Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Christopher A. Jeffreys of counsel), for appellant.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant County of Suffolk appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), dated September 17, 2010, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant County of Suffolk for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it is granted.
The defendant County of Suffolk established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not have prior written notice of a defect on a sidewalk that allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall ( see Suffolk County Charter § C8–2A; Regan v. Town of N. Hempstead, 66 A.D.3d 863, 864, 887 N.Y.S.2d 259; Koehler v. Incorporated Vil. of Lindenhurst, 42 A.D.3d 438, 839 N.Y.S.2d 539; Lysohir v. County of Suffolk, 10 A.D.3d 638, 639, 781 N.Y.S.2d 693). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Regan v. Town of N. Hempstead, 66 A.D.3d at 864, 887 N.Y.S.2d 259; Lysohir v. County of Suffolk, 10 A.D.3d at 639, 781 N.Y.S.2d 693). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the County's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
SKELOS, J.P., BALKIN, ENG and SGROI, JJ., concur.