Present PESCE
In support of its motion, defendant set forth detailed and specific reasons for its belief that plaintiff may be ineligible to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits as a fraudulently incorporated professional corporation ( see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, 4 N.Y.3d 313 [2005] ), and established that it had sought disclosure related to that defense. Defendant further established that plaintiff had failed to comply with a so ordered stipulation and two court orders wherein plaintiff had been directed to provide the disclosure. “The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial court' “ (Orgel v. Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 A.D.3d 922, 923 [2012] and Giano v. Ioannou, 78 A.D.3d 768, 770 [2010], quoting Fishbane v. Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 A.D.3d 1079, 1081 [2009];see Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 N.Y.2d 118, 123 [1999] ). Although dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party's conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith ( see Rock City Sound, Inc. v. Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 A.D.3d 685 [2011] ). In the present case, plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its repeated refusal to fully comply with defendant's discovery requests, even after agreeing to do so by so-ordered stipulation and being directed to do so by court orders, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply ( see Tos v. Jackson Hgts. Care Ctr., LLC, 91 A.D.3d 943 [2012];Rowell v. Joyce, 10 A.D.3d 601 [2004] ). We note that plaintiff's motion to stay discovery was untimely. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., WESTON and RIOS, JJ., concur.