicate the boots belonged to anyone else. Lt. McDonnell and Capt. Abraham recognized that the soles of defendant's boots were similar to prints at the crime scene and collected his boots along with the other interviewees' shoes. Defendant voluntarily relinquished his boots with the disclaimer that they were his only shoes and that he “wouldn't be stupid enough to walk into a police station with blood on [them].” To keep defendant from going barefoot, officers loaned him a pair of rubber boots used by inmates during cleaning.

After analyzing the subjects' shoes, Lt. McDonnell determined that although Brandy could be excluded as a source of the bloody footprints, defendant could not be excluded. Defendant's boots shared the same tread detail, size (nine), and shape as the print Lt. McDonnell lifted at the crime scene.

Meanwhile, Deputy Hostnick separately interviewed Brandy. At some point, Deputy Hostnick stepped away and a male officer granted Brandy permission to use the restroom unaccompanied. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Hostnick discovered that Brandy took the opportunity to remove three cassette tapes from the interview room, pull all the tape out, and flush the jewelry she had been wearing down the toilet. Brandy was arrested at 10:00 a.m. on January 6, 2003.

Sometime after defendant gave his boots to detectives, but apparently before they realized he could not be ruled out as the source of the bloody footprints at the scene, Det. Jason Morgan drove defendant

back to the Bruce trailer. On the way, defendant again sat in the front seat and, as he exited the vehicle, returned the rubber boots he was loaned at the station. Defendant entered the Bruce trailer wearing only socks on his feet and Det. Morgan left to return to the station. By the time Det. Morgan traveled 200–300 yards, however, he received a call advising him to reclaim defendant. When Det. Morgan arrived back at the trailer, less than two minutes later, the door to the trailer was open and defendant met him at the doorway with a duffle bag, still not wearing any shoes. Det. Morgan informed defendant he was needed back at the station for additional questioning. Defendant agreed, but stated he needed to get to the bus station afterwards. Det. Morgan gave defendant the rubber boots to wear back to the station.

Upon returning to the station, defendant gave his consent for the detectives to search his duffle bag. The bag contained clothing, but no shoes. Defendant identified certain items in the duffle bag as his belongings, including a pair of jeans on which blood evidence connected to the unrelated homicide of Terrance Blaze was later found.

Defendant was subsequently placed under arrest for the murder of Julian Brandon. After his arrest, defendant was transferred to the Caddo Parish Correctional Center where he was temporarily placed in an intake cell with Collies Sharpes and Bobby Evans, each of whom had recently been arrested on separate charges. None of the three knew each other before being placed together in the cell. Defendant made statements to Sharpes and Evans indicating his involvement in the crime. After defendant was removed from the intake cell, either Sharpes or Evans called a guard over and divulged what defendant had said. The following day, Sharpes and Evans separately gave recorded statements to Caddo Parish Detective Marianna McClure.

Sharpes testified that during his brief encounter with defendant, defendant volunteered that he had been arrested for murdering an “old couple up in Blanchard.” According to Sharpes, defendant stated he instructed his girlfriend Brandy to “knockoff” the couple to see whether she had what it took to kill and he had taken a bracelet from the victims during the crime. Sharpes testified that defendant said Brandy did the killing and attempted to cover her tracks by flushing some of the victim's jewelry down the toilet at the police station. Defendant boasted police “didn't have anything on him,” and informed his cellmates that he was from Mississippi. In Sharpes' appreciation, defendant was excited as he spoke about the crime: his eyes brightened and he appeared gratified and proud of what he said he and Brandy had done together. Sharpes testified he had not received anything for his testimony, he has never been an agent of the state, he did not receive information about the crime from law enforcement, and although he had access to a television in jail he did not see any related news reports.

Cellmate Bobby Evans also testified about his encounter with defendant. At defendant's second trial, Evans, who was still incarcerated and a self-described “four-time loser,” became uncooperative. When called to the stand, he acknowledged his prior testimony recounting defendant's January 6, 2003, statements but balked when asked to relay them again. After a combative exchange with the prosecutor, Evans explained he had initially disclosed defendant's statements only because he was “young and scared,” but he no longer wanted anything to do with defendant's case because he still had time left to serve and was worried he might meet defendant again behind bars. After having his memory refreshed as to the content of his prior testimony, Evans confirmed that, on January 6, 2003, defendant stated he and his girlfriend Brandy killed “two old people;” defendant was putting Brandy to a test; Brandy flushed the victim's bracelet down the toilet; defendant had blood on his shoes; defendant buried the murder weapon behind the victims' home; Brandy's brother was present during the murder; Brandy's brother wore defendant's shoes and defendant wore someone else's shoes, to “throw people off;” Brandy shot the woman and defendant shot the man; a detective released defendant back to Brandy's “mama's house,” but came back for him; the “old man” hit Brandy with a Budweiser bottle; and they had tied up the victims. Evans denied that detectives had supplied him with any information about the crime and stated he had not seen or heard anything about it on the news. On cross-examination, it was elicited that Evans told Detective McClure defendant's skin tone was “really white,” and that when Evans testified before the grand jury he stated, contrary to his trial testimony, defendant said Brandy shot the man and defendant shot the woman.

Investigators determined that neither Sean George nor Johnny Wright were involved in the Brandon murder. On the day of the murder, Sean was subject to a court order which required him to stay within 150 feet of his mother's trailer and was wearing an ankle bracelet that monitored his whereabouts. After speaking with Sean's probation officer, investigators ruled him out as a suspect. Separately, investigators independently verified Wright's alibi through multiple sources.

On the evening of the murder, January 1, 2003, surveillance cameras captured two individuals attempting to use the ATM at the Northwood Branch of the Hibernia National Bank in Shreveport, between 7:32 and 7:36 p.m. While the ATM could not record which card, i.e., which bank account was attempted to be accessed or whose card was inserted, electronic bank data showed the users inserted a card and supplied an incorrect PIN. Brandy's father, John Holmes, reviewed enhanced ATM surveillance imagery and identified Brandy as the female and testified the black male with her looked like defendant. Tammy Holmes, Brandy's stepmother, identified Brandy and defendant in the same photograph. At 6:55 p.m. and 7:01 p.m. on the same evening, the bank also recorded two separate failed attempts to withdraw $200 using Mr. Brandon's ATM card from an ATM inside a convenience store near the Brandon home. The withdrawals were declined for use of an incorrect PIN. There was no surveillance camera at this ATM. Testimony established that it was an easy walk from the Bruce trailer to the Brandon home and to both of these ATM locations.

After Brandy and defendant were arrested, investigators obtained warrants to search in and around the Bruce trailer. In the bedroom Brandy and defendant shared, investigators found two pillows with apparent bullet holes, similar to the one found near Mrs. Brandon, and a box of plastic food prep gloves from a Subway restaurant. The gloves had a small diamond pattern which was consistent with the diamond pattern imprinted in the dried blood stain found on the Brandons' door. Outside the trailer, just beyond the porch, there was a bottle of bleach and a “little burn pile” of charred clothing, a mop, a shoe sole, and other fabric. Three spent shell casings and a clear plastic glove which contained a pearl bracelet and a gold bracelet with multicolored stones were recovered from a gutter along the roof.

Investigators also traveled to Lumberton, Mississippi to investigate a link between Brandy and the weapon used to shoot the victims. With the help of John and Tammy Holmes and local law enforcement, investigators located the spot where John used his .380 handgun for target practice. Caddo Parish authorities excised a portion of a pine tree that had been hit by gunfire and collected spent shell casings from the ground nearby. Lt. McDonnell extracted a bullet from the tree sample and submitted it for lab analysis.

Forensic analyst and ballistics expert Richard Beighley compared the bullets and spent shell casings and concluded that: (1) the portion of the bullet extracted from Mr. Brandon's brain fit with the fragment embedded in the ceiling above him; (2) the bullet extracted from the Mississippi pine tree was fired by the same weapon, a .380 caliber, that shot Mr. Brandon; (3) the same weapon fired at least one of the bullets that yielded the shell casings recovered from the gutter at the Bruce trailer; and (4) the shell casings collected from around the pine tree in Mississippi were from the same .380 caliber weapon that produced the casings recovered from the gutter at the Bruce trailer. According to Beighley, that two of the casings from the gutter were unable to be conclusively matched with the other ballistics evidence was attributable to the fact that a .380 caliber is an inexpensive gun that variably fires with less force than is necessary to leave unique impressions on the bullet or its casing.

As to blood at the scene, DNA testing revealed that blood on the knives contained Mr. Brandon's DNA and none of defendant's DNA was detected. DNA testing of bloodstains on defendant's boots, however, revealed the presence of Mr. Brandon's DNA, with a statistical probability that it came from someone other than Mr. Brandon of one in 208 trillion. One of the shell casings recovered from the gutter at the Bruce trailer also tested positive for Mr. Brandon's DNA, with a statistical probability that it came from someone else of one in 2.26 billion.

Defendant asserted he was innocent and presented his case that he was never inside the Brandon home, the perpetrators were two white people, as Mrs. Brandon told paramedic Tommy Adams, and the shoes he wore to the police station belonged to Sean George. In support of his theory, defendant called his younger brother, Bradley Brumfield to testify. According

to Brumfield, while defendant lived near him in Tylertown between 2000 and 2002, they were roughly the same size and had a habit of sharing clothing and shoes, specifically size 10.5 or 11 shoes. Brumfield stated that he had never seen defendant wearing the size 9 boots in which he was arrested. Brumfield also stated that, the day before defendant left for Shreveport, he was helping him work on his truck's transmission and defendant cut the palm of his right hand. Brumfield also recalled that when he visited defendant in jail, defendant denied any involvement in the murder and blamed Brandy for his entanglement in the case.

Mike Brandao, a nurse practitioner who responded with paramedic Tommy Adams to transport Mrs. Brandon in the medivac helicopter, also testified. According to Brandao, Mrs. Brandon was alert enough to physically respond while on the helicopter, i.e., squeeze a hand; although, as a result of the excessive aircraft noise and the helmet he was required to wear, Brandao did not hear anything that Mrs. Brandon may have said to Adams. Brandao explained that, as a result of the noise, it is generally difficult for medical personnel to understand patients on board the helicopter.

During the penalty phase of the proceedings, following the jury's return of the guilty verdict, the state presented evidence of defendant's involvement in the unrelated murder of Terrance Blaze. The evidence indicated defendant and Brandy committed the murder together in Brandy's mother's vehicle three days after the Brandon murder. The state also presented victim impact evidence concerning how the crime affected the Brandons' friends and family. The defense offered mitigation evidence in an effort to establish defendant's intellectual disability/mental retardation. The defense also offered evidence to show he had a difficult childhood.

The jury was unpersuaded by the mitigation evidence and unanimously determined a sentence of death should be imposed.

DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS FRUITS OF ILLEGAL DETENTION

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements that were obtained from him the night of January 5, 2003, and the morning of January 6, 2003, arguing that the evidence and statements resulted from an illegal detention, and that his intellectual deficits prevented him from knowingly and voluntarily consenting to the waiver of any of his rights. Specifically, defendant sought to exclude his boots, photos of his boots, photos of his hands, two buccal swabs, his fingerprints, fingernail scrapings, his duffle bag and its contents, along with his statements that he had been with Brandy Holmes since his arrival in Shreveport, that the boots he was wearing were his only shoes, and that he was not stupid enough to walk into the station with blood on his shoes. Defendant takes issue with the means by which officers procured him and argues the Fourth Amendment proscribes his removal from a private residence and prolonged detention without probable cause. Defendant asserts the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because he did not voluntarily consent to go to the station or to the collection of his personal effects. Instead, defendant claims he acquiesced only as a result of the officers' coercive tactics, coupled with his sub-average intellect and intoxicated state.

An arrest is “the taking of one person into custody by another [through]

actual restraint [that] may be imposed by force or may result from submission of the person arrested to the custody of one arresting him.” State v. Fisher, 97–1133 (La.9/9/98), 720 So.2d 1179, 1183; La. C.Cr. P. art. 201. Whether a person has been arrested is determined by an objective test; neither the person's subjective impression nor the lack of formality of the arrest resolves the issue. State v. Thibodeaux, 414 So.2d 366, 368 (La.1982). The determination of whether an arrest occurred depends on the totality of the circumstances, but several factors distinguish an arrest from lesser infringements on personal liberty. State v. Allen, 95–1754 (La.9/5/96); 682 So.2d 713, 719. A prime characteristic of any Fourth Amendment seizure of a person is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not consider himself or herself free to leave. Id. Ultimately, whether a person has been arrested depends on circumstances indicating an intent to impose an extended restraint on the person's liberty. Id.

We agree with the trial court's finding that the interaction between defendant and the detectives does not meet the definition of an arrest or a detention. At the suppression hearing, defendant testified he only went along to the station because he felt intimidated. He testified that when he was summoned from Brandy's bedroom, Deputy Hostnick unsnapped her holster in an overt show of force and directed him to come along. In contrast, Deputy Hostnick denied ever unstrapping her holster in defendant's presence, either as a show of authority or otherwise. She stated she made no attempt to use or display her weapon and explained such an act would have been out of character, especially given that she was trained to never unstrap her holster unless she intended to use her weapon. Deputy Hostnick testified further that, at no point before defendant was arrested on the morning of January 6, 2003, did she ever tell him he had no choice but to comply. According to Deputy Hostnick, and as Detective Ward independently attested, if defendant had simply said, “I'm not going with you,” when they initially approached him inside the Bruce trailer, the officers would have left without him because they lacked probable cause to detain him at that time. As Detective Ward recalled, defendant was cooperative and did not express any unwillingness to go to the station. In Detective Ward's view, it appeared defendant came along, at least in part, because Ms. Bruce made it clear she did not want him left unattended with her grandchildren.

In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court weighed these differing accounts and found defendant voluntarily cooperated and the circumstances did not rise to a level constituting arrest or detention. The trial court reasonably rejected defendant's assertion that he went along to the station because Deputy Hostnick unsnapped her holster threateningly, in light of Deputy Hostnick's contrasting testimony denying the allegation. There is no showing that the court unreasonably credited Deputy Hostnick's testimony. Detective Ward's independent testimony corroborated Deputy Hostnick's statements indicating that at no point was defendant told he was required to comply with officers' requests. Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise forcibly restrained. He was not placed in the back of the police vehicle to be taken to the station. Rather, defendant voluntarily rode to the Sheriff's office with Captain Abraham as a front seat passenger. Based on this testimony, the trial judge reasonably determined defendant was not removed from the trailer against his will and was therefore not taken into custody at that time.

The United States and Louisiana Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; La. Const. art. 1, § 5. If evidence is derived from an unreasonable search or seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1688, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); State v. Tucker, 626 So.2d 707, 710 (La.1993). A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Thompson, 11–0915 (La.5/8/12), 93 So.3d 553, 574. One of these exceptions is consent. Id. The state has the burden of proving the consent was given freely and voluntarily. Id. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge under the facts and circumstances of each case. These factual determinations are to be given great weight on appellate review. State v. Edwards, 434 So.2d 395, 397 (La.1983). The state bears the burden of proving the admissibility of the evidence seized without a warrant when the legality of a search or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to suppress evidence. La. C.Cr. P. art. 703(D). Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress. Consequently, the ruling of a trial judge on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Long, 03–2592 (La.9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1179.

Despite the fact that defendant was not under arrest or officially detained, defendant was nonetheless advised of his Miranda rights at the station. We find no error in the trial court's finding that defendant voluntarily waived his rights. At the suppression hearing, defendant claimed he had consumed half of a “fifth” of Jim Beam and smoked marijuana during the preceding hours. He also stated, however, that he did not have any trouble understanding the questions asked of him. Moreover, Deputy Hostnick and Detective Ward both testified separately that he did not appear intoxicated and appeared to understand everything they said. The trial court pointed to defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing, wherein he acknowledged that Detective Ward read his Miranda rights to him out loud, while he followed along with a written copy, and wherein he stated that the Miranda rights were familiar to him from his previous arrests, and that he understood what Detective Ward was doing and he agreed to sign the form and talk to her. Defendant further stated he understood he had a right to be represented by an attorney. The trial court was specifically impressed with defendant's ability to relate specific facts about his case and about his prior arrests, and based on his testimony and noting his prior work history, the court found defendant was “street smart” and had at least average adaptive skills. Furthermore, in considering the totality of the circumstances, it is relevant but not dispositive that a subject has been using intoxicants. State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073, 1076 (La.1983). Similarly, evidence of intellectual disability, without more, is insufficient to show involuntariness. See Holmes, 5 So.3d at 72–73.

As to the specific circumstances in which physical evidence was collected from defendant, Detective Ward testified defendant never asked whether he had a choice in complying with the officers' requests. According to Lt. McDonnell, defendant voluntarily relinquished his boots and consented to the collection of his fingerprints, buccal swabs, and fingernail scrapings at 1:15 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., respectively. Although defendant maintains that he cooperated at the station only because he felt compelled, he conceded that he never asked whether he was free to leave, never

requested an attorney, never asked to place a call, and, up until his arrest, never invoked his right to remain silent. According to defendant, when Sgt. McDonnell asked to photograph his boots and collect his buccal swabs, fingerprints, and fingernail scrapings, he responded by asking whether he had a choice, to which he claims Sgt. McDonnell replied in the negative. In contrast, Lt. McDonnell testified that when he asked for the boots, defendant responded by stating, “you can have them, but it's the only shoes I got.” And when defendant was informed there were boots he could borrow, he “took his shoes off and held them out for [Sgt. McDonnell] to receive and put in a brown paper bag.” When pressed as to whether defendant said anything further as he gave over his boots, or at any other point during the collection of evidence, Sgt. McDonnell testified defendant stated, in a “[v]ery relaxed” and “cooperative” demeanor, “you can have anything you want.” Sgt. McDonnell denied defendant ever asked whether he had a choice to refuse to provide his boots or other physical samples. After defendant was returned to the Bruce trailer and then brought to the station a second time, he arrived carrying a duffle bag which, according to Detective Ward, he also voluntarily relinquished. In fact, by defendant's own admission, he read, understood, and voluntarily signed a written consent to the search of his bag. Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that the detective read the consent form to him, and further noted that the detective marked the form so that it specifically applied to the search of the bag.

In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial judge found defendant voluntarily consented to the collection of his personal effects. The court therefore found all evidence obtained before his arrest admissible under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The court also found that any statements made before his arrest were admissible because they were made with full understanding of his rights, as evidenced by his testimony and the waiver he signed upon arrival at the station. Nothing in the record suggests the trial court unreasonably credited Sgt. McDonnell's testimony in concluding that defendant freely and voluntarily relinquished his boots, buccal swabs, fingernail scrapings, fingerprints, and duffle bag. The trial court properly examined the voluntariness of defendant's statements, in addition to assessing whether he consented to the searches and seizures, and acted within its discretion in concluding defendant's rights had not been violated. Defendant shows no error in the trial court's ruling.

EVIDENTIARY RULINGS–EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion to Admit Evidence, seeking to admit custodial and noncustodial statements by Brandy Holmes implicating third parties other than Robert Coleman as the perpetrator in the crime. In his memorandum in support of the Motion to Admit Evidence, defendant characterized the statements as follows:

1) A pre-arrest statement to acquaintances Chris Addison, Marvin Brown, and Johnny Wright, that she killed some old people;

2) A custodial statement denying personal involvement and claiming Wright committed the murders;

3) A custodial statement that she shot Mr. and Mrs. Brandon and stabbed Mr. Brandon while defendant and Wright were both present;

4) A custodial statement that she shot both Brandons, that Wright cut Mr. Brandon, and that defendant did not participate;

5) A custodial statement that she and Wright committed the crimes while defendant was at her mother's trailer;

6) A custodial statement that Sean was not involved, that she and Wright planned the attack, and defendant “tagged along” but left saying he wanted nothing to do with it;

7) A custodial statement that she did not murder anyone;