PER CURIAM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 427,423. Welding A. Paulino, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole M. DeMuro, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Study Hall, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Welding A. Paulino appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review (the "Board") disqualifying her from unemployment benefits. We affirm.
Paulino was employed as a family worker at Study Hall, Inc. ("Study Hall") for approximately eleven years. Study Hall is a preschool that obtains funding from the State. Paulino was responsible for assisting families of children in the school by finding resources. Paulino worked on an annual contract that expired on June 30, 2013.
On the morning of April 24, 2013, Paulino was at a monthly meeting with a state agency to discuss the use of state funds. According to Paulino, during the meeting she mentioned that the school could offer a summer program because it serves lunch. Later that day, Paulino was called into the owner's office. The owner told Paulino that she had said something she should not have said. The owner told her, "I am not going to fire you . . . well, I'm not going to re-hire you because you are done here."
The next day, Paulino arrived at work and attended a meeting with the owner, the director, and two co-workers to confirm that Paulino had made the statements attributed to her the previous day. Paulino asserts that during the meeting she was laughed at and humiliated. According to Paulino, she said she was leaving work after the meeting because she did not feel well and she gathered personal items from her desk. Paulino went to a doctor the next day but did not have money to pay for the visit. She stopped at work to collect personal documents and then went home. She never returned to Study Hall after April 26, 2013. She applied for unemployment benefits that same day.
Following a telephone hearing, the Appeals Tribunal found Paulino was disqualified for benefits, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work. She appealed the denial of benefits. The Board affirmed the disqualification and also rejected Paulino's argument that the job aggravated her health, because she had not provided competent medical documentation to support the allegation. The Board similarly rejected Paulino's contention that her work environment justified her decision to leave work.
On appeal, Paulino argues that she was subject to imminent discharge and had good cause, related to her work, for voluntarily leaving due to conditions at work. Alternatively, she argues that she was effectively terminated on April 26, 2013, because on that day she knew she was not going to be offered a renewal of her contract at the end of June. She contends that her separation date should reflect her sick time.
In considering such an appeal, we pay considerable deference not only to an administrative agency's findings of fact and credibility assessments, but to its expertise as well. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). A decision of an administrative agency is disturbed only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).
After careful consideration of Paulino's contentions and the record on appeal, we are satisfied that there is adequate, substantial, and credible evidence to support the Board's determination. The Appeal Tribunal determined that Paulino left her job over 60 days before the expiration of her contract. Under the plain language of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.5, she is disqualified from benefits. Paulino's argument that her separation date should reflect her sick time is unsupported by the record. Moreover, she applied for benefits on April 26, 2013, certifying that was her last day of employment. She failed to demonstrate risk of imminent discharge or that she left due to cause attributable to work. Her remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION